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This thesis examines the precarious early years in Marine Corps aviation, the difficulties 
between the Americans and British before, and during the First World War and the 
integration with the Royal Air Force—all to see the positive impact of the integration on the 
future of Marine aviation. In 1912, the first United States Marine was admitted as a student 
aviator at the Naval Aviation School in Annapolis, Maryland.  Then-1st Lieutenant Alfred A. 
Cunningham sparked a movement within the seagoing service, a movement that he 
shepherded through the earliest days of military aviation into a small combat force that 
competently performed in the First World War and later solidified its existence through 
service in the interwar period of the 1920s and 1930s.  The Marine Corps’ aviation 
component suffered through competition with their Navy brethren’s desire to eliminate the 
whole Corps in the early twentieth century.  Under Cunningham’s leadership, the Marines 
arrived in France ready to perform antisubmarine warfare duty only to find themselves 
without the requisite aircraft.  It was this unfortunate event that lead to the Marines service 
with the Royal Air Force, which in turn provided the Marines with skills that were utilized 
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INTRODUCTION: 
INTEGRATION OF US MARINE CORPS AVIATION WITH BRITISH ROYAL  
AIR FORCE DURING FIRST WORLD WAR 
 
 
When the American Congress declared war against Germany on 6 April 1917, the 
United States Marine Corps (USMC) consisted of just 462 commissioned officers, 49 warrant 
officers and 13,214 enlisted men.1 While the United States Marine Corps did have trained 
pilots and mechanics in 1917, the whole of the section on 6 April 1917 consisted of just five 
officers and thirty enlisted men, and the Corps had sent its first Marine for aviation training 
just five years prior.2 To say Marine Corps aviation was in its infancy is an understatement 
indeed. However, more than thirty years later, Marine Corps aviation was robust, 
experienced, and well-equipped with men and capable aircraft such as the Vaught F4U-4 
‘Corsair’ and the Grumman F4F ‘Wildcat’ that assisted the infantry forces to march across 
the Pacific and defeat the Japanese forces.   
This transformation is rooted in the experiences of the earliest Marine aviators in the 
First World War when they arrived in France in the Summer of 1918 without aircraft and 
equipment. Despite the anti-amalgamation commander of the American Expeditionary 
Forces, General John J. Pershing, Naval—and Marine—aviation were quickly incorporated 
into the Royal Air Force (RAF) squadrons where they were given practical training and on-
the-job experience in aerial combat, antisubmarine warfare, and what is known today as close 
air support. It is asserted that if not for the amalgamation of these Marines by the British, 
Marine Corps aviation would have languished during the interwar period of the 1920s and 
1930s as it may have been viewed as a failed experiment; instead, those aviators who 
remained on active duty through this period, took their experiences with the British and 
                                                        
1 Edwin N. McClellan. The United States Marine Corps in the World War (Washington, DC: Historical Section, 
Headquarters Marine Corps, 1920), 1.  
2 Ibid., 124. 
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applied them to operations during the ‘Small Wars’ in Nicaragua, Haiti, and the Dominican 
Republic, as well as China. 
To explore this thesis, the origins of US Marine Corps and Navy aviation must be 
examined. In addition, the cooperation, or lack thereof, between the Americans and the 
British had an impact on the relations of the men within the operational squadrons stationed 
in France. Further, how Marines and their aircraft made it to France must also be examined 
before the events of the amalgamated squadrons can be discussed. The experiences of the US 
Marines while in service with the RAF left an indelible mark on the Marine Corps. Those 
experiences were passed down to the newer generations during the Interwar Period (1920s–
1930s) and subsequently the Second World War.  The few veteran Marines of the First World 
War who remained in the service took their hard earned lessons and passed them to the next 
generation and this will be explored herein. 
The Literature 
United States Navy and Marine Corps Aviation 
To understand the context of the relations between the USMC and the RAF, it is 
imperative to know how the Marines and the Navy came to create Naval Aviation in the 
United States. In late 1930, Major Edwin McClellan was stationed at Headquarters Marine 
Corps as the only Marine Corps historian. He was a prolific writer, producing many articles 
for Marine Corps Gazette covering all aspects of the Corps’ history, including aviation. Also 
stationed at Headquarters was Major Alfred A. Cunningham, and the two Marines 
corresponded regarding the early days of aviation. McClellan’s article ‘The Birth and Infancy 
of Marine Aviation,’ published in May 1931, is detailed with information that Cunningham 
provided and yet is lacking from the official records.3 The history of Marine aviation is 
intertwined with that of the Navy, and one must first understand how Marine Corps aviation 
                                                        
3 Edwin N. McClellan, “The Birth and Infancy of Marine Aviation.” Marine Corps Gazette Vol 15, No 5, (May 1931): 11-13 
and 43-44. 
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made its way on to the combat scene with the Navy, and how the Americans were accepted 
and treated by the more experienced British. Not a true separate armed service during the 
First World War, the Marine Corps was forced to procure aircraft and pilots from the US 
Navy; when Marine Corps aviation went to war, it did so under the US Navy. One would 
surmise that the Marine Corps, nearly one hundred years later, has produced an official 
history of either Marine aviation or the Marine Corps in the First World War, and despite the 
small publication of Major Edwin N. McClellan’s The United States Marine Corps in the 
World War (1920), no definitive official history of Marines or Marine aviation in the First 
World War has been published to date.4 The brief Marine Aviation: The Early Years 1912–
1940 (1977) by Edward C. Johnson, most remarkably glosses over the topic of integration 
into Naval aviation during the First World War.  
Although without a formally recognized office or title, he [Alfred A. 
Cunningham] became de facto director of aviation for the Marine Corps. In 
1917, he represented both Marine and naval aviation [sic] on the interservice 
board which selected sites for coastal air stations. He recruited men for 
Marine air units, sought missions for them to perform, and negotiated with 
the Navy, the Army, and eventually with the British for equipment and 
facilities.5 
  
Johnson may not have delved into the particulars, but his citations yield excellent 
locations for finding those missing specifics of Cunningham’s actions to get Marines to 
France. Johnson’s use of the official records is admirable, however, he uses a significant 
amount of personal interviews decades after the facts, which leaves aging minds and 
memories to tell the tales. 
Amateur historian, retired Marine, and veteran of the First World War, Roger 
Emmons was prolific in detailing the events and persons of the Marine Corps’ aviation 
contribution to the war; however, even Emmons’ material lacks any specifics regarding the 
integration of USMC aviation into the larger Naval aviation, and further lacks detailed 
                                                        
4 Edwin N. McClellan. The United States Marine Corps in the World War. 
5 Edward C. Johnson. Marine Corps Aviation,11. 
 9 
footnotes. Emmons’ two-part articles in Cross and Cockade Journal ‘The First Marine 
Aviation Force’ mentions Cunningham’s observation mission to France and subsequent 
report to the General Board, but does not give the details of Cunningham’s 
recommendations.6 Of course being articles, which are short in nature, they lack sufficient 
space to provide much in the way of specifics. Emmons’ second part of the article, which 
appeared in the following issue of the journal, ever so briefly introduces readers to the fact 
that Marines were assigned to squadrons of the Royal Air Force, starting in August 1918. It is 
true that Marines, in larger numbers, were flying with the British in August, however, 
Emmons completely overlooks those pilots who flew in June and July with the British and 
participated in combat actions over France.7 Emmons’ articles are not supported by footnotes 
so readers are left to wonder if these are the tales remembered decades after the events, 
stories that have already been hashed-rehashed, or are actually based on official records. 
Emmons appears to be far more interested in the romanticized stories of the Marine flyers in 
France, likely due to his intended audience of other First World War aviation enthusiasts. 
Noted military historian Graham Cosmas entered the foray into Marine Corps aviation 
with his 1977 article ‘The Formative Years of Marine Corps Aviation, 1912–1939’ in which, 
even he, minimizes the work put forth by Cunningham to ensure that Marines were in the air 
and the fight.  
In these hectic months, Cunningham, newly promoted to captain and with no 
official position beyond command of the Aviation Company and personality 
de facto director of Marine Aviation. He persuaded Major General Barnett 
[Commandant of the Marine Corps] to enlarge the air arm; he recruited 
officers and men for it; and he negotiated with the Navy and the Army for 
aircraft, equipment and flying fields.8  
 
Under the direction of Edwin H. Simmons, the Marine Corps Historical Program’s published 
                                                        
6 Roger M. Emmons, “The First Marine Aviation Force,” Cross and Cockade Journal (Summer 1965). 
7 Roger M. Emmons, “The First Marine Aviation Force,” Cross and Cockade Journal (Autumn 1965). 
8 Graham Cosmas, ed. Marine Flyer in France. The Diary of Captain Alfred A. Cunningham. November 1917–January 
1918. (Washington, DC: History and Museums Division, Headquarters Marine Corps, 1974), 85–86. 
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histories and other works took on an air of the ‘heroic’ style of writing; however, Cosmas’ 
sources are sound and his brief history is well supported by those sources. 
Further investigation into the histories produced by the US Navy has yielded several 
additional works produced; however, again no official history of significance or depth has yet 
been published by the armed service. A History of US Naval Aviation (1925) by Marine 
Captain W. H. Sitz is informative, but it too lacks any substantive details about integration. 
Given the opportunity to write a detailed history of how his fellow Marines were utilized in 
the air over France, Sitz relegated the Corps’ participation in the Northern Bombing Group to 
a disappointing two-sides of a single page.9 Without footnotes or a bibliography, Sitz’s brief 
history is left lacking any serious credibility. 
Lastly, ‘Combat Effectiveness: United States Marine Corps Aviation in the First 
World War’ by Lieutenant Commander Michael J. Morris, which appeared in the fall 1997 
issue of Over the Front has provided more details on the assignment of Marines to British 
Royal Air Force squadrons than all other material reviewed; even so, the information is 
limited due to the nature of the publication.10 With that said, the source material found in his 
footnotes is a rich source of material and review of this topic.  
An interesting source for photographs not commonly seen, and little more regarding 
the history of Naval aviation, is America’s First War: The United States Army, Naval and 
Marine Air Services in the First World War (2000) by naval historian Terry C. Treadwell.11 
The work, rightfully so, combines Marine Corps and Navy aviation together into a single 
chapter and again recounts the same tried and true stories of combat over France. Treadwell 
appears to dedicate far more time to the Army Air Service and the pre-war events in aviation 
                                                        
9 A. H. Sitz, A History of US Naval Aviation. (Washington, DC: Bureau of Aeronautics, Navy Department, 1925).  
10 Michael J. Morris, “Combat Effectiveness: United States Marine Corps Aviation in the First World War,” Over the Front 
(Vol 12, No 3, Fall 1997).  
11 Terry C. Treadwell, America’s First Air War: The U.S. Army, Naval and Marine Air Services in the First World War. 
(Shewsbury: Airlife, 2000).  
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than the other services and provides only a brief overview of the United States’ contribution 
to air power in the war. 
While not an official history produced by the Navy or Marine Corps, naval biographer 
Archibald D. Turnbull and public historian Clifford L. Lord’s History of United States Naval 
Aviation (1949) has yielded far more specifics and than all previous works mentioned. A 
significant number of pages detail the meetings that took place before war was declared, 
including establishing the Office of Naval Aviation under Captain Noble Irwin, and the 
British counterpart assigned to the United States.  
Secretary of the Navy’s order of March 7, 1918, made Irwin Director of Naval 
Aviation, enabling him to “draw enough water” in the administrative ocean of 
the Navy Department. Thus it became possible to hold well-organized weekly 
conferences with all the bureaus, and, as a means of stimulating inter-Allied 
cooperation, Flight Commander H. B. Hobbs, representing the Royal Air 
Force, could be invited to appear at the conferences in his official capacity.12 
  
Marines are not neglected in this book—the reconnaissance mission of Marine 
Captain Bernard L. Smith to France is detailed as well as his findings; the events of the 
Marine pilots in the Azores conducting anti-submarine patrols are not omitted nor are the 
events to secure basing locations in Great Britain and France. The book offers the impression 
of the fatherly British watching over the inexperienced Americans.  
It was from the ever-watchful British Admiralty that Sims got his first news, 
coupled with an inquiry as to this extensive planning for France while 
relatively little had been done about England. . . . It is safe to say that had 
conferences been held at the level of the high command . . . air bases in 
England and Ireland would have been chosen ahead of any bases in France, 
for supporting aerial operations against U-boats . . .13 
  
Turnbull and Lord use exhaustive sources from official documents, board reports, and 
published histories—many of which are cited herein. 
Another excellent work, which could contend for official status is the more recently 
                                                        
12 Archibald D. Turnbull and Clifford L. Lord. History of United States Naval Aviation. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
1949), 98. 
13 Ibid., 120. 
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published Stalking the U-Boat: US Naval Aviation in Europe During World War I (2010) by 
Geoffrey L Rossano.14 Far more in depth and at the operational and strategic level of warfare, 
Rossano provides details not before seen in the area of aviation integration and uses the 
records and resources in depth to support his history.  While Rossano does focus more 
heavily upon the US Navy over the Marines, what he does include regarding the Corps is far 
more than any previous publication.   Rossano partnered with aviation historian Thomas 
Wildenberg to write Striking the Hornets’ Nest: Naval Aviation and the Origins of Strategic 
Bombing in World War I (2015).15 While this subsequent work provides additional 
information related to the Corps’ involvement with the RAF and its own missions in late 
1918, very little new information is found and the citing of Rossano’s previous book in the 
endnotes is frustrating for readers. 
W. Atlee Edwards’ article ‘US Naval Air Force in Action 1917–1918’ was written at 
the behest of Admiral William S. Sims, then editor of the periodical and former commander 
in Europe. Edwards starts off with a point that still resonates today.  
It is scarcely an exaggeration to say that less is known of the activities of the 
U.S. Naval Air Force in action than any phase of America’s efforts during the 
Great War. This is, doubtless, due to two reasons: first, the work was not 
spectacular and, secondly [sic], the Armistice intervened before our air 
program had fully matured. Almost without exception accounts of air 
operations have been written for popular consumption and have, therefore, 
concerned themselves principally with the romance of the air , . . . ignoring for 
the most part of the vast amount of preliminary work, the careful planning and 
the arduous training which made these aerial fighters and their heroic exploits 
possible.”16  
 
Regrettably, Edwards starts off strong but does not support his thesis with actual 
details of the ‘preliminary work’ or ’careful planning.’ Instead, Edwards provides an 
overview of the actions of naval aviation, and the strength and distribution of German forces. 
                                                        
14 Official publication herein is defined as a publication researched and produced by historians of the government or military 
service. 
15 Geoffrey L. Rossano and Thomas Wildenberg, Striking the Hornets’ Nest: Naval Aviation and the Origins of Strategic 
Bombing in World War I. (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2015).  
16 W. Atlee Edwards, ‘The U.S. Naval Air Force in Action 1917–1918,’ United States Naval Institute Proceedings Vol 48, 
No 11 (November 1922): 1863. 
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However, Edwards recovers with a good overview of locations of air stations built, an 
extensive review of the submarine blight (Sims’ influence is easily recognized in this portion 
of the article), and the efforts of the Northern Bombing Group. Additionally, Edwards details 
the events surrounding the reassignment of the Northern Bombing Group to the RAF’s 
control.  
Although the Northern Bombing Group was originally created to exterminate the 
submarines from the coast of Belgium it eventually wound up as part of the British 
Army in the great drive of 1918, but not until after it was offered to General Pershing 
and declined on the grounds that it could be used to greater advantage where it was an 
in conjunction with the British.’17  
 
While not the thesis of the article, this line by Edwards leaves the reader wondering if 
Pershing was less inclined to take the naval aviators because of his bias against the naval 
service or because he actually thought they were better served by working with the British. 
Of course, as an article, room is limited and Edwards covered the salient points—most salient 
of all was that his patron, Admiral Sims, was seen in a positive light. 
 Overall, the literature produced about American Naval Aviation has continually 
lacked detailed information on the Marine Corps’ participation, the accomplishments made 
and those who persons who were trained by the British and contributed to the war in the air.  
The likely cause for this omission of information is likely the small nature of the Marine 
Corps’ overall contribution compared to that of the Navy, and thus overshadowing of the 
Corps’ activities by its sister service.   
While the focus remains on the integration of the United States’ Naval Aviation into 
that of the British, one must examine the attitude and feeling of the British on the American 
Army Air Service and vice versa to get a fuller understanding. Unlike the Navy and Marine 
Corps, in 1978 the Army Air Service managed to produce an official history of its service in 
                                                        
17 Ibid., 1877. 
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the First World War.18 The four-volume history is quite detailed and provides excellent 
information on the feelings of the Americans toward the British. Air Force historian Maurer 
Maurer is quite frank about the lack of trained pilots, the lack of sufficient aircraft, and the 
issues of too many allied aircraft varieties. ‘Facing the Air Service at all times was the 
newness of the aviation forces in the United States, the practical nonexistence there of 
mechanical training centers, the variety of types of foreign planes, airplanes, and tools with 
which our mechanics would have to deal, and the great amount of construction necessary in 
the American Expeditionary Force.’19 Maurer is also candid about the inferior support 
actually provided by the Americans to the British. Under the subheading of ‘Our Debt to the 
Royal Air Force,’ Maurer states: 
The assistance given by the Royal Air Force to the Training Section of the Air 
Service was invaluable. While the contribution in completely trained pilots delivered 
to the American Service was small, the value of the training given to instructors in 
methods of instruction in flying, gunnery, bombardment, navigation, and night flying 
can not [sic] be overestimated. The British officers, furnished to the Training Section 
as instructors and advisers, performed in all cases the most valuable work. The price 
paid to the British by the American Air Service for the training of American pilots, 
and the assistance rendered them through American personnel in England and their 
use of American pilots in active service on their front, were by no means 
disproportionate to the benefits received.20 
 
Maurer’s multi-volume work clearly holds up well over time. The history is solidly 
researched and the various appendices of each volume supplements the authors own words 
well. 
The first work published on the Army Air Service was printed in 1919, authored by 
Arthur Sweetser.21 Journalist, statesman, and author, Sweetser’s work was that of the 
everyman view of the First World War and later on the creation and functioning of the 
                                                        
18 Maurer Maurer, The U.S. Air Service in World War I (Vol I–IV). (Washington, DC: Office of Air Force History, 1978). 
19 Maurer, The U.S. Air Service in World War I (Vol I), 83. 
20 Ibid., 103. 
21 Arthur Sweetser, The American Air Service; A Record of its Problems, its Difficulties, its Failures, and its Final 
Achievements (New York, London: D. Appleton and Co, 1919). 
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League of Nations. His foray into aviation seems slightly out of his normal body of work 
until one realizes his service during was not limited to reporting but in the uniform of the 
American Air Service. American Air Service is an excellent overview history of the Air 
Service, and Sweetser was easily aware of the French and British desires for American aid 
and how to entice the Americans into offering themselves as fuel for the fire. ‘Both Missions 
felt free to make a strong appeal for the Air Service, not only because the only Americans 
they had seen in action were the Lafayette Escadrille fliers, but even more because they 
sensed that the imaginative appeal of air fighting would prove the best basis for asking 
American aid without seeming to be endeavoring to push us into the maelstrom.’22 
European early air power and World War I historian John H. Morrow’s The Great 
War in the Air is far more comprehensive than that of Sweetser—Morrow had the luxury of 
time and distance from the events as well as access to the many records of the belligerent 
countries’ air services in order to produce his work. Written in a chronological format and 
focusing on each country for a given year, Morrow delved deep into many archives to come 
up with an excellent comprehensive history. Morrow clearly outlines and details the varied 
personalities and internal politics, which affected American aviation and how it fought in 
France.  
At the front of the U.S. Air Service command was riven with internal rivalries, 
which the May (1918) appointment of Brig. Gen. Mason M. Patrick as chief to 
replace Gen. Benjamin Foulois did not resolve. Only when Col. Billy Mitchell 
became the top American air combat commander . . . did tensions ease.23   
 
Morrow hints at the integration of Americans and British but does not fully explore the 
relationship; as an example, at one point he states that Trenchard was Mitchell’s ‘mentor’ but 
does not explain how or in what way the relationship existed.24  The sources listed in 
Morrow’s bibliography are excellent and detailed; certainly a gold mine for anyone 
                                                        
22 Ibid., 59. 
23 John H. Morrow, The Great War in the Air (Washington, DC: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1993), 337. 
24 Ibid, 336. 
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researching the topic—sections delineate sources not only by type (primary, secondary, etc.) 
but also by country. 
 
Royal Naval Air Service, Royal Flying Corps, and Royal Air Force 
Starting with a review of the various official histories produced by the military 
historical offices of the United Kingdom published in the years after the war, one can see that 
these works have primarily focused on the creation of the Royal Flying Corps (RFC), the 
Royal Naval Air Service (RNAS) and the combination of these organizations into the Royal 
Air Force, combat operations of squadrons, the individual pilots, and the airframes flown.  
The six volume history War in the Air: Being the Story of the Part Played in the 
Great War by the Royal Air Force by Walter Raleigh and H. A. Jones spends very little time 
and energy on the details of how the Americans were integrated into British aviation, let 
alone any discussion of issues of integration.25 While this history, produced by the Air 
Historical Branch, may lack any information on the American participation in the war, or any 
descriptions of training American pilots upon their arrival in France, it does cover major 
operations, policies, and creation of the Royal Flying Corps. Another source as valuable as 
Raleigh and Jones is The Royal Air Force in the Great War (1936) produced by the Air 
Historical Branch.26 Again, as with Raleigh and Jones, the book has no mention of the 
Americans who were trained by the British; however, the work does provide plenty of details 
on the Royal Flying Corps and Royal Naval Air Service actions in the war and the 
subsequent merging of the two to create the Royal Air Force. 
The commercially published histories such as The Royal Flying Corps: A History 
(Norris, 1965), Flying Corps Headquarters (Baring, 1968), Fleet Air Arm (Kemp, 1954), Into 
                                                        
25 Walter Raleigh and H. A. Jones, The War in the Air: Being the Story of the Part Played in the Great War by the Royal Air 
Force (Vol 1-6). (Oxford: Oxford Press, 1922-1937). 
26 Air Historical Branch, The Royal Air Force in the Great War. (London: Imperial War Museum, 1936). 
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Wind: A History of British Naval Flying (Popham, 1969) and Birth of Independent Air Power 
(Cooper, 1986) are good overview histories of the RNAS, RFC, and RAF and their policies—
each work lacks any mention of Americans and their training or integration into the fight 
against the Germans and therefore are included as background sources only.27 Included in 
this general overview is Goulter’s article ‘The Royal Naval Air Service; A Very Modern 
Force,’ which appeared in the edited Air Power History: Turning Points from Kitty Hawk to 
Kosovo (2002). Goulter, as with the others, leaves out any mention of American’s integration 
or training of their pilots. Each provides the basic history for British aviation in the First 
World War but does miss the opportunity to discuss American aviation that the British 
clearly aided in building.28 
John Abbatiello’s Anti-Submarine Warfare in World War I: British Naval Aviation 
and the Defeat of the U-Boats (2006) is a product of the author’s dissertation and is an 
excellent work on the antisubmarine warfare (ASW) campaign fought by the Royal Naval Air 
Service.29 Abbatiello ensures that, while focused on the British war effort, the American 
contribution to the ASW campaign is not overlooked and additionally covers the future 
planning that had taken place in the event that the war had continued into 1919. ‘The key 
feature of the American involvement in bombing the Flanders bases was that they would 
continue the assault into 1919 alone. . . . The Admiralty welcomed the American 
contributions simply because it had no choice in the matter.’30 Abbatiello’s history fills the 
gap of knowledge on the ASW mission and honestly debunks any myths surrounding the 
number of actual U-boats destroyed during the war. 
                                                        
27 Geoffrey Norris, The Royal Flying Corps: A History. (London: Frederick Muller, Limited, 1965), Maurice Baring, Flying 
Corps Headquarters, 1914-1918. (Edinburgh, London: Blackwood, 1968), Hugh Popham, Into the Wind: A History of 
British Naval Flying. (London: Hamilton, 1969), and Malcolm Cooper, The Birth of Independent Air Power: British Air 
Policy in the First World War. (London: Allen & Irwin, 1986).  
28 Christina J. M. Goulter, “The Royal Naval Air Service: A Very Modern Force,” in Air Power History: Turning Points 
from Kitty Hawk to Kosovo, ed. Sebastian Cox and Peter W. Gray (London: Frank Cass, 2002), 51-56. 
29 John J. Abbatiello, Anti-Submarine Warfare in World War I: British Naval Aviation and the Defeat of the U-Boats. 
(London: Routledge, 2006).  
30 Ibid, 78.  
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While the histories of British military aviation, and specifically naval, do cover the 
events of the war, none provide any information on the integration of Americans, let alone 
the extensive training of pilots and mechanics nor the operations conducted together.  No 
doubt that the years of war prior to the Americans arrival left the amount of American 
participation and integration a small aspect and one easily overlooked. 
Personalities 
Early aviation history was driven by several key personalities within each branch of 
the armed services of both the United States and Great Britain. Before delving into the 
general attitudes of each country, it is necessary to review the attitudes of key men—
Frederick Sykes, Hugh Trenchard, John M. Salmond, John H. Towers, and William S. 
Sims—where the information is available; regrettably, no detailed biographies have been 
written on Alfred A. Cunningham, Mark L. Bristol, or Noble E. Irwin—American naval 
aviation pioneers. 
Of the British personalities, one begins with Andrew Boyle’s 1962 biography of 
former Commander of the Royal Flying Corps, Chief of the Air Staff and Commander of the 
Independent Air Force, Trenchard’s is one of the most biased biographies written.31 Boyle’s 
biography is flattering and not as critical of the man.  The recently published Boom: The Life 
of Viscount Trenchard—Father of the Royal Air Force (2016) by Russell Miller has the 
luxury of distance of time from the subject and provides more realistic portrait of the man, 
however still very encomiastic just not as pronounced as Boyle’s.32  Regrettably, Trenchard 
was a difficult subject as he left very few published works that illuminated his thoughts. 
More specifics on his thoughts are pending a thorough review of his personal papers.33 
Upon the arrival of Marine aviation in France, the RAF’s Chief of the Air Staff was 
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Brigadier General Frederick Sykes. US Air Force officer Eric Ash’s admirable biography of 
the man captures the bittersweet feelings of the British at the entry of the Americans into the 
war, ’The Americans had no equipment, no weapons, no ammunition, no aircraft. Hence their 
initial arrival hindered Britain’s fight against the enemy.’34 The need for manpower and 
equipment was real, however, the ability of the Americans to assuage that need was a 
delusion, and Sykes was in a quandary—how to win the air war and gain the resources 
needed from the Americans. Ash paints the portrait well:  
The link to American production was an important step into the birth of the 
RAF and IAF, but it created problems for Sykes once he assumed command. 
In the first place, the Americans failed to live up to their part of the contract 
to supply “Liberty” engines. . . . Secondly, American airmen demanded 
greater representation in decision-making and forced Sykes’ council to spend 
considerable time and effort trying to placate American interests. . . . Thirdly, 
in exchange for the American supplies that never materialized, the Air 
Ministry had agreed to organize, train and equip the American air service. 
Sykes had to contend with this drain on British resources and manpower.35 
 
Ash’s work on Sykes reinforces the notion that the relations between the Americans and 
British was complicated and strained due to the American potential for aid that were 
unrealized.  
Regrettably, the only biography of John M. Salmond, Swifter Than Eagles; The 
Biography of Marshal of the Royal Air Force Sir John Maitland Salmond (1964) is that by 
Australian-born military historian John Laffin.36 Produced while Salmond was still alive and 
far too laudatory, Laffin’s biography lacks any criticism of Salmond and the work is a 
disappointing piece from a prolific historian. 
In America’s Naval aviation circles, the power brokers were lower ranking men than 
their British counter-parts, yet just as invaluable to the war effort and combat aviation. John 
H. Towers was well known in British circles after spending much of the early years of the 
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war in London with the American Assistant Secretary of War and later as assistant Naval 
Attaché.  Naval historian Clark G. Reynold’s 1991 biography of Towers easily captures the 
frustration the pilot endured in those early years before America’s entry into the war. ‘Towers 
wrote to Bristol that “the individual officers have been fine,” but that the Royal Navy “very 
strictly enforced orders not even to talk!”’ And when he tried to arrange an inspection trip to 
Paris, the embassy sent his army counterpart instead. In fact, Britain’s lack of cooperation 
was deliberate. As Towers remembered it, ‘At first they resented the evincing, on the part of 
the Americans, of any interest in what was going on. It was their war.’37 Reynolds continues 
to show how Towers pressed forward and was not deterred by the British proverbial stone 
wall. Despite his best efforts, maybe because of them, Towers was returned to the United 
States before America entered the war and was placed in charge of the Bureau of Navigation. 
Reynolds concentrates his efforts in the years after the First World War and Towers’ struggle 
to create a strong Navy air arm in an era of battleship supremacy, which misses his 
significant role within the earliest days of American Naval aviation.  
The man in overall command of US Naval Forces in Europe was William Snowden 
Sims; despite his position of command, Elting E. Morison’s 1942 (initially published a month 
after the attack on Pearl Harbor, and later reprinted in 1968) biography of the Admiral lacks 
any perceptions, feelings or other commentary on the use of Naval aviation in the First World 
War.38 Where Morison does strike well is putting forth the friendly attitude Sims felt for the 
British and his long-standing friendship with Admiral John R. Jellicoe, and yet is lacking in 
the newly formed friendship with Vice Admiral Lewis Bayly, commander of all destroyers in 
Queensland. Morison excellently provides details on the higher-level efforts of the US Navy 
in the war, the perceptions of Americans and the British are helpful, and his bibliography is 
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detailed and very useful; regrettably, the lack of information on Naval aviation is 
discouraging. As much as Morison’s research and writing are heralded, his status as son-in-
law to Sims leaves one questioning the historian’s objectivity to the subject matter. Admiral 
Sims’ autobiography The Victory at Sea (1984) is a history of warfare on the seas and gives 
limited information on aviation used in ASW and regrettably provides little personal insights 
on numerous topics.39 
While no biography has been written of the Marine Corps’ first aviator Alfred A. 
Cunningham, Graham Cosmas edited the flyer’s diary covering the period in which 
Cunningham was on a liaison trip to England and France in late 1917 and early 1918 and 
produced the Marine Flyer in France. The Diary of Captain Alfred A. Cunningham. 
November 1917–January 1918 (1974). Often written when time was limited, Cunningham’s 
diary offers significant doses of the Marine’s complaints against the US Army administrative 
system, the weather, his desire to receive mail from his wife, but little more. While 
Cunningham does comment on the facilities and foreign officers, he does not give great detail 
or personal insight. An example is his arrival at the Army Ecole de Aviation, in Tours, France; 
he stated: ‘It is quite a big place with 10 very large wooden hangars and several Bessioneau 
canvas hangars. No flying on account of the wind. They have about 65 Caudron training 
planes and 2 Nieuport of chasse model but old. This place can be made into an excellent 
school but is in bad shape now.’40 Cosmas unfortunately did little, save for textual edits; no 
annotations or analysis of the diary entries by the Marine flyer, let alone any supplemental 
information from official records. 
There still remains significant gaps in published biographies of many significant men 
involved in the earliest days of Naval aviation, such as two war-time Directors of Naval 
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Aeronautics, Captains Mark L. Bristol and Noble E. Irwin, and the edited diary of 
Cunningham is no substitute for a solid biography.  This thesis will expand upon the areas 
lacking in the areas of early Marine Corps aviation and its pioneers through the official 
records and personal narratives of key personnel.  
 
American and British Attitudes 
The last selection of works examined was those in which the relationship between the 
United States and Great Britain could be placed in perspective and better understood; what 
were the attitudes of the two countries’ aviation and naval establishments—were they 
amenable and open about combining their efforts to defeat Germany, or was the alliance 
simply one of convenience—in the end, were the relationships advantageous to Marine Corps 
aviation?  
US Army historian David Trask lead the way into the Anglo-American relationship 
with his work Captains and Cabinets. Anglo-American Naval Relations, 1917–1918 (1972).41 
Trask’s book is an excellent high-level overview of the allied countries’ naval relations as 
America enters the war on the high seas, but does not include any discussion of naval 
aviation. Overall, he acknowledges the perception of a harmonious relationship between the 
two, but does explore that the two were often in conflict over naval strategy and policy, such 
as the American belief that the British were not forceful enough against the German U-boat.  
Years later, two well-known and respected historians delved deeper into the naval and 
aviation cooperation aspect of the relationship between the United States and Great Britain—
taking their lead from Trask. In April 1980, US naval historian Dean Allard’s article ’Anglo-
American Naval Differences During World War I’ was published by the Society for Military 
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History’s journal.42 Allard’s article, while not covering aviation, does give good perspective 
on the beliefs of the major naval players such as Admirals Sims and William S. Benson. He 
sums up the chief American interest (and therefore divide between the United States and 
Great Britain).  
A prominent theme in all these issues was the isolation of American policy 
based on national self-interest and distinctive strategic concepts. In contrast to 
the model developed by the British and Admiral Sims, Washington 
officials . . . did not believe that America’s primary role was to provide 
unqualified assistance to the Royal Navy. Instead, the United States fleet gave 
priority to establishing and supporting an independent American Army in 
France, an effort that was entirely separate from the defense of the mercantile 
convoys serving Great Britain or of the general defeat of the German U-boat.43 
 
Royal Air Force historian Sebastian Cox’s 2004 article in Air and Space Power 
Journal details the short history of integrating the US Army aviation into the Royal Flying 
Corps and its successor the Royal Air Force during World War I.44 Cox covers the issues 
over training, combat, and strategic policies—the desire for American pilots and equipment 
and the inability of American’s to provide what they promised. Despite the shortcomings of 
the American military establishment to provide the equipment and men needed (and wanted) 
by the British, the efforts of the British essentially established American aviation as a viable 
military service. ‘The links that were established during the First World War, though they lay 
dormant for two decades, were very quickly reestablished during the second great conflict a 
generation later.’45 Cox’s article is an excellent overview using previously published 
materials as extensive research in primary sources for an article of this length would have 
simply been untenable.  
Anglo-American Naval Relations 1917–1919 edited by Michael Simpson is a 
collection of documents covering the time before the United States enters the war through to 
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May 1919.46 The collected documents published are a mix of policy and operational 
documents sent between the leaders of each country, their designated ministers, and the 
military commanders in the fight. The documents are not relegated simply to the ships of the 
line and their actions, but all aspects of Naval interactions including aviation.  In the 
introduction to Part II (American Entry into the War, April to June 1917), Simpson provides 
a short, but useful overview but does not offer commentary throughout.  Another edited 
volume of the same sort is The Naval Air Service Volume I 1908–1918, edited by retired 
Royal Navy Captain and military historian Stephen Wentworth Roskill.47 The documents 
chosen, used in concert with Simpson’s edited volume, make a worthwhile contribution to the 
aviation aspects of the First World War, with excellent introductions placing the documents 
in full context. 
While the relations between the national governments and even the militaries of the 
Americans and British has been well documented and covered in scholarly publications, the 
individual interactions require exploration which will be addressed in this thesis in order to 
understand how the men of the two nations worked and fought together. 
Research Methodology 
Reviewing the personal papers collections of the key Marine Corps and Navy officers 
was essential in order to explore the integration of the air services of the US Navy and 
Marine Corps. As personal observations and thoughts are often contained within personal 
correspondence or documents retained by the individual rather than the official documents of 
the organization, the papers collections of Alfred A. Cunningham (USMC), John H. Towers 
(USN), and Roy S. Geiger (USMC) were examined. The same methodology holds true with 
regard to the integration of the Marines into to the Royal Air Force—the papers of John M. 
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Salmond (RAF), Hugh Trenchard (RAF), William S. Sims (USN) and again those of Alfred 
A. Cunningham will be examined in detail. 
A collection of records that have proven quite beneficial, and yet are often 
overlooked, are those personal military service records of US service members. In the time 
before computers and electronic records, the military service records often contain copious 
amounts correspondence, official documentation related to service, as well as key dates and 
details regarding the person’s service. Key Marines were identified for their involvement in 
the integration of US Navy and Marine aviation and therefore their records were examined—
Alfred A. Cunningham, Roy S. Geiger, William N. McIlvain, and Bernard L. Smith.  
The impact of the integration of the Marines into the RAF is important and 
identifying the number of Marines assigned to the RAF in the war is key to understanding 
how many hours were flown, how many missions, and what types of missions were flown. 
Starting with the official muster rolls of the First Marine Aviation Force, held by the Marine 
Corps History Division, the lists of names were reviewed to identify the names of the 
Marines on detached duty to the RAF during the months of August to November 1918. 
Utilizing the 217 and 218 Squadron Record Books and Record of Flying Times, the list was 
cross examined to determine the exact amount of time each Marine served with the RAF and 
if any combat missions were flown. Within the ’World War I Aviation’ Collection at the 
Marine Corps History Division is the official logbook for the First Marine Aviation Force in 
France in 1918; it too was utilized in conjunction with the information found in the records of 
217 and 218 Squadrons. A chart was compiled of the names in the appendices of the thesis. 
Lastly, in conjunction with the official records, several oral history interviews with Marines 
who served with the British will be reviewed for pertinent information. The interviews were 




It is quite clear that Cunningham’s efforts to get Marine pilots integrated into Naval 
aviation has not been thoroughly explored, nor are those specific efforts of Towers and his 
predecessors to get US Naval aviation into the fight in Europe. It seems that previous authors 
have merely skirted the issues with general statements to the facts but do not support them 
with concrete commentary. It is left to the researcher to pour through the personal papers and 
archives to glean these missing specifics. At the higher levels, such as those of men like 
Trenchard and Sims, due to their status, historians are more aware of their impressions and 
desires due to their preservation of personal papers, but lose the operational level view of the 
integration. The biographies do give readers a good understanding of these men’s positions 
and personal views on the topic. The material must be explored in order to determine the 
exact nature of the British and Marine Corps relations during their integration. 
Today, even with a separate and equal Air Force, each of America’s branches of the 
Armed Forces maintains an aviation component. The Marine Corps and the Navy each 
fiercely guard their aviation assets from budget cuts or doctrinal curtailment. Understanding 
the Corps’ infant-like entry into the First World War in the air is vital to understanding how 
and why airplanes and aviators in the modern Marine Corps remain so unwaveringly 
protected and defended and as an integral portion of the Marine Air-Ground Task Force 
concept. Without the efforts of Cunningham, whose deals behind closed doors garnered the 
Corps’ entry into Naval aviation (and thereby the war effort), the Marine Corps today would 
look and function very differently and quite possibly have disappeared from the arsenal of the 
American military establishment.  
To understand the times in which these events occurred, the relationships between the 
national governments of the United States and United Kingdom, as well as their military 
relationships is necessary and thus will be explored in Chapter One. The chapter deals with 
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the tensions that occurred between the two nations leading to the entry of the United States—
specifically the question of if the United States would ever enter the war. The tensions 
continued once the Americans entered the war, conflicts arose around the question of 
amalgamation of the US military into the British and continued throughout the remainder of 
the war.  Published personal diaries, letters and papers of key persons are utilized as well as 
official War Cabinet records to examine the relations.  
It is the goal of chapter two to explore the relationship between the US Marine Corps 
and Navy. As the chapter reveals, this relationship was wrought with conflict over mission, 
appropriations, and manpower. In order for naval aviation to function, the two had to 
collaborate and accomplish the mission together. However, various levels of the Navy 
hierarchy were convinced the Marine Corps was unnecessary; therefore, appearing to wait for 
an opportune time to attack the Corps. Despite the differences, the two naval services were 
able to create a singular air component, which will be explored in the chapter as well. 
With the Marines’ arrival in France and aircraft unavailable, the Corps had to find 
another means of completing its mission and the Royal Air Force was the means. In Chapter 
Three, the relationship between the RAF and USMC will be explored highlighting the 
specific operations of the combined 217 and 218 operations and the first independent 
operations of the Marines. This combination of British RAF and American Marines will be 
discussed in the context of the lasting impact made upon the Americans that resulted in 
doctrinal leaps in use of aviation during the Interwar period and later in the Second World 
War.   
Chapter Four will highlight an event a different aspect of the integration of both the 
RAF and USMC, through the curious case of Marine Captain Edmund G. Chamberlain, a 
pilot who experienced combat with the RAF but was later court martialed by the Americans 
for falsification of his record with the British. The Chamberlain affair allows for a window 
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into the relations of the British and Americans at the individual level, and an avenue to view 
on how Americans were received and perceived.  In Chapter Five, the lasting impact of the 
service of the Marines with the RAF will be examined.  The Marine Corps aviation during 
the Interwar period of the 1920s and 1930s will be reviewed to determine if the experiences 









Before Marine aviation could arrive in France and begin combatting the German U-
boat menace with the British, the British and American governments and military still had to 
work out their differences. Leading to the entry of the United States into the war, the years of 
relations between the two countries had not been completely amicable. It was not a forgone 
conclusion that America would enter the war, and if so, on the side of the British. This 
chapter will explore the historical relations between the two, the months leading to America’s 
decision to enter the war, and the major conflict point of military amalgamation. The 
relationship between the two nations was tenuous at best, and the fate of Marine aviation 
depended on a positive relationship between the national governments as well as the military 
leadership.  Had the points of conflict between the United States and Great Britain not been 
mitigated, the integration of the Marine Corps’ aviation component with the Royal Air Force 
would have been a non-existent event. 
To explore the tenuous nature of dealings between the two nations, this chapter will 
examine the national leadership and the military leadership of both countries by utilizing the 
published writings of President Woodrow Wilson and Prime Minister David Lloyd George 
and the published works of the military leaders General John J. Pershing and Field Marshal 
Douglas Haig. Relations within the British and American navies and specifically the aviation 
portion will be examined in chapter three. 
Interactions between the United States and Great Britain were often tense and strained 
and therefore worth an examination before delving deeper. Aiding the understanding of the 
complicated events leading to the US and British alliance in 1917 are several works covering 
events prior to the American entry into the First World War, those during the war, and those 
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since the end of the war, which are utilized in examining these events. These works include 
H. C. Allen’s Great Britain and the United States—A History of Anglo-American Relations 
1783–1952 (1969), David R. Woodward’s Trial by Friendship—Anglo-American Relations 
1917–1918 (1993), David Dimbleby and David Reynolds’ An Ocean Apart—The 
Relationship between Britain and America in the Twentieth Century (1988) and Anglo-
American Relations at the Paris Peace Conference of 1919 by Seth Tillman (2016).48 While 
not an extensive review of the relations, this chapter will examine the dealings to provide the 
historical context in which the events of 1917–1918 occurred as well as the complicated 
relations between the United States and Great Britain leading to their alliance.  
Historical Context 
The relations between the United States and Great Britain do not start with the 
coalition force created in 1917; they are, however, impacted by the previous fourteen decades 
since the Americans broke with the British during the American Revolution. To understand 
the interactions between these two nations during the First World War, one must also 
examine their dealings and interfaces in the many decades leading to their alliance in the war. 
The relationship between these two countries was one born of revolution, forged through 
conflict and ultimately one of strained partnership in 1917–1918.  
The relationship between the United States and Great Britain was a complex one 
starting with the American Revolution in 1775, when the Americans rejected the distant 
British rule without representation. While not initially a revolution for independence, rather 
one of the ability to participate in their government, the Colonists eventually realized that due 
to distances and unique struggles of the North American lifestyle, they had grown apart from 
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their brethren across the Atlantic and separation was the only answer.49 The new American 
nation and the older British Empire emerged from nearly a decade of warfare as separate and 
distinct countries; however, their shared history, linked through the Atlantic and borders in 
common continued to draw them into political intrigues and even war as the decades 
progressed.50  
Despite the end of the American Revolution in 1783, the British and the new nation 
were once again in conflict less than three decades later; the chief cause of disagreement was 
the impressment of American merchant sailors by British privateers. Unwilling to allow the 
British to return any Americans to subjugation, the United States declared war in June 1812. 
The war remained the singular focus of the young American nation, while Great Britain 
continued to remain more focused on the Napoleonic War on continental Europe. Despite the 
lack of sole attention on the Americans, Britain was able to burn the American capital and 
earn several victories over the United States; the Americans also struck several blows against 
British naval vessels, but in the end the war ceased in stalemate with the Treaty of Ghent just 
three years later.51 The early history of these two nations started bloody and combative. 
The American Civil War erupted and pitted the industrial northern states against the 
agricultural southern states; the same southern states that produced the cotton that kept the 
mills in England well supplied.52 Complicating matters internally for the British was the need 
for cotton and that the British banking investments in the large southern plantations drew the 
British toward the Confederate cause, and yet, the abolitionist movement of the north (funded 
in part by residents of Great Britain) pulled public opinion in the opposite direction. 53 The 
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British found it difficult to create stable and equal policy toward either belligerent’s cause. 
Great Britain did ultimately actively support the Confederacy during the war, and after the 
Union victory in 1865, the Americans directed their ire toward the British claims of raids 
upon American shipping during the war, culminating in 1871 when the Treaty of Washington 
was signed.54 The first one hundred years of international relations between the British 
Empire and the United States certainly did not bode well for the next hundred years; 
however, fortunes began shifting with the times. 
The two nations left the Gilded Age and were thrust into the first world-wide war of 
the new century. As post-war industrialization created new millionaires in the upper classes 
of American society, the two nations drew closer together, and the new wealth of the former 
colony even began to intermarry with the old nobility of the empire.55 The two were on the 
friendliest terms in their mutual history, and yet still struggled as the war waged on. While 
the United States remained neutral through nearly three years of the war, it was not 
completely out of the European affairs.  
As British financial resources were increasingly drained by the war, its dependence 
upon the United States increased. The British relied heavily upon the financial backing of 
loans from the United States as well as materiel supplies from the Americans. This 
dependence upon the Americans was discussed in the War Cabinet in November 1916 as a 
Treasury memorandum was circulated detailing the depth to which the Americans supported 
the British. The concerns regarding remaining favorable with the Americans lest they end 
their support, or dictate British actions were included. ‘It is hardly an exaggeration to say that 
in a few months’ time the American executive and the American public will be in a position 
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to dictate to this country on matters that affect us more nearly than them.’56 The British 
acknowledged that the United States held the power in the relationship and that it behooved 
them to remain on good terms as well as to continue to make progress on the military front as 
well to show that Britain remained a good investment. 
It is readily apparent that the United States’ and Great Britain’s relationship has been 
one of complications since it began. While united by a shared history, common language, and 
religion, the years of separate sovereignty often overruled their commonalities and as the war 
proved, even allies often are not allied in their desires and thinking thus causing friction. Two 
major stress points that caused the tension between the two were the slow decision of the 
United States to enter the war, and once entered, the disagreement between the two on how 
their militaries would specifically operate with one another. 
National Relations: Will the United States Enter the War? 
As demonstrated, the relationship between the US and Great Britain was not as strong 
as the post-First World War and thus conflicts may have derailed the American entry 
altogether.  These points of tension are explored herein. When war broke out in Europe in the 
last days of July 1914, American President Woodrow Wilson made clear that the United 
States would remain neutral and not be drawn into the affairs of Europe; less than a month 
removed from the first shots fired, Wilson issued a Presidential Proclamation in which he 
acknowledged the many nationalities that made up Americans and that each person may have 
loyalties elsewhere across the Atlantic. On 18 August 1914, the president implored his fellow 
citizens to hold fast against the tide of sentimental and familial desires to join the war in 
Europe stating: “The United States must be neutral in fact as well as in name during these 
days that try men’s souls.”57 The United States’ neutrality was a major point of strain on the 
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relations between it and Great Britain and as the United States was drawn more into the 
events in Europe, its neutrality remained a major concern for the Allies. Even as a number of 
American lives were lost, and political intrigues increased, the American president remained 
steadfast in his conviction of keeping his nation out of the European war. This thesis will 
demonstrate how American neutrality was a major source of anxiety for its relations with 
Great Britain. 
Later that year, Wilson dispatched his envoy Colonel Edward M. House to Great 
Britain with the goal of bringing about peace between the belligerents. Then-Minister for the 
Exchequer, later Munitions Minister and subsequently Prime Minster, David Lloyd George 
recalled House’s visit in 1914. House visited in a ‘role of disinterested and benevolent 
adviser, to urge a better understanding between everybody and everybody else.’58 The two 
countries were diametrically opposed in their ultimate desires for the outcome of the war. As 
his war memoirs point out, Lloyd George and the Allies were aware that America was torn in 
her support of one side over the other due to large populations of German-Americans and old 
sentimental leanings toward the French and a slow-to-blossom friendship with Great 
Britain.59 President Wilson described his own reason for remaining neutral as a matter of 
keeping the United States a separate sovereign nation in the world—he feared that if 
embroiled in the war, his nation would lose its singular identity. In his February 1916 letter to 
Senator William J. Stone, Wilson made this case:  
What we are contending for in this matter [avoidance of war] is of the very 
essence of the things that have made America a sovereign nation. She cannot 
yield them without conceding her own importance as a nation and making 
virtual surrender of her independent position among the nations of the world.60 
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As the war continued, the president remained rooted in his neutral principles, and yet 
he attempted to broker peace between the warring nations. In early December 1916, the 
German Government issued an offer of peace via the United States. While a politicized and 
controversial memoir, the writings of David Lloyd George offer a limited view into the mind 
of the leader of Great Britain before America’s entry into the war.  David Lloyd George 
recounted the events within his War Memoirs; without Germany’s acceptance of its 
culpability for the war, peace was unlikely. On 18 December 1916, it was agreed that a 
response to Germany would be sent via the United States; the response was to refute the 
unwillingness of the Germans to accept their responsibility for the war and yet offer general 
terms for peace without specifics.61 Wilson provided the Germans the British response and 
offered additional commentary, which continued to reveal his desire not to be fully engaged 
in the war, let alone its end. In his response to the Germans, Wilson stated that he was not 
proposing peace, not even offering to mediate a peace, but simply wishing to facilitate it.62 
Peace was as close in December 1916 as it had ever come, and yet Wilson remained steadfast 
in his determination to keep the United States out of European affairs. However, the use of 
Wilson as the intermediary for peace between the Allied and Central Powers, Lloyd George 
believed, drew the United States closer to the Allied cause. ‘There is no doubt that the Allied 
answers to the German and Wilson Note favourably impressed American public opinion, and 
there was a perceptible change in the atmosphere across the Atlantic from that date.’63 
Instead of accepting the chance for peace, Germany chose to continue to fight in the 
hopes for outright victory. Despite the German decision not only to reject peace, but to 
resume unrestricted submarine warfare, Wilson remained reluctant to ask Congress to declare 
war. In his 3 February 1917 address to Congress, Wilson asked only for the break of 
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diplomatic ties with Germany and not a declaration of war. He refused to believe Germany 
was so against the United States. ‘I can not [sic] bring myself to believe that they [Germany] 
will indeed pay no regard to the ancient friendship between their people and our own. . .’64 
Despite the break of diplomatic ties with Germany, the United States did not join the war.  
The British continued to haemorrhage men and materiel; hundreds of thousands of 
tons of shipping losses in February alone meant that without a rapid change in the situation—
either the addition of the United States on the side of Great Britain or the outright defeat of 
Germany—Great Britain would starve and thus be defeated in rapid succession.65 No doubt, 
the delay in American active response to the aggressive Germans left the British leadership 
with concerns about any American participation and strained relations further. The records of 
the Imperial War Cabinet reflect the increasing concerns of the lack of manpower to fight the 
war and the efforts to draw more from Canada, and yet the need to leave enough men behind 
to protect the thirty-five hundred mile frontier and against the large number of enemies 
against the British living in the United States.66 
Lloyd George’s own words about Wilson’s lack of effort to even prepare for the 
possibility of war easily expose his feelings of disdain for the Americans; he remarked that 
the president’s refusal to consider entering the war was no longer based on reality, rather ‘an 
article of religious faith’ and detached from reality.67 Interestingly enough, Lloyd George’s 
memoir does not mention the frustration that must have been felt by the British as tons of 
shipping was lost while the American president continued to wait for an overt act by 
Germany; the Prime Minister’s memoir directs his commentary toward the lack of 
preparedness by the American’s during this waiting period. ‘Had those two months been 
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utilized for preparation, the American Army would have been adequately represented in the 
trenches in France at the end of March 1918.’68  
The overt act that the British thought would trigger the entry of the United States 
seemingly appeared in mid-January 1917. On 17 January, the British code breakers of Room 
40 intercepted the German foreign secretary Arthur Zimmermann’s telegram to the Mexican 
government.69 The Germans informed the Mexican government that unrestricted submarine 
warfare would resume on 1 February and Mexico should consider an alliance with Germany 
in order to neutralize the United States. Further, the telegram included ‘Germany’s promise to 
assist Mexico “to regain by conquest her lost territory in Texas, Arizona, and New 
Mexico.”’70 The delay that occurred between the decryption of the telegram and the 
notification of the Americans was caused by the time it took to decipher the encrypted 
message, and also the concern that the German’s would find out that their codes had been 
broken. However, the delay between the notification of the American’s on 27 January 1917, 
and the American declaration of war on 6 April, most certainly was frustrating for the British. 
Considering the British turned over the most damning of documents, it is quite likely they 
held high hopes of an immediate declaration of war by the United States, and yet more than a 
month passed before such action. In fact, such was the belief of the British chief code 
breaker, William Reginald ‘Blinker’ Hall. As the American press broke the story, Hall 
reached out to the British Naval Attaché in New York, Captain Guy Gaunt in order to begin 
opening channels of communication with the US Chief of Naval Operations. Gaunt informed 
Hall that such planning was premature.71 
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The American process for declaring war is not a simple one; the president does not 
declare war, Congress does. In 1917, relations between the president and Congress were 
tenuous at best; Congress contained a large percentage who were isolationists and obtaining 
any war declaration—despite the inflammatory nature of the telegram—was not a forgone 
conclusion.72 On 2 February 1917, British Ambassador to the United States, Sir Cecil Spring 
Rice wrote to Foreign Secretary Arthur J. Balfour that progress toward peace—either by 
negotiations or American military involvement—was being made. His tone was optimistic; 
however, two weeks later his tone was subdued as Congress was slow to act and seemingly 
content to continue delaying actions.73 Congress’ multiple factions continued to stress the 
situation with its debates. The pro-isolationist faction of the lower chamber fought against the 
interventionists over the perceived notion of British interference with American neutrality. As 
stated, quite aptly, by Thomas Boghardt, ‘the telegram failed to become a unifying factor.’74 
As the American Congress continued to debate itself on the necessary actions, the 
Germans continued to inflict shipping losses in the Atlantic. On 12 March 1917, the 
American cargo ship Algonquin was sunk off the coast of Great Britain; that same day the 
Germans sank three other American-flagged ships.75 While it was eventually the continued 
loss of shipping that forced the Americans into the war, the Americans response remained too 
slow and perplexing to the British. Spring Rice’s exasperation poured into his 23 March 1917 
letter to Balfour.  
Opinion was considerably shocked by the sinking of the “Algonquin,” and the 
public were prepared to consider it as the “overt act.” It required, however, the 
sinking of three more American ships . . . really to arouse the public and the 
Administration.76 
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Wilson requested and obtained a declaration of war against Germany, which was 
granted by the Congress on 6 April 1917. Stephen Gwynn, editor of Spring Rice’s letters, 
captured what the ambassador must have felt upon hearing of the declaration—the frustration 
and anxiety lifted from years of waiting for the eventual American entry into the war. ‘His 
[Spring Rice’s] difficult task had been to watch and wait . . . to refrain from counting with 
certainty and prematurely on American help.’77 With the entry of the Americans, there was 
likely a deep sigh of relief initially; however, the American entry into the war provided only 
little ease to the minds of the British. Quite simply, the American army was not ready for war 
on the scale of that of the Western Front. 
Military Relations: Amalgamation  
Despite overcoming the initial friction of the American entry into the war, points of 
conflict continued between the two nations and threatened the newly formed alliance.  The 
strained relations at the national level of both countries were only stressed further as the 
United States entered the war in April 1917, and the two armies were to come together 
against Germany, because of the topic of amalgamation. For this purpose, amalgamation is 
defined as the idea that American soldiers were to be trained by the British and subsequently 
drafted into the British Army. The suggested course of action, amalgamation, was presented 
to the Americans nearly as soon as they entered the war; and, as will be discussed, became 
the next major source of strain on relations between the United States and Great Britain. It is 
not the intent of this thesis to argue for or against amalgamation, rather to show that it was a 
major conflict point for the two nations. 
The British believed, and understandably so, that the American military was simply 
not going to be ready enough to fight a war and that adding an additional area of 
responsibility along the Western Front would effectively cause a weak point in the line at 
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which the Germans could easily penetrate. When the United States entered the war, it did so 
with a Regular Army numbering just 5,791 officers and 121,707 enlisted, and no division 
sized formations. Mobilizing the National Guard was required, and yet that did not bring the 
Army up to full-strength.78 The American military establishment barely had regiments, let 
alone larger organizations such as brigades, divisions, corps, or field armies. The number of 
skilled, prepared, and trained senior officers necessary for staff and command duties was 
equally abysmal. Of the 5,791 regular officers on active duty in April 1917, only 379 had 
completed command and staff education.79 The forces with the most combat experience 
within the American military were within the US Marine Corps and elements of the Army 
itself. The Marine Corps, while numbering just over ten thousand officers and men, had 
gained valuable combat experience in China, the Philippines, and the Caribbean in the fifteen 
years leading to the outbreak of war in Europe.80 The Army had witnessed its share of 
combat in China and the Philippines just as the Marine Corps; however, the Army and 
National Guard forces that participated in the Punitive Expedition in Mexico against Poncho 
Villa in Mexico fought only the heat, insects, and drillmasters.81 The British were correct to 
be worried that the United States would be unable to field its own fighting force. Therefore, 
having additional manpower simply folded into their forces, which were already organized 
and experienced, made the most sense to the British, and thus they pressed the Americans to 
adopt the policy of amalgamation.  
In April 1917, the Allied Missions arrived in the United States; the British Mission 
under Arthur J. Balfour was ready with the plan for amalgamating the Americans into the 
British Army. Major General George Tom Molesworth ‘Tom’ Bridges informed the 
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American Army Chief of Staff, Major General Tasker Bliss that the best way Americans 
could help was to send five hundred thousand untrained men immediately to England where 
they would be trained and drafted into the British Army.82 The British were expecting very 
little from the Americans, in fact Lloyd George stated in May 1917:  
It is upon the shoulders of France and Great Britain that the whole burden of 
the war rests. . . . America is still an unknown. We must not count upon her 
aid in a military way for a long time to come.83 
 
The appearance that America was in the war in name only certainly caused stresses on the 
relations between the two nations. The Americans, particularly Pershing, understood the 
British position. He noted in his memoir that he knew the British worried the American 
forces were not to be sufficient enough to impact the war but also suspected there was more 
to British motives. Pershing felt the Allies, the British in particular, saw the Americans as a 
necessity to win the war, but looked up on them as late arrivals after so many years of simply 
playing witness to the devastating war.84 The United States, feeling desired strictly for 
manpower and supplies, it is understandable that the Americans remained wary of their new 
allies’ intentions. Pershing clearly states this feeling in his memoirs: ‘Our belief in the 
existence of such an attitude on the part of the Allies naturally stirred in our minds a feeling 
of distrust, which was emphasized, and which, therefore, continued to be a factor in all our 
relations up to the end.’85 
Just days after the American declaration of war, the British War Cabinet began 
outlining the ways in which the Americans should be asked to render assistance. As outlined 
in the War Cabinet meeting minutes of 9 April 1917, the British were not only in need of 
American wheat, steel, shipping, and shipbuilding, but they had detailed plans for American 
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troops. Of course, the ultimate desire being for the immediate receipt of large numbers of 
American forces at brigade strength at least, but lesser requirements also being that as many 
trained Americans as necessary for an advanced force ready in France by August/September 
for service in a quiet sector and of course, the possibility of Americans serving as drafted 
recruits in the British, Canadian, or French Army outright.86 Amalgamation, whether as 
individual recruits within the British military, or larger units trained and in service under 
British command, remained a thorny issue between the new partners. 
While retaining national identity was a major factor against amalgamation for the 
Americans, Pershing was keenly aware of what he perceived as failures by the British. Upon 
arrival of the British Mission in the United States, Major General Bridges outlined his 
proposal for the Americans. Bridges stated that the Americans would be trained in the 
English depots and then drafted into the British Army—the training consisted of just nine 
weeks in England and an additional nine days in France. During Pershing’s early days in 
England, he visited British training camps, watched the men demonstrate an attack, guard 
against gas, and fight in the trenches. His keen eye noted that most of the men he watched 
were unfit for duty on the front due to wounds or illness. Pershing further noted that many 
British officers realized that the period of nine weeks’ training for recruits was 
insufficient, but such preparation was for trench warfare only. Much to my 
surprise, they gave little thought to the possibilities of open warfare in the near 
future, if at all.87  
 
Maintaining the health and survivability of one’s forces was at the forefront of Pershing’s 
mind and if that meant remaining a separate and distinct force, then it must be.   
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On 20 July 1917, Pershing finally met with Field Marshal Haig, commander of the 
British Expeditionary Force—his counterpart within the British military.88 Haig’s own papers 
lack any detailed commentary on his impression of America’s entry into the war; however, 
from April to July, Haig was undoubtedly consumed with the major battles that took place at 
Arras, Vimy Ridge, and the major offensive planned for Passchendaele. Interestingly, both 
men comment in their respective personal documents regarding their initial meeting; 
however, Haig limited simply to stating that Pershing is unlike the typical American.89 
Pershing, though, provides more details regarding the meeting of the two great men. While he 
does not specifically comment upon amalgamation, or if it was even discussed, Pershing does 
realize that the relationship between the French and British had not been one of complete 
unity.90  
A proponent of open warfare, Pershing remained critical of the Allies’ efforts on the 
Western Front and the great loss of life in battles of attrition. It is easy to understand just why 
the idea of placing American men under British command was so odious to him.  
The theory of winning by attrition . . . , which was evidently the idea of the 
British General Staff, did not appeal to me in principle. Moreover, their army 
could not afford the losses in view of the shortage of men which they, 
themselves, admitted.91 
 
To Pershing, if the British were seemingly willing to allow the continued war of attrition, 
then it seemed logical that placing Americans into direct control of the British was 
undesirable.  
Compounding the problem and adding to the strain between the Americans and 
British was the shipping complication—over the months of May, June, and July 1917, more 
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shipping was lost in the Atlantic than was reaching Europe. Pershing had received reports 
from American Naval Commander Admiral Sims that based on the attrition rate, ‘there would 
soon be insufficient Allied shipping left to bring over an American army . . . and that the 
Allies would find it difficult to keep up their supply . . . necessary to carry on the war.”92 The 
need for American bodies in the British military was critical to continue to battle the 
Germans but without sufficient shipping to ensure the flow of those Americans, the war’s 
conclusion was drawing near. With these issues, among many others, weighing on his mind, 
it is not hard to understand why Haig was desirous of amalgamation and eager to have 
American men in the fight. As the British continued to press Pershing on amalgamation, they 
also continued to stress that they were already bearing the majority of the burden. In their 
January 1918 War Cabinet meeting, they requested amalgamation once again, with a 
reminder that they were ‘maintaining nearly the whole of the maritime transport of our 
European allies.’93 
In late spring 1918, the Germans launched a major offensive on the Western front 
dubbed ‘Operation Michael’, in which they advanced forty miles in eight days, managed to 
capture seventy thousand British prisoners, and decimate a number of British divisions.94 
This offensive, while not an outright victory for Germany, it exacerbated the internal strife 
between Lloyd George and Haig, each blaming the other for the failures on the field of battle. 
In addition to placing blame on Haig for his perceived failures in the latest German offensive, 
Lloyd George additionally blamed President Wilson for his inaction and seeming indifference 
to the urgency of the war. With a sense of urgency and because of the several combat 
divisions made ineffective by the German offensive, the Prime Minister returned to placing 
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pressure on the Americans for more forces.95 On 28 March 1918, Lloyd George appealed 
directly to President Wilson requesting one hundred twenty thousand men per month between 
the months of April and July, which would be brigaded with the British.96 Wilson again 
provided a qualified approval to send what was possible but left the final disposition of 
American troops to Pershing, and thereby frustrating the British once again with an apparent 
lack of understanding of the severity of the need for Americans. The convoluted method of 
decision making within the United States surely left the British frustrated; requesting troops 
or brigading of troops via the Balfour Mission to the president, or through their ambassador 
or even directly to the president never seemed to receive clear and concrete responses. No 
matter the channels through which the requests were made, the question of amalgamation was 
always deferred to Pershing.  
By the 1 May 1918 Supreme War Council meeting, the United States had managed to 
place 23,548 officers and 406,111 enlisted men in France under the structure of four 
divisions.97 Despite the number of American combatants in France, during the meeting on 1 
May, Haig criticized Pershing for lack of understanding regarding the critical nature of the 
war and the British. Haig derided Pershing as ‘very obstinate, and stupid,’ and that Pershing 
‘did not seem to realise the urgency of the situation.’98 However, as the summer of 1918 
progressed, more Americans arrived and divisions were formed, trained, and readied for the 
front under the British.99   During this time, Haig and Pershing agreed that Americans would 
only serve as reserves if the situation were dire enough to require their employment.100 This 
agreement, dubbed the London Agreement was Pershing’s only concession to the 
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amalgamation question. Pershing’s decision only to allow for emergency usage of the 
American divisions ‘undercut Haig’s plan to use American replacements to restore his 
shattered divisions.’101 Friction between the British and Americans continued as the issue of 
amalgamation did not simply go away; rather it transitioned from the idea of individual 
American soldiers being trained by, and thence melded into British units, into the reluctant 
desire of the British to amalgamate whole American divisions. Despite the minor change in 
the British position, American leaders remained steadfast in their desire to build and fight 
with an all-American Army. 
Relations between the United States and Great Britain continued to be tested—in 
August 1918 when King George V visited the front lines and decorated members of both 
countries’ forces. During an informal meeting between Pershing and the king on 12 August, 
the monarch made it clear he was eager to have as many as Americans as possible ‘serve with 
the British Army’ and further suggested American forces should use the port of Dunkirk to 
hasten the flow of soldiers to the British area of responsibility.102 The two continued 
conversing with regard to the friendly relations between the nations and the desire to continue 
the positive interactions, but it was clear that the amalgamation issue had not been resolved.  
After meeting with the King, Pershing immediately met with Haig regarding the 
latter’s plan for removing several American divisions from the British in order to begin 
creating the all-American army. Haig attempted to sway Pershing away from the decision by 
stating that withdrawing the American divisions would cause criticism ‘from the British 
troops in the field but also from the British Government.’103 Pershing’s response was firm 
and clear: ‘I reminded him [Haig] of our agreement that these troops were at all times to be 
under my orders and that while they had been placed behind his armies for training they were 
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to be used there in battle only to meet an emergency.’104 While firm with Haig, Pershing 
understood the feelings of the Field Marshal; he understood the losses that had been 
experienced by the British, the non-stop combat and that defeat was never far away.105 
Despite the seemingly cordial attitude of both men after the conclusion of the meeting, Haig 
was clearly still dismayed about the removal of the Americans as he recorded in his published 
papers on 25 August. ‘What will History say regarding this action of the Americans leaving 
the British zone of operations when the decisive battle of the war is at its height, and the 
decision is still in doubt!’106 Pershing lashed out at the British as well stating, ‘due to 
differences in national characteristics and military systems, the instruction and training of our 
troops by them [the British] retarded our progress.’107 Despite the progress of the war in the 
favour of the Allies, the Americans and British remained at odds with one another regarding 
the use of American troops. Rufus Isaacs, 1st Marquess of Reading, British Ambassador to 
the United States visited Pershing in Paris in early September and seemingly attempted to 
force Pershing’s hand regarding amalgamation. While the two discussed shipping, and the 
increase in British shipping for American usage, Lord Reading seemingly hinted that the 
increase was dependent upon ‘a greater proportion of our troops for service with their 
armies.’108  
Less than two months later, the hostilities ended; the need for Americans to buttress 
the British forces ceased. The focus of efforts and energies was placed upon the competing 
desires for how peace would be accomplished, what reparations were to be, and which 
country or empire would remain after November 1918. The amalgamation issue disappeared 
the moment the fighting ceased. The Allies—British, French, and Italian—all had desires for 
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American forces. While the relations were strained, and at times even veiled hostility, the 
Americans and the British managed to work together with the other allies to defeat the 
Germans.  
Conclusion 
While the United States looked upon the First World War as a European War, the 
Allies increasingly drew the Americans into the intrigues with requests for supplies of food, 
munitions, and equipment. As the events in Europe spilled into a global war, notably due to 
Germany’s unrestricted submarine warfare and attempt to lure Mexico in against America, it 
was no longer possible for the United States to remain oblivious and neutral. Despite these 
factors, the Allies were held in a state of uncertainty for nearly two months while the United 
States continued seemingly to debate the matter before declaring war. It seemed as if the 
Americans were simply waiting to see which side would fail before entering the war, all of 
which strained relations between the two nations. 
Once the Americans joined the Allies, the concern shifted to how American forces 
could most effectively be utilized. Both the United States and Britain were aware that 
America’s military was severely understrength, untrained, and ill-equipped for a war on the 
scale of the Western Front. The war had already taken its toll on the British; the resumption 
of unrestricted submarine warfare by the Germans saw the rise in the amount of shipping sent 
to the floor of the ocean along with the much needed supplies, not just weapons and 
munitions but basic sustenance. British survival was at stake if events did not turn in their 
favour rapidly.  
Much to the chagrin of the British, the American entry into the war was not the 
desired blessing, and this caused further anxieties for the British. The British deemed 
amalgamation of American men into the British army as the most logical and rapid solution 
to their manpower shortages. However, the American desire to remain a separate and 
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independent power was in direct contravention to the British wishes. It is true that the 
American military was sorely unprepared for the war in Europe; however, despite the slow 
start, the United States did manage to field sixty-five infantry divisions and an additional 
cavalry division under the command of nine corps with strength of about two million men.109 
Ultimately, while the American army did form an independent force, and served on its own 
front, men of the 27th and 30th Divisions (II Corps) served directly with the British. In the 
fifty-seven days the 27th Division served on the front, it suffered 8,334 killed, and wounded 
and in the sixty-nine days the 30th served on the front, it suffered 8,415 killed and 
wounded.110 Notwithstanding initial fears that Americans would not fight, these men did and 
made the ultimate sacrifice just as their British counterparts had. 
Oddly, as the American Army commander fought against amalgamation, the US Navy 
and the British Royal Navy were to become quite intertwined. The earliest days of strain and 
distrust between the two nations were seemingly forgotten as the American Navy, replete 
with its aviation contingent, arrived in Europe.  However, the creation of American Naval 
Aviation, a combination of Navy and Marine Corps aviation components, was another point 
of stress which may have had an impact on future integration with the Royal Air Force., and 
therefore is discussed in Chapter 2.   
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Chapter Two 
BUILDING RELATIONSHIPS:  
UNITED STATES NAVY AND MARINE CORPS AVIATION 
 
In the earliest days of Marine Corps aviation personalities shaped the institution. It 
was through the strong management and personal connections, combined with the fortuitous 
assignments of the early Marine aviators such as Alfred A. Cunningham, Bernard L. Smith 
and William M. McIlvain that made the Corps able to establish an effective combat aviation 
element. These men, despite the contradictory efforts of key Naval personnel to abolish the 
Marine Corps just four years earlier in 1908, forged relationships, made the most of their key 
billets, and pressed their forward-thinking ideas ahead at a time when the Marine Corps was 
not even sure it needed or wanted aviation. The early aviators, under Cunningham’s dynamic 
leadership, had to contend with old rivalries with the Navy and were not only able to 
establish an aviation section within the Marine Corps, but also prove its worth against the 
submarine menace, establish its combat effectiveness over land, and support combat ground 
forces all in less than a decade.  
This chapter will examine the relationship between the US Navy and Marine Corps 
aviation in the years leading up to America’s entry in the First World War and before they 
were solidified into the singular Naval Aviation.  Before exploring the relationship between 
the RAF and USMC aviation, it is necessary to understand how American Naval aviation 
came into existence and the tensions between the two sea services. To examine this 
relationship it is imperative to understand that it was not always simple or unified—years of 
complex political and fiscal conflicts had predated naval aviation. Years in which many 
prominent members of the Navy and powerful politicians attempted to marginalize, and 
outright abolish, the Marine Corps had fractured the Navy Department’s two armed services. 
This splintering was but one of several attempts by officials of the Navy, US Army, and 
legislators to disband the Marine Corps, leading to institutional paranoia within the Corps, 
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which will be explored further in the chapter. Further, this chapter will determine how the 
Marine Corps started its own air component despite its well-established mission of ship-born 
detachments, landing parties, and garrison protection at shore-based barracks, as well as how 
it came together with its rival service to create a singular aviation asset overcoming the 
animosity toward, and bias against, the Marines by US Navy officers.  
Institutional Paranoia: The Struggle to Retain a Marine Corps 
It is suggested that inherent within the Marine Corps is an institutional paranoia, 
which drives the organization and its leadership to continually remain vigilant against outside 
forces which would seek to dismantle it.  In his 1984 autobiography First to Fight, retired 
Marine Lieutenant General Victor H. Krulak summed up the trait of the Marine Corps that 
has been present since its earliest days. Krulak distilled the underlying thought of the 
collective Corps well: ‘Beneficial or not, the continuous struggle for a viable existence fixed 
clearly one of the distinguishing characteristics of the Corps . . . paranoia.’111 A character 
trait carried by many Marines, paranoia began when the first blow was struck to disband the 
Marine Corps, less than two years after the reestablishment of the Corps.112 Krulak’s history 
of the Marine Corps’ struggle for survival centres on paranoia and is required reading for all 
Marines, ensuring that Marines remain ever mindful of their services’ fragility. Krulak used 
the first battle between the Navy and Marine Corps as a prime example: 
One articulate spokesman for those in the Navy antagonistic toward the 
Marines was Captain Thomas Truxtun [sic], variously of the frigates 
Constellation and President. Holding strong views on the propriety of a 
limited and subordinate posture of Marines at sea, he did not hesitate to cross 
swords with the Marine commandant and the secretary of the navy. In 1801 he 
said, “It is high time that a good understanding should take place between the 
sea officers and Marines and that an end be put to their bickerings. If this 
cannot be done it may be thought best to do without Marines in ships of the 
U.S. by adding and equal number of ordinary seaman to the crew of each 
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ship.” He made his views plain on rank and precedence, too. “The fact is, the 
youngest sea lieutenant in the Navy takes seniority over the oldest marine 
officer in the service.” Truxtun’s [sic] words sounded what was to be a 
century-long running battle with the Marines—a battle that contributed greatly 
to the paranoia so often identified with the Corps.113  
 
Understanding this paranoia helps one understand the depth to which every Marine feels as if 
the Corps will disappear with the stroke of a political pen, if not for their own collective 
efforts to establish unique and necessary means of warfighting, which separates them from 
their sibling armed services of the United States. The paranoia is a derivative of the numerous 
attempts by various organizations and individuals to diminish or outright disband the Marine 
Corps. 
The relationship between the various branches of the armed forces of the United 
States can be contentious; budget seasons can bring out the worst in the senior members of 
the military, all of whom are simply vying for the most in defense appropriations from 
Congress. With the invention of the airplane and its military applications realized, the Navy 
and Marine Corps were at a precarious time in their histories; the two services needed to get 
along in order to gain the benefits of adding aviation to their arsenals, or their often-tentative 
relationship would doom their efforts. As will be discussed, the efforts to disband the Marine 
Corps by the Navy could have been seen as masked attempts to simply procure more (men, 
materiel, appropriations) that the Navy seemingly already shared with the smaller Marine 
Corps. 
Noted Marine and Marine Corps historian Robert Debs Heinl’s June 1954 article ‘The 
Cat with More than Nine Lives’ published in US Naval Institute Proceedings provided a 
detailed history of just where the Corps earned its paranoia to that point in time. After nearly 
one hundred eighty years of existence, the US Marine Corps had fought off every 
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conceivable attempt to diminish, amalgamate, or outright abolish the smallest of the armed 
forces—whether the attempts were made by the US Army, Navy, or even presidents—
paranoia was the norm for the Commandants, the members of the senior officers, and the 
supporters of the Corps.114 Prior to the outbreak of the First World War, there had been no 
fewer than ten attempts to abolish the Marine Corps; often the idea of up-and-coming Naval 
officers who believed that Marines no longer served a purpose onboard ship or senior Army 
officers who thought the Corps was encroaching on the roles and responsibilities of the land 
forces.115 With each successive battle against the detractors, the Marines became increasingly 
suspicious for the next attempt to abolish the Corps and on the offensive to prove their worth 
to the public and the government.  
This institutional paranoia spread throughout the Corps and continues to the present. 
The events of the 1908 attempt to disband the Marine Corps are well documented within the 
published histories of the Marine Corps. Heinl published his popular history in 1962. Soldiers 
of the Sea was the first full history of the Corps that not only included World War II and 
Korea, but also the developmental events, which impacted the Corps survival such as those in 
1908.116 Previous histories, particularly that by Lieutenant Colonel Clyde H. Metcalf, Heinl’s 
professional predecessor, published his compiled history in 1939; however, Metcalf’s was 
simply a straight forward history of the Corps’ military engagements.117 Heinl’s history was 
less a work of scholarship or objectivity as he often punctuated the text with his personal 
colorful commentary, and he frequently interjected cagey comments toward those 
individuals. In describing one of the many attempts by William F. Fullam to disparage the 
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Marine Corps, only to be rebuffed, Heinl simply inserted his personal comment, ‘Exit 
Captain Fullam.’118 However, despite his interjections, Heinl describes the 1908 attempt 
concisely and clearly. The events of 1908 are also well documented within Allan R. Millett’s 
Semper Fidelis first published in 1980.119 Millett, a retired Marine and university professor, 
omits Heinl’s vibrant vocabulary and strictly provides a detailed history of the Corps, leaving 
out commentary or analysis of events. Millett’s history was updated and republished in 1991, 
further ensuring that younger generations of Marines are fully versed in the formative events 
in the Corps’ history and that the paranoia remained within the institution. 
The events of 1908 built on the growing institutional paranoia of the Marine Corps 
and with key individuals involved, it can be seen as an event that possibly had an adverse 
effect on the Chamberlain court martial which will be discussed in Chapter Four and 
therefore is worth exploring herein. To understand the extent this paranoia played during the 
Chamberlain affair, one must understand the 1908 assault upon the Corps that took place the 
decade before the Chamberlain court martial. The latest attempt came on 10 December 1906 
when the Bureau of Navigation Chief, Rear Admiral George A. Converse suggested to the 
House Naval Affairs Committee in his annual report, that Navy vessels no longer required the 
services of Marines and in fact the Marines would be better served to be stationed 
collectively onshore and ready for expeditionary duty.120 This most recent attempt to remove 
Marines from Navy ships was a mirror to the failed attempt first made in 1891 by then-junior 
Naval officer Fullam. The tables had turned, and by 1906 Fullam was no longer a junior 
officer with little voice in the greater din of Naval politics, and those who thought as he did 
(dubbed Fullamites) were in well-placed positions to spearhead the task of eliminating the 
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Corps, including Commander William Sowden Sims, Naval Aide to the president.121 The 
small Corps of the pre-First World War period was susceptible to amalgamation into the 
Army if not outright dismantling. Technological changes and better standards within the 
Navy no longer required a Corps of Marines to operate rifles from fighting tops or to 
maintain good order and discipline onboard ships of the line. Gone were the earliest roles and 
missions of the Marines, which will be discussed further. 
Fullam entered the fray with his own letter to the Secretary of the Navy echoing the 
words of Admiral Converse and was buoyed by his well-placed friend, Commander Sims, a 
most aggressive member of the reform movement in the Navy. Through Sims, Fullam’s 
argument that Marines were no longer needed on ships was put before the president. Sims 
submitted a lengthy report to Roosevelt outlining the reasons for the removal of the Corps; he 
cited the two previous recommendations by the Bureau of Navigation to remove Marines 
from ships, which were beat back by Marine Commandant George F. Elliott.122 Sims 
suggested a surgical approach to removing the Marines; by-pass Congress and use the 
presidential power of Executive Order. ‘The effect of removing the Marines from the ships 
would be electrical, because the demand is universal.’123 
While Sims was an active participant within the movement to remove Marines from 
the ships or disband the Corps altogether, the biographical works published on Sims omit this 
part of his life. Both Morison’s Admiral Sims and the Modern American Navy and Benjamin 
F. Armstrong’s 21st Century Sims do not cover the controversy stirred by Sims while serving 
in the Theodore Roosevelt White House.124 Simple reasoning can be used to determine a 
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possible reason why this was the case by reading the acknowledgements of both works. 
Neither author consulted any persons other than those of high rank within the US Navy 
(retired and active) and those persons closely associated with the US Navy; leaving out the 
close relationship with the Marine Corps, thus overlooking this event in both service’s 
history. Further, as will be discussed, the attempt was unsuccessful and therefore such a 
blemish possibly not desired to be remembered. 
By 1908, the US Army added its opinion to the discussion when Army Chief of Staff 
Major General Leonard Wood proposed that the Marine Corps should be incorporated into 
the Army’s Coast Artillery. Wood, a favorite of President Theodore Roosevelt, had served 
with Roosevelt in the famed San Juan Hill expedition of the Spanish-American War. The two 
Rough Riders were in agreement that the Marine Corps carried too much influence with 
policy-makers in Washington, was self-aggrandizing, and that the Navy and Army would 
benefit from the latter’s absorption of the Corps.125 With the stroke of a pen and Executive 
Order 969 of 12 November 1908, President Roosevelt defined the duties of the Marine Corps 
and excluded the shipboard duties, once the hallmark of the Marine Corps.126  
Initial reaction to the order within the rank and file of the Corps was acceptance; 
however, it was soon followed by suspicion and fear that this pen-stroke was only the first 
step in the total abolition of the Corps. The president’s own words to his aide validated the 
fear the Corps felt.  
I do not hesitate to stay that they [the Marines] should be absorbed into the 
army and no vestige of their organization should be allowed to remain. They 
cannot get along with the navy, and as a separate command with the army the 
conditions would be intolerable.127  
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On 28 November 1908, President Roosevelt confided in his friend General Wood further 
echoing his thoughts on the Marine Corps’ position,  
I think the marines should be incorporated in the Army. It is an excellent corps 
and it would be of great benefit to both services that the incorporation should 
take place.128 
 
Throughout the end of 1908, a flurry of letters was exchanged between Fullam, 
Wood, Major General Commandant Elliott, and the president regarding the position of the 
Corps in the US military. In addition to the correspondence, a group of Marine officers with 
political and familial connections joined together in order to save the Corps. Well-known and 
well-decorated Marines such as Colonel Charles H. Lauchheimer (Adjutant and Inspector), 
Colonel Frank L. Denny (Quartermaster of the Marine Corps), Colonel George Richards 
(Assistant Paymaster) and Lieutenant Colonel Charles McCawley (son of former Colonel 
Commandant Charles L. McCawley ) were brought together under the informal leadership of 
Colonel Littleton ‘Tony’ Waller Tazewell Waller, Major Wendell C. Neville (future 
Commandant) and most importantly Captain Smedley D. Butler.129  
The battle for the Corps came to a head on 7 January 1909 when the House of 
Representatives Naval Affairs Committee commenced hearings on the annual 
appropriations—more of an inquisition against the White House’s actions against the Marines 
rather than simple budgetary discussions. Each of the Marines listed above testified before 
the committee, bringing to bear their connections, most especially Butler whose own father, 
Senator Thomas Butler, chaired the committee.130 The Washington Post newspaper 
understood the attitudes of the military and Congress well. In the 18 January 1909 article 
‘Removal of the Marines,’ the newspaper summarized the Navy’s position efficiently, ‘If the 
question were left entirely to the most competent and responsible officers of the navy, it is 
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likely that Congress would find the President well supported in his position.’131 Of all the 
high-profile names the Corps put in front of the committee, the most convincing was that of 
Colonel Richards who stated that it would cost an additional $425,000 to replace the Marines 
with sailors on board ships. Three months of testimony by Marines and its detractors ensued. 
However, on 3 March 1909, Congress passed the Naval Appropriations Act of 1910—it 
included the provision for the Corps: 
Provided that no part of the appropriations herein made for the Marine Corps 
shall be expended for the purposes for which said appropriations are made 
unless officers and enlisted men shall serve as heretofore on board all 
battleships and armored cruisers and also upon such other vessels of the Navy 
as the President may direct, in detachments of not less than eight per centum 
of the strength of the enlisted men of the Navy on said vessels.132 
 
The Marine Corps was at a crossroads in which a new mission must be found, or face 
the Fullamites again. The battle against the Navy and the Army left an indelible mark on the 
members of the Corps—an institutional paranoia that remains today. At every budget 
hearing, and during times of economic crisis, the Corps immediately begins an offensive 
campaign to defend the mission, the size, and the need for the US Marine Corps. As aviation 
had yet to become the integrated combat asset it is today, if the Marines were permanently 
removed from the ships, it was a very real possibility that the Corps’ aviation would have 
never existed and possibly the Corps would have eventually foundered. The removal of the 
Marines from the Navy’s ships was the first step in the process of eradicating the Corps from 
the US military. As the removal did not succeed, and aviation took root in the Marine Corps, 
the service was seemingly safe from its detractors. The 1908 attempt to disband the Marine 
Corps showed that paranoia was a necessary tool for the Marines; the very survival of the 
service depended upon members being vigilant and quick to react. Just three years later, the 
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Marine Corps sent its first Marine to learn to fly. This new technology added to the tenuous 
relations between the Navy and Marine Corps. 
Brief Historical Overview: Aviation Comes to the Marine Corps 
It is imperative to understand the background and history of the US Marine Corps, 
and its aviation to understand fully how the Marines found their air combat element in France 
and flying with the British less than a decade later. How and why did the United States 
establish a Marine Corps as well as how and why did this body of sea soldiers adopt aviation, 
and from whom did the idea that the Corps needed aviation originate? The US Marine Corps’ 
beginnings, constituted on 11 July 1798, were much the same following the paths set by the 
British and Dutch Royal Marines that were founded more than a century before. The 
responsibilities of maintaining good order and discipline of the sailors, serving as snipers 
from the tops of the sails and boarding parties when going against enemy ships were added to 
the traditional ones, and with that the Marines found themselves an integral part of the Navy. 
As technology advanced, the cannon aboard ship became increasingly labour intensive and 
swelled in number and size; therefore, the Marines added operating secondary batteries of 
guns to their list of responsibilities.133  
A new mission sprung forth from the 10 June 1898 amphibious landing of the 1st 
Battalion of Marines commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Robert W. Huntington (dubbed 
Huntington’s Battalion) at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, during the Spanish-American War. The 
landing and taking of Guantanamo Bay foretold the future of the Corps. Rapid deployment of 
Marines whereupon the force would take an objective from the sea in an amphibious landing. 
Colonel Commandant Charles Heywood was quick to seize this potential mission for his 
Marines as it ‘showed how important and useful it is to have a body of troops which can be 
quickly mobilized and sent on board transports, fully equipped for service ashore and afloat, 
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to be used at the discretion of the commanding admiral.’134 Witnessing the Guantanamo Bay 
landing, the General Board,* proposed the creation of a Marine battalion that could defend 
advance bases in support of naval forces and freeing the Sailors to remain on the ships 
instead of being added to the landings. The Advanced Base Force concept, as it was known, 
stated that the Marines were the most suited for immediate needs of establishing advanced 
bases, creating quick defenses, gun emplacements, and laying mines.135 With the 
demonstrated skill of Huntington’s battalion and the increased territorial possessions of the 
United States in the far reaches of the Pacific Ocean, it was never more imperative for the 
United States to have the ability to project its naval power from the sea and maintain it once 
acquired. The Marine Corps fit the need at a critical time. 
In 1901, a detachment of Marines under Major Henry C. Haines stationed at Newport, 
Rhode Island, were directed to study advanced base operations thereby building on the 
experiences of Huntington’s Battalion and the desire of the General Board the year earlier. 
The next step was the creation of a school for Marines to learn the skills necessary for 
advanced base work. A site in New London, Connecticut, for the Advanced Base School was 
chosen as early as 1906; however, due to exigencies of the service, as well as troubles of 
inter-service rivalry, it was five years before ten Marine officers were assigned as students at 
the location.  
In the spring of 1910, the General Board requested that the Secretary of the Navy 
George von Meyer direct the Marine Corps to assume responsibility for advanced base 
equipment located at Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, and Subic Bay, Philippines. This was soon 
followed by the directive to the Commandant from the Assistant Secretary of the Navy 
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Beekman Winthrop, which stated, ‘You will prepare for the care and custody of advanced 
base material and take necessary steps to instruct the officers and men under your command 
in the use of this material.’136 In the following year, the Advanced Base School was relocated 
to Philadelphia Navy Yard where Marines were already garrisoned and equipped for 
expeditionary duty; thus could quickly board ships for exercises or real-world applications of 
the new concept.137  
No detailed history of the Advanced Base Concept has been researched or written. To 
date, the various general histories of the Corps, previously discussed, specifically those of 
Metcalf and Heinl, provide little details or background. However, Kenneth J. Clifford’s 
Progress and Purpose (1973), while short, does provide the key facts and personalities of the 
creation and mission.138 Clifford’s history recounts the facts and events without commentary 
or analysis, and therefore does not connect aviation with the Advanced Base Force Concept 
directly, rather simply as events that took place during the same decade.  
A keen witness and student of the Advanced Base Force concept was Second 
Lieutenant Alfred A. Cunningham, who was assigned to the Advanced Base School in 
November 1911, where he conceived a potential role for aviation. A self-taught pilot prior to 
entering the Marine Corps, there is no doubt Cunningham was an apt pupil in the methods of 
advance base work and the potentiality of integrating aviation into same. Six months later, in 
May 1912, upon his request Cunningham was reassigned to the Aviation Camp at Annapolis 
for Naval aviation training.139 Cunningham knew that aviation could be a valuable asset in 
the Corps’ arsenal; despite the Marine Corps’ lack of aircraft and trained pilots, Cunningham 
could still see the potential. Writing to his peers in 1916’s Marine Corps Gazette, 
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Cunningham tied the Advanced Base Force concept together with aviation. ‘Arrangements 
are also being made to furnish them [newly recruited Marine student pilots] with land 
machines for carrying on practical work with the Advanced Based troops.’140 Cunningham 
asserted that aviation was a natural addition to advanced base work; stating that the planes 
will cooperate well in the following ways: 
Offshore patrols to prevent surprise raids by enemy light forces. 
Anti-submarine patrols. 
Spotting for shore batteries in attacks by enemy ships. 
Photography, bombing, and torpedoing enemy craft and bases within reach.141 
 
He further included mine detecting and charting enemy mines as part of his vision for 
aviation. Additionally, Cunningham knew that the fundamental mission of the Corps was to 
place individual Marines on the ground in combat, and that aviation was a supporting arm of 
the combat forces. ‘It is fully realized that the only excuse for aviation in any service is its 
usefulness in assisting the troops on the ground to successfully carry out their operations.’142 
As Marine aviation is actually a part of Naval aviation, supporting the infantry on the ground 
in combat was not a forgone conclusion, and thus Cunningham’s comments demonstrate his 
innovative thinking on behalf of the Corps. 
The new mission of the Advanced Base Force brought forth by the Navy gave Marine 
Corps aviation an added purpose and the ability to fill a niche, which gave the fledgling air 
service meaning at a time of uncertainty in its usefulness. It may seem that the sea soldiers 
were an unlikely source of aviators unless in support of the fleet; however, the Marine Corps’ 
aviation program grew out of the Navy’s need for troops to take and hold advanced bases in 
an era when ships of the line were incapable of unlimited sailing without refueling. Ships 
required coal for steam to power their advances across the oceans of the globe; without 
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friendly locations to refuel, the fleet was useless.143 Landing Marines to take and hold these 
locations and other basing locations around the world extended the reach of the US Navy, 
and this was the heart of the Advanced Base Force concept. The Corps expanded its 
capabilities, allowing it the ability to protect the Marines on the ground from the air, as well 
as from the fleet at sea. Marine Corps aviation ensured the longevity of the Corps in a time 
when its mere survival was in doubt.144   
As the first Marine aviator the Marine Corps holds Cunningham in high esteem, and 
even though his articles were published a century ago, they remain a valued piece of the 
Corps’ history and are still cited in various doctrinal articles found in Marine Corps Gazette 
and Naval Institute Proceedings. The official history of Marine Corps aviation by Johnson 
remains the easy reference for those simply requiring the basics.145 Like many of the official 
histories published by the service, it lacks analysis but remains useful nonetheless. Between 
Cunningham’s articles and Johnson’s official history, Edwin McClellan’s article ‘The Birth 
and Infancy of Marine Corps Aviation’ published in 1931 remained the most definitive 
history.146 Within the McClellan personal papers collection are the letters between McClellan 
and Cunningham, in which the two discuss the earliest days of Marine aviation; the letters act 
as an informal oral history interview between the historian of the Corps and the first aviator 
of the Corps. Of the histories and articles published on aviation and the Advanced Base Force 
concept, only Cunningham tied the two together as an additional, viable method of aiding 
those Marines on the ground seizing and then defending newly acquired territory. 
Creating Naval Aviation: The Integration of Marine and Navy Aviation Before the First 
World War 
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In 1911, when then-1st Lieutenant Alfred A. Cunningham was stationed at Marine 
Barracks, Philadelphia, he was already a man of the air having become a balloon pilot eight 
years before under his own initiative and expense. His desire to fly airplanes drove him to 
strike a bargain with a cash-strapped inventor who had built his own aircraft. Cunningham 
‘leased the airplane for twenty-five dollars a month,’ and dubbed the craft Noisy Nan due to 
the airplane’s extreme noise.147  Cunningham’s experience with his homemade aircraft 
yielded only short straight flights; turns were impossible; just getting the craft into the air 
took much willpower and skill on the Marine’s part.  
I called her everything in God’s name to go up. I pleaded with her. I caressed, 
I prayed to her, and I cursed that flighty Old Maid to lift her skirts and hike, 
but she never would.148  
 
He learned the fundamentals of flying from these early attempts. 
After joining the Aero Club of Pennsylvania in 1911, Cunningham’s new connections 
to Philadelphia high society proved useful; he gave talks and presentations to the members 
explaining how the Marine Corps could utilize the new technology. Soon state and federal 
politicians were contacting fellow Philadelphian Major General Commandant William P. 
Biddle directly; Cunningham eventually found himself called to Headquarters to explain to 
the senior Marine. ‘What are you doing up there in Philadelphia? The politicians are trying to 
get a Marine Corps Flying Field established at Philadelphia and it looks as if you were at the 
bottom of it all.’149 These early days of negotiating with Headquarters Marine Corps and 
learning the art of the soft sell with politicians and other politicos certainly proved useful to 
Cunningham in his future role as the head of Marine Aviation.  
The Major General Commandant finally acquiesced to Cunningham, and on 16 May 
1912 the amateur flyer was detached from the Advanced Base School at Philadelphia, and 
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ordered to the aviation camp the Navy had set up at Annapolis, to become a seaplane student 
pilot.150 Cunningham joined an already established cluster of naval aviation pioneers, which 
included Lieutenant John H. Towers, US Navy, his instructor.151 It was not long after that the 
initial group was joined by Second Lieutenant Bernard L. Smith, another Marine and gifted 
pilot. This founding cadre of pilots and their cooperation with one another proved 
instrumental to ensuring Marine Corps aviation was involved in the fight against the German 
U-boat menace. How these men worked and flew with one another was what naval aviation 
hinged upon in these earliest days; their failure could have meant the complete failure of 
Marine Corps aviation.  
The history of these earliest days of naval aviation have been well documented by 
various historians, such as Turnbull and Lord in their History of United States Naval Aviation 
published in 1949.152 While the contribution of the Marine Corps is not completely omitted, 
Turnbull and Lord do not provide the level of detail one would expect for history of naval 
(vice navy) aviation. It is not a surprise as both men were senior officers within the United 
States Navy who credit their efforts to a significant number of prominent admirals for their 
assistance; despite the title, their main focus was the Navy’s aviation. 
In these early days of aviation, personalities caused conflict and those who felt as if 
they were being overlooked were quarrelsome, acted in prima-donna fashion and caused 
trouble for all those who would listen. Navy Captain Washington I. Chambers, de facto head 
of Naval Aviation in Washington under the Secretary of the Navy, warned Lieutenant 
Theodore G. Ellyson, senior naval officer in charge of training, regarding the Marines in 
correspondence—Cunningham in particular. ‘In regard to the Marines, we must be 
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diplomatic, but the first serious indication that Cunningham exhibits of big head, or lack of 
willingness to cooperate and I will ask for his detachment.’153 As Cunningham’s training 
officer, Towers was required to deal with the possibility of Cunningham’s potentially 
contentious attitude, but he found himself pleasantly surprised when the Marine turned out to 
be against type. ‘Towers was pleased that the marine Cunningham had not been 
uncooperative . . . he had not only worked with Towers and performed well but also helped 
him [Towers] court marines in the fleet.’154 The years of negotiating his entry into aviation 
while in Philadelphia had been advantageous for Cunningham after all. 
Early in 1913, the entire aviation component departed Annapolis for Guantanamo 
Bay, Cuba, with the mission of convincing the senior Naval officers in the fleet of the 
viability and potential uses of aircraft. Towers, as senior aviator in charge of the mission, 
kept his supervisor in Washington apprised of the situation and events. If Towers held any 
animosity toward the Marine contingent, he could have easily sabotaged it after any incidents 
such as crashes or lack of airmanship. A prime example of his support of the Marines came in 
his 23 January 1913 report to Chambers, head of Naval Aviation at Navy Headquarters: 
This morning the wind came at 8.45 [sic], and caught Cunningham alone, 
and smith [sic] and me, each with a passenger. Cunningham was forced to 
the water, could not turn his machine, and had to cut off and be towed in. I 
made the hangers all right with Bellanger, but Smith landed too far out and 
could not make it, so finally made a beach around the Point, where this 
machine now is and will have to stay until late this evening. Smith and I on 
separate occasions got caught out the same way last week. This is just to 
illustrate how suddenly it comes.155 
 
Had Towers wished to discredit the Cunningham and Smith, his letter need not explain that 
he was also easily caught in such conditions and that in the end it was not the fault of the big 
head Cunningham or the novice Smith. 
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While at Guantanamo Bay, the pilots took many senior officers aloft in attempt to 
convince them of the safety of aviation and the potential uses by the fleet. During this period, 
Towers’ attitude toward the Marines went beyond simply tolerating them. ‘He made friends 
with two marine sergeants,’ later recalling that during midday siesta breaks they ‘would 
guide us up the Guantanamo River to large wooded areas where there was fine wild guinea 
shooting and also to a fresh water lake alive with ducks’ to enhance the unit’s already famous 
cuisine.156 
Despite Towers’ own personal interactions and agreeable relations with the Marines, 
others in the Navy, including Ellyson, remained skeptical; it was almost as if Ellyson was 
trying to find any indication that the Marines were not performing and could therefore be 
transferred. While still at Guantanamo Bay, Ellyson questioned Towers by letter in late 
February 1913 inquiring, ‘Why is it Herbster (Navy pilot) has so many people under 
instruction and Cunningham has none?’157 Towers explanation was succinct and to the point 
in his response and certainly in defense of the Marine. ‘Cunningham has two officers of the 
Fleet, and Smith and Chevalier, under instruction. He is getting along very well.’158 Another 
opportunity to discredit Cunningham, and the Marines, was passed over by Towers. 
In spring 1913, the aviators returned to Annapolis to continue their efforts of learning 
to detect submarines and training the increasing number of students. In August of that year, 
Cunningham announced his resignation from aviation duties ‘because my fiancée will not 
consent to marry me unless I give up flying.’159 With Cunningham’s departure from 
Annapolis and flying, Bernard Smith became the senior Marine aviator and was soon joined 
by the Corps’ third pilot—Second Lieutenant William N. McIlvain. With Cunningham 
transferred, the building and maintaining of the relationship between the Navy and Marine 
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Corps was left to Smith. Despite Smith’s long service with the Corps, no personal 
correspondence or diary remains to provide his thoughts or personal recollections on his 
efforts to integrate the two aviation components.  
On 1 October 1913, Cunningham was transferred from Annapolis to Headquarters 
Marine Corps in Washington where he was appointed acting assistant Quartermaster.160 
Despite Cunningham’s transfer from active flying, he was still called upon by the Department 
of the Navy as the Corps’ expert and his services were requested to assist in ‘drawing up a 
comprehensive plan for the organization of a Naval Aeronautic Service’ just the next 
month.161 Unfortunately, his record does not indicate the length of time Cunningham served 
on the committee, but in February 1914 he was once again called upon by the Department of 
the Navy to render assistance, this time to aid ‘Naval Constructor Holden C. Richardson, U.S. 
Navy, in trying out Flying Boat D-2, which is now at the Navy Yard, Washington, D.C., 
undergoing alterations.’162 Cunningham quickly became the Marine Corps’ expert and 
additional tasks continued to increase as war in Europe expanded. It is readily apparent that 
any reservations about Cunningham held by the Navy’s aviation headquarters had been 
overcome by his admirable service at Annapolis and Guantanamo Bay, and by the supportive 
efforts of Towers.  
In Cunningham’s absence, Smith and McIlvain worked to introduce aviation to their 
fellow Marines. The earliest vestiges of what is known today as the Marine Air-Ground Task 
Force came into being when on 3 January 1914 the Marine Section of the Naval Flying 
School consisting of Lieutenants Smith and McIlvain with ten enlisted mechanics, embarked 
at Philadelphia on the transport USS Hancock.163 Equipped with a flying boat and an 
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amphibian drawn from the aircraft at Annapolis, the Marines sailed for Culebra, Puerto Rico, 
to join the newly created Advance Base Brigade in the annual Atlantic Fleet exercises. While 
their infantry counterparts established defensive works, repelled mock amphibious attacks, 
and withstood simulated bombardment, the mechanics established a seaplane base at Culebra 
as Smith and McIlvain flew reconnaissance and scouting missions.164 This exercise was the 
first instance of the Corps utilizing combined arms power—today a staple of Marine Corps 
operational capabilities. 
During the month long stay in Puerto Rico, nearly every day Smith and McIlvain took 
the opportunity to introduce aviation to the officers of the Advanced Base Brigade by taking 
the men aloft ‘over Culebra and its defenses to show the ease and speed of aerial 
reconnaissance and range of vision open to the eyes of the aerial scout.’165 One of the officers 
given the first-hand opportunity was Lieutenant Colonel John A. Lejeune who flew for 
fourteen minutes; Lejeune was destined to lead the Marines in combat in France and later to 
take the helm of the Corps as Commandant. 
The Marine pilots were not simply working with their own fellow Marines; they 
continued their efforts of integrating with their Navy counterparts as well. This was evident 
in August 1914 when Smith was reassigned to Paris as the Assistant Naval Attaché and his 
former tutor Towers was across the English Channel in London serving in the same capacity. 
While the United States had not yet entered the war, Smith toured the Western Front and 
witnessed aviation under combat conditions.166 The American Naval Attaché at Paris, 
Commander William R. Sayles, in 1917, reported officially that he considered Lieutenant 
Smith, ‘under practically war conditions, had as much knowledge of the theory and practice 
of aviation as any officer in the world and that he would be invaluable to the country on 
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aviation duty.’167 Towers spent an increasing amount of his time with the RNAS and toured 
British air stations and manufacturers, when permitted.168 Aviators Towers and Smith came 
together in November 1915 in Paris and spent the next five days comparing notes from the 
past year as well as visiting French aviation stations and manufacturers.169 Towers’ and 
Smith’s collaborations while stationed as assistant naval attachés in London and Paris, 
respectively, produced excellent working relationships and partnerships that further 
integrated the two air services. The two pilots ‘compared notes on the events of the past year 
and visited French air stations and factories.’170 This positive working relationship between 
the Navy and Marine Corps continued once they returned to the United States and were both 
assigned to the Navy Department. Cunningham’s own proposal for the Northern Bombing 
Group was given a positive endorsement and support from Towers in his billet at the Navy 
Department. This simply would not have been possible if Cunningham or Smith had 
exhibited a big head in the very early days; in the infancy of Marine aviation, good 
relationships were key with regard to obtaining appropriations and a steady stream of 
qualified officer candidates for flying as poor leadership or lacking abilities may have been 
an easy excuse for the Corps to end the experiment.  Because the Marine Corps had yet to 
realise the benefits of aviation to the service, Cunningham’s deftness with office politics and 
desire to attain additional skills were instrumental to its survivability in the earliest days of its 
existence.  This skill served Cunningham later upon the arrival of Marine aviation in France 
as will be discussed further in this chapter. 
With Cunningham and Smith reassigned, McIlvain remained behind as the senior 
Marine aviator. McIlvain’s forward thinking lead him to the inescapable conclusion that 
Marines should fly more than seaplanes. In November 1914, McIlvain proposed land flying 
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was a skill that every Marine aviator should possess; he requested that he be temporarily 
detailed to the Army Aviation School at San Diego for a course in land flying.  
My reason for requesting this, is that I think Marine officers doing any flying, 
should be able to pilot either over land or over water machines, so that in case 
of an expedition, they would be of some use to the Marine Corps on land, as 
well as the Navy at sea.171  
  
While his request was disapproved, it is readily apparent that, like Cunningham, McIlvain 
was thinking of the advantages to the Corps of pilots with both sea and land flying abilities. 
Cunningham’s self-imposed banishment from flying was short-lived; in February 
1915, he requested orders reassigning him to aviation duty. ‘My reason for making this 
request is my interest in and knowledge of this work and my good record while engaged in it 
as shown by my efficiency reports.’172 Cunningham’s request was approved, and on 11 May 
1915 he was reassigned to Naval Aeronautic Station, Pensacola, Florida, for duty as a student 
aviator. Soon thereafter in spring 1916, Cunningham applied and was accepted to the Army’s 
Signal Corps Aviation School in San Diego, California, where he was given instruction in 
land flying. 173 His assignment to the Army school made him the first officer of the Marine 
Corps and the Navy to be ordered to land flying. His assignment to the Army school was 
fortuitous for the Marine; he learned further skills that would be utilized once the United 
States finally entered the war the following year. It is possible that Cunningham’s training in 
land flying, and his work with Advanced Base operations lead to the August 1916 
correspondence sent by Secretary of the Navy Josephus Daniels to Secretary of War 
requesting permission to train naval aviators at the Army School. ‘It is desired to train a 
limited number of naval aviators to fly land-machines, in order to provide for Advanced Base 
Operation of the Navy, and to have officers of the Marine Corps so trained that they will be 
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available when the Marines are acting with the Army.’174 Surprisingly, despite previous 
animosity towards the Corps, the Army approved.  
The timing could not have been better for the Marine Corps or Cunningham while 
stationed in California, as he was selected by the Department of the Navy to be the aviation 
representative on the Commission on Navy Yards and Stations in the autumn of 1916.  
The Commission requires the assistance of an expert aviator in the selection of 
aviation bases on the Pacific Coast. First Lieutenant Alfred A. Cunningham, 
U.S.M.C., now on duty at the Signal Corps’ Aviation School, San Diego, 
California, has been recommended to the Commission as being particularly 
well qualified to rend this assistance.175 
 
It appears Cunningham’s charm and congenial methods had proven to beat back the ill 
feelings between the Navy and Marine Corps, for at the end of his tenure with the 
Commission in early 1917 he received a letter of commendation for his work. ‘He 
[Cunningham] was so agreeable personally that each and every member regrets his 
departure.’176  
It was entirely possible that both the US Navy and US Marine Corps could have 
created their own, and wholly separate branches of aviation in 1912. These sister services had 
moved further apart with the 1908 crisis, and much bad blood existed between the officers of 
each, which could have made it an easy decision not to create a single maritime aviation 
component. However, as demonstrated, through the efforts of a few forward-thinking men, 
the Corps and Navy were able to create a single, yet somewhat independent, aviation asset 
within the Department of the Navy. Cunningham’s early efforts to have the Marine Corps 
adopt aviation for potential use with the Advanced Base Force and his adept and personable 
skills with the Navy fliers allowed him to start the cautious process of integrating the two into 
Naval Aviation. While the 1908 crisis did leave a sour attitude among many Navy officers, 
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men like Towers were not predisposed and simply trained the Marines as he did any other 
naval officer.  
Cunningham’s positive attitude and willingness to serve on numerous Navy 
Department committees proved the Marines were agreeable partners and not the adversaries 
of the 1908 crisis. The relationship between Cunningham, Smith, and Towers was key to the 
establishment of Marine Corps aviation. If any of these men had been replaced by a weaker 
or disagreeable personality, the entire endeavor would have been scrapped, as aviation was 
still considered experimental by the Marine Corps and Navy. Aviation required the careful, 
methodical, and strong-handed administration that Cunningham possessed; coupled with his 
desire to use what the Navy had to offer in order to get Marine Corps aviation established, he 
was a powerful force with which to reckon. 
McIlvain and Cunningham pressed ahead to learn land flying and thus added another 
skill to the arsenal of the aviators. The stage was set, and when America entered the First 
World War in April 1917, the Marines quickly fielded two combat aviation units to battle the 
submarine menace in the Atlantic. The 1st Aeronautic Company was deployed to Ponta 
Delgada, Azores, in January 1918—the first American aviation component in the fight 
against Germany—and the First Marine Aviation Force was deployed to France along the 
Channel Coast the following July.177 At the conclusion of the war, the exploits of the Marine 
aviators in Europe had become ingrained within the Corps’ history; two Medals of Honor 
were presented to Marine aviators, several combat resupply missions established the Corps’ 
land-flying ability and the agreeable cooperation with the Navy solidified the integration of 
the two, which will be discussed in a later chapter. 
 
Getting Marine Corps Aviation into the First World War: Antisubmarine Warfare and 
the Creation of the Northern Bombing Group, 1917–1918 
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From the time he was transferred to Annapolis until his retirement sixteen years later, 
Cunningham was tireless in his pursuit of furthering the cause of Marine Corps aviation. 
Cunningham’s crowning achievement up to the entry of the United States into the First 
World War was the creation of Marine Corps aviation and the integration of it with the 
Navy’s aviation. Through sheer hard work, compromise, a congenial attitude, and at times the 
luck of being in the right place at the right time, Cunningham managed not only to have 
aviation accepted by Marines but demonstrated that aviation could be a valuable combat asset 
of the Marine Corps. With the assistance from his fellow Marines, Smith and McIlvain, the 
Corps’ aviation contingent was set on firm footings in advance of the United States’ entry 
into the war. Now that the Marine Corps had its own aviation component, how would these 
Marine aviators be utilized and would the experiment work in the favor of the Corps is to be 
discussed, in order to understand how the Marines became involved in the air war and what 
mission they were to accomplish. 
Just months before America’s entry into the war, Cunningham was ordered to 
Philadelphia Navy Yard in connection with the establishment of the Corps’ Aeronautic 
Advance Base Unit.178 Four months later, war was declared and that same day, he was issued 
orders directing him for special additional duty to assist the Department of the Navy in 
locating suitable sites for East Coast air stations; his experiences on the West Coast the 
previous year had proved fruitful. 179 Cunningham toured the coast as requested until October 
1917 when Major General Commandant George Barnett issued orders directing him to 
proceed ‘to Paris, France . . . for temporary duty in connection with obtaining information 
concerning aviation.’180 His own diary, published by the Marine Corps’ Historical Program 
decades after his death, does not cover the facts leading to his assignment overseas; however, 
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understanding Cunningham’s firm belief in Marine aviation, it is likely he had spent 
considerable time and energy convincing the Commandant of the need for the assignment. 
During his crossing of the Atlantic, Cunningham witnessed the scourge of the German 
U-boat; it was then he could fully understand the role naval aviation should play in the war:  
This looking for submarines is the most nerve straining duty I ever did. You 
must see them first, and, as their periscope is very small, the odds are against 
you. You feel that the slightest negligence on your part might lose the ship and 
all on board. I freely strained my eyesight while on watch today. I am 
confident that I saw the periscope of a submarine today, but, as it did not 
reappear I might have been mistaken. The ten minutes after I saw it were 
anxious ones.181 
 
While his diary is full of personal comments meant for his wife, there is little in the way of 
commentary on the locations Cunningham visited or specifics regarding observations that 
could potentially benefit Marine Corps aviation; however, Cunningham’s forty-six-page 
report to the Major General Commandant contained his observations. It can be easily 
understood that over the course of six weeks, the site visits to French aviation schools, French 
aviation units at the front, as well as British aviation schools and squadrons on the Channel 
Coast left an impression on Cunningham. During the course of his special duty, Cunningham 
was afforded unfettered access to the French and English pilots, given opportunities to fly in 
operations over the trenches and to participate in aerial combat against the Germans. During 
the six weeks, Cunningham visited with officers of the RFC and the RNAS, the Société Pour 
L’Aviation et ses Dérivés (SPAD) Airplane Factory, the US Navy Air Station at Dunkirk, 
and various British and French aviation and gunnery schools to form his opinions and 
recommendations for his report.182 
Cunningham witnessed that French aviation, with the able skill of the pilots of the 
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Lafayette Escadrille, supported the ground forces in the trenches and combatted the German 
aviators in the skies, whereas Britain’s RNAS split its efforts—supporting the ground forces 
but also combatting the U-boat menace over the English Channel. As stated previously, 
Cunningham knew the value of aviation supporting the ground forces; however, all attempts 
to place Marine pilots in direct support of Marine combat forces was wholly refused by the 
Army.  
This officer made every possible effort, both with the War Department in 
Washington and the American Expeditionary Forces authorities in France, to 
secure authority for our Marine aviation squadron to serve with the Marine 
Brigade in France. No success whatever attended these events. Army aviation 
authorities stated candidly that if the squadron ever got to France, it would be 
used to furnish personnel to run one of their training fields, but that this was as 
near the front as it would ever get.183 
 
Cunningham knew that the only remaining opportunity for Marines to get into the war was to 
work with the Navy and carve a niche in the antisubmarine warfare arena. His trip to the war 
zone and conversations with the British destroyer patrol convinced him that there was room 
for Marine aviation in antisubmarine warfare.  
These inquiries developed that the Germans realized the danger . . . and 
energetically suppressed any attempts of the British Navy to patrol these 
waters [the English Channel] with seaplanes, sending out their best land 
pursuit planes to shoot them down. An inquiry as to why the British did not 
patrol this area with bombing planes protected by fighting land planes 
developed the fact they were so hard pressed on the front in Flanders and 
northern France that they could not spare the planes for this work.184 
 
Cunningham returned to the United States with a plan to fill the void with Marines; 
outlined in his forty-six-page report in January 1918. While his report was consumed with 
technical reports on aircaft and weapons, Cunningham indicates a preference for being 
operating ‘with and under the Royal Naval Air Service instead of the French.’185 
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Cunningham was preparing to operate fully equipped squadrons, and therefore did not 
anticipate the need for integration in his report. Without an operational aviation unit ready for 
deployment to the warzone, he set to work recruiting pilots from across the Corps and the 
Navy in order to build up sufficient manpower and equipment. His expansion of Marine 
aviation was tested with the creation of the 1st Marine Aeronautic Company and its 
subsequent deployment at the crucial time Cunningham was trying to convince the higher 
authorities of need for Marine aviators in France. 
With Bernard L. Smith assigned to the Chief of Naval Operations, and William M. 
McIlvain commanding a small aviation detachment in Philadelphia, aviator number four, 
Francis T. Evans, had already been deployed to command the Marine aviation company in 
the Azores, therefore leaving Cunningham to rely upon Aviator number five Roy S. Geiger at 
the Naval Air Station in Miami to ensure Marines were properly trained to fly. Cunningham 
knew that only a forceful presence at the Marine Corps and Navy headquarters could achieve 
all that he wanted, and therefore he remained in Washington through early 1918 to continue 
to recruit men into service and acquire machines to form squadrons for duty in France.  
We have plans for organizing four squadrons, sixteen machines each, of land 
fighting machines at Curtiss Field, near Miami, Fla. While the details of the 
scheme have not been approved, I think it is fairly safe. These squadrons will 
be sent to France as soon as the equipment can be secured.186  
 
Once home in Washington, Cunningham promoted the plan he formulated while 
overseas—the Northern Bombing Group, in his mind, was the perfect avenue for Marine 
aviation in the war. As the British informed Cunningham during his visit that they did not 
patrol this area due to shortage of men and equipment, he realized the dangers of U-boats and 
the gap left behind was just the niche he had been looking for the Marines to fill.  
Cunningham’s idea stated that the ‘flying boats can be used for offensive against 
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submarines if properly protected by fighting machines.’187 In his report, Cunningham offered 
a squadron of land flying Marines, which was initially intended for service with the US 
Army’s 4th Brigade, as the right men and machines to assume the role in combating the 
submarine menace. ‘It is believed that this squadron can be of much more value if used at 
Dunquerke [sic] to assist in securing the control of the air and protecting the machines 
operating against submarines than it could if used as part of the Army.’188  
Cunningham’s former instructor Towers returned to the United States from his duties 
in London and again was in a position to aid the Marine in his efforts as a member of the 
Chief of Naval Operations (Aviation) staff in Washington. In fact, Towers was well aware 
that Naval Aviation’s mission in the war was  
the destruction of the enemy submarine, wherever it could be found, and 
second only to this was the protection of supply and troop ships. The primary 
mission was purely offensive. . . . No matter how many bombing machines we 
put out . . . if there are no fighting machines to protect them it is a useless 
sacrifice.189  
 
The two pioneers were thinking alike once again.  
With the aid of Towers’ prestige at the Chief of Naval Operations, and Cunningham’s 
personable attitude, the two managed to put the entire plan before the Major General 
Commandant, the Navy’s General Board, and the Secretary of the Navy. It was not long 
before ‘orders were issued . . . to organize four Marine land squadrons as quickly as possible 
and secure from the Army the necessary planes to carry out the operation.’190 Recruitment of 
student aviators began in earnest, and Cunningham split his time between Washington and 
Miami, closely managing the entire process through cables and letters on a daily basis. Even 
in an age without computers or the Internet, events moved fast and furious. Often his 
correspondence to Geiger or to Lieutenant Douglas B. Roben, who manned the office in 
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Washington in Cunningham’s absences, was filled with changes to his initial plan to get 
Marines in the fight.  
The latest is that the forces for the bombing expedition have been reduced to 
four day squadrons and four night squadrons. . . . In other words, it is expected 
to operate eight squadrons of land machines and they eventually all be manned 
by Marines.191  
 
Despite the initial teamwork between the Marines and Navy, many of the old rivalries 
returned to the surface to hamper Cunningham. In June 1918, after rejecting seventeen Navy 
men for training and commission in the Marine Corps as aviators, Cunningham found that 
Captain Irwin, Head of Naval Aviation at Navy Headquarters was not as cooperative as 
hoped. Cunningham, in a letter to Geiger, vented his irritations with the Navy’s lack of 
cooperation.  
In regard to getting some squadrons abroad, I will tell you what I know about 
the matter. I worked on the idea of getting two squadrons abroad as soon as 
possible. I could not get anything definitive from Operations so wrote out a 
cablegram to Admiral Sims [Chief of Naval Forces in European Waters] 
stating that two squadrons would be sent as soon as transportation could be 
secured. Capt. Irwin would not send this. Recently I wrote out . . . saying that 
the four squadrons would leave soon as transportation could be secured. Capt. 
Irwin agreed to send this after adding “recommendations and suggestions 
requested.”192 
 
Cunningham’s frustration with headquarters continued to fester as his proposal 
seemed to change in front of his eyes. His ultimate goal of placing Marine aviators in the air 
in the war remained the same and Cunningham did everything he could to keep that effort 
moving forward. However, it seemed the old rivalries did not remain in the past and 
Cunningham used his interpersonal skills to keep this plans on the right track. Cunningham 
remained in constant contact with his subordinate officers, keeping them informed of the 
actions he took or was unable to take to ensure Marine aviation progressed. 
Things have been alternately discouraging and encouraging. They 
[presumably Navy’s aviation office] have been changing their minds so fast I 
could hardly keep up with them. I have put every obstacle I could in their way 
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when they were headed in the wrong direction and did my best to remove all 
obstacles when they were headed our way. It has averaged up that they have 
taken the line of least resistance, which has been the line we wanted to take.193 
 
The concept of working relationships between the services at the highest levels can lead to 
great successes or great failures is well synthesized by retired Air Commodore Peter W. 
Gray’s 2009 dissertation ‘The Strategic Leadership and Direction of the Royal Air Force 
Strategic Air Offensive Against Germany from Inception to 1945,’ and reinforces the actions 
that Cunningham was required to take in order to create a successful air arm for the Marine 
Corps.194 The higher headquarters of both the Navy and Marine Corps were forced to work 
together in order to establish Naval Aviation and conflict naturally occurred, and it was 
Cunningham’s effective maneuvering that allowed for progress to be achieved instead of a 
stalemate or stagnation to take root. Gray states, ‘in the ideal world, the more difficult, or 
complex an organisation has become, the greater the need for clear lines of authority and 
accountability.’195 This was often the case for conflict between the Navy and Marine Corps 
as clear lines of authority were lacking and therefore it was imperative for Cunningham to 
remain in a micromanagement role on behalf of the Corps. 
On 16 June, Cunningham reorganized his aviation assets into a headquarters 
detachment and four squadron (A, B, C, and D). With Smith returned from Paris and 
stationed in Washington, Cunningham placed Geiger and McIlvain in command of 
Squadrons A and B, Douglas B. Roben and Russell A. Presley in command of Squadrons C 
and D, respectively. Once in command, the commanding officers of the first squadrons of the 
Marine Corps were shipped to France to establish the Corps’ footprint and begin building 
Cunningham’s Day Wing of the Northern Bombing Group.196 On 12 July 1918, Cunningham 
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was detached from Miami, and was ordered to foreign shore expeditionary service in France 
in order to command the First Marine Aviation Force and the Day Wing of the Northern 
Bombing Group.  
Cunningham’s arrival in France was met with a cold reality; no one knew of the 
Marine’s arrival.  
We arrived in France safely after a very pleasant trip but found upon arrival 
that no one knew we were coming or where we were supposed to go. I 
presume Operations [Navy Department] had failed to cable Capt [Hutchinson 
‘Hutch’ I.] Cone [commander of naval aviation in Europe] and no one knew 
what do with us. . .  When we arrived, the Army immediately tried to take 
possession of us and dispose of us as they saw fit. I blocked this . . .197 
 
Whether the Navy Department, or the Marine Corps itself, failed to ensure the proper 
logistics were in place is unknown; however, it was once again Cunningham who simply had 
to take matters into his own hands and ensure that all was as it should be. Had he been a less 
capable administrator, the Marines would have found themselves without an aviation combat 
force in France. Marine Corps aviation was not adequately prepared for full-scale air war 
when the United States entered in April 1917; however, Cunningham had grown the air arm 
to such a size that a squadron was deployed to the Azores in January 1918. By the end of that 
same summer another two squadrons were in France with a cadre of trained pilots and 
mechanics.  
Practical Application of Antisubmarine Warfare—Marines in the Azores 
The American Navy was well aware, as it entered the war, that coaling stations were 
required for many ships of its fleet as they were simply unable to carry enough coal to make 
the crossing of the Atlantic; the vital nature of the Portuguese islands of the Azores became 
abundantly clear.198 A small American naval base (Naval Base #13) was established in the 
city of Ponta Delgada on the island of São Miguel. The smaller American vessels could use 
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the port to refuel when making their crossings; however, the strategic value of the islands 
worried the Americans that Germany would occupy the islands and thus further wreak havoc 
on the transatlantic shipping of cargo and troops.199 As the American Navy leadership 
contemplated the situation in the Azores, the Germans acted; on 4 July 1917, German U-boat 
155 bombed the harbor of Ponta Delgada.200 Unbeknownst to the Germans, the USS Orion 
(AC-11), an American naval collier, was anchored nearby and as the Germans attacked, the 
Orion engaged the U-boat. While fire was exchanged between the Americans and Germans, 
no actual targets were hit; however, the U-boat was driven off.201 The need for expansion of 
defensive capabilities of the harbor led the Americans to dispatch warships; however, 
Admiral Sims rerouted them to mainland Europe.202  
As the Navy continued its internal struggle to place its warships in the most effective 
locations, Cunningham continued to recruit men for aviation—eventually enough to create 
two separate units, 12 October 1917 saw the 1st Aviation Squadron and 1st Aeronautic 
Company created.203 Just two days later, the 1st Aeronautic Company relocated from 
Philadelphia to Cape May, New Jersey, the Navy’s antisubmarine warfare training 
location.204 Any concerns regarding the relocation of any major warships of the Americans 
from the Azores was tempered by the Navy Department’s announcement that a squadron of 
Marines trained in antisubmarine warfare was to be dispatched to Ponta Delgada.205 
Cunningham regrettably did not discuss the deployment of the 1st Marine Aeronautic 
Company, the first operational deployment of Marine aviation into a combat zone in the First 
World War, in his personal correspondence. His attention was fully focused on getting 
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Marine flyers into France; likely due to the fact that the aircraft sent to the Azores were 
already obsolete—lacking radios and a maximum flight time of two hours.206 
On 9 January 1918, the USS Hancock (AP-3) with the 1st Aeronautic Company 
onboard sailed from Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, and three weeks later arrived at Ponta 
Delgada on 22 January. The harbour was too shallow for the large ship to disembark its 
passengers or unload its contents, thus leaving the unloading to many trips to and from by a 
small flotilla. Recorded in the diary of Marine 2d Lieutenant Walter S. Poague was the 
system devised for unloading the larger ship.  
We’ve got a pretty decent system and the unloading proceeds faster than I’d thought. I 
have a title. I am “Admiral of the Mosquito Fleet” because I had the brilliant idea of 
using the ship’s boats as lighters. The executive officer gave me four big boats and a 
steam launch and I am unloading two hundred tons a day, which helps a lot. 207  
 
Included in the cargo of the ship were the aircraft that the Marines were to fly; ten Curtiss R-
6s and two Curtiss N-9s were shipped over with the Marines. The aircraft were both single-
engine airplanes that were equipped with floats and carried a pilot and observer.208 
Disassembled and crated for the crossing, the aircraft and camp for the Marines required 
many man-hours to reassemble before flight operations could begin.  
On 16 February 1918 the Marines’ first flights since arriving in the Azores drew large 
crowds. Three machines were launched and made ten flights of thirty minutes each.209 The 
Marines took the few machines into the air and practiced bombing targets on the island. ‘At a 
certain predetermined point on the ground was a marker, and I flew the plane while he [1st 
Lieutenant Harvey B. Mims] dropped a dummy [bomb].’210 The high aspirations of the 
Marine flyers in Ponta Delgada were soon tempered by the weather, which made flying 
difficult at best and nonexistent at worst. On 30 March, after two solid weeks of no flying, 
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Poague recorded in his diary the chief cause of the uncooperative weather stating; ‘You see 
the wind hops over these mountains and swirls which makes air work suicidal.’211 
The experiences of the Marine aviators and crew on the island were typically one of 
boredom interlaced with hops (patrols) over the water attempting to locate German 
submarines. Often the flights themselves were uneventful, but because of the winds swirling 
over the mountains, the takeoffs and landings in the harbor were wrought with complications 
and dangerous. Poague records one such landing that nearly cost him his life and that of 
Lieutenant Mims early in their time on the island.  
Death came close today. . . . Mims and I had been up for half an hour and on 
returning, making a landing in a stiff breeze, were forced to keep on by a cutter 
getting in the way. A ten-foot buoy, a monitor and three subs loomed up before us, a 
hundred feet away, and we were going a hundred miles an hour. We rose and cleared 
the buoy by two feet, then facing the rock cliff had to turn so sharply that she side 
slipped on one wing to within eight feet of a heavy dock; after that we had to clear the 
mass of big shipping 700 feet away, which we cleared by perhaps five feet; and just a 
touch of any one of them would have finished us.212 
 
The patrols conducted by the Marines were done so in a radius of seventy miles around the 
island; during June and July the only sightings recorded were American convoys, British and 
Portuguese ships, and various local fishing and sailing boats. A review of June and July 1918 
War Diaries (the only complete months), the 1st Aeronautic Company was often hampered 
by poor visibility, heavy winds, and rain; despite the lack of favorable flying weather, the 
unit was able to accumulate 124 patrol and practice flights in June, and another 107 patrol 
and practice flights in July.213 The mechanics of the 1st Aeronautic Company remained 
continually busy repairing engines, propellers, and pontoons; the aircraft were obsolete upon 
arrival, and the flights and landings in rough weather did not help the airframes.214 The 
lessons learned by the Marines in the Azores were reported back to the Marines that remained 
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in the US and thus the remaining aviators learned from their counterparts for their impending 
deployment to France. 
While much of the time spent in the Azores was uneventful, one Marine did not return 
home due to a poor quality aircraft and difficult weather. On 5 November 1918, Poague and 
Gunnery Sergeant Walton B. Zeigler were assigned to conduct a sunrise scout patrol. Ziegler 
reported the events in a letter to Poague’s family after the war: 
After leaving the buoy I expected to feel it take off any moment, but the pontoons just 
seemed to be touching the top of the waves. We traveled for quite a distance when the 
plane rose several feet and then settled, and the pontoons struck the top of a wave and 
gave way. I saw one come through the right lower wing and I loosened my belt to 
jump, but we bounded and turned over too fast to jump. We turned over twice and 
stopped with us hanging head down under water. I fought my way out between the 
tangled wires and wreckage and was about exhausted when I reached the surface, but 
was not hurt badly, teeth knocked loose and stiff neck.215 
 
Poague never surfaced and Zeigler attempted to untangle the pilot from the wreckage under 
water, but was unsuccessful; he remained on the wreckage of the aircraft for thirty minutes 
waiting for aid to arrive, at which time Poague’s body could be retrieved.216  
As the submarine menace passed, many of the senior Marines were shipped to France 
or returned to the United States to train new recruits.217 The achievements of the Marines in 
the Azores were not for naught, although overshadowed by the success of the First Marine 
Aviation Force in France, which will be discussed later. While none of the oral history 
interviews, or surviving correspondence of the Marines who served in the 1st Aeronautic 
Company indicate such, it is clear that utilizing flying boats and seaplanes was not the way of 
the future for the Marine Corps. While the Marines in the Azores did not accumulate an 
enviable combat record, they did accumulate hundreds of practical flights and skills only 
actual patrols could achieve. As recorded by an enlisted Marine, ‘We saw a few [submarines] 
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out there; in fact were dropped a few bombs, but as far as we know we didn’t damage 
anything. . . . But we kept them submerged, I think.’218 While antisubmarine warfare was the 
mission for Marine aviation in the First World War, as will be demonstrated, it was a mission 
that was not to remain after the First Marine Aviation Force arrived in France in 1918.  
Conclusion 
The interservice rivalry between the US Navy and Marine Corps took a toll on the 
efforts of those men trying to establish an aviation organization for the Department of the 
Navy. Also undoubtedly, the actions and efforts of the Fullamites and Army during the 1908 
struggle damaged the relationship between the Navy and Marine Corps. While there were 
those, like Irwin who remained distrustful of the Marines, others took them without bias. 
Towers and Cunningham created an effective Navy-Marine Corps team. The interpersonal 
and management skills possessed by Cunningham, the placement of Smith with the Navy 
Department, and the skills of the earliest Marine aviators allowed the Corps to integrate and 
ingratiate its aviation with that of the Navy and produce a powerful combination.  
While still a part of the Navy establishment, Marine Corps aviation, through 
Cunningham and McIlvain’s foresight, not only adapted its pilots to seaplane but landplane 
flying, which at the time was solely an Army function. This added benefit allowed the Corps 
to field squadrons to combat the submarine menace in the English Channel from bases in 
Dunkirk and over the central Atlantic from the base in the Azores. While the aviators in the 
Azores were not as effective or well known as those in France, their deeds were valuable at 
what was not practical for the Marine Corps. As the antisubmarine mission eased, Marines 
shifted their focus to assisting the ground forces in the trenches of France and Belgium, 
which would have been impossible had Cunningham and McIlvain not insisted on learning 
landplane skills from the Army. 
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If Cunningham had failed at any point leading to the arrival of the First Marine 
Aviation Force in Europe, Marine Corps aviation possibly could have failed. It is possible 
that Marine Corps aviation could have suffered irreparable damage or had been set back so 
far as to make it no longer worth the Corps’ effort, expenses, or the allocation of manpower. 
Cunningham considered himself a Marine aviator first, and with McIlvain, realized the 
opportunities that opened with learning land-based flying and supporting the Marines on the 
ground and were eager to expand the abilities of Marine pilots. Without this commitment, 
and the efforts of Cunningham to ensure that all Marine aviators learned this skill, the Day 
Wing of the Northern Bombing Group would have not succeeded as a Marine endeavor. The 
necessary personnel would have been drawn from the Navy and Navy pilots would have 
taken over the role, therefore freezing out the Corps altogether. This is readily apparent as a 
possible outcome as Navy pilots were already unhappy with the Marines’ involvement. The 
Navy’s aviators were keenly aware of the situation with the Marines and were dismayed 
when their chances of commanding their own squadrons vanished upon the news of the 
Marines taking over the Day Wing. ‘We saw our dreams of a crack naval squadron that we 
had striven so hard to obtain and perfect sort of vanishing in thin air.’219 Another echoed 
aviator Freddy Beach’s comments:  
Unfortunately for the Navy fliers. . . . Washington had assigned the day 
bombing role in the Northern Bombing Group to the Marine Corps, 
leaving . . . newly qualified aviators [Naval] without hope of promotion to 
flight or squadron leader—and even without a mission.220 
 
The rivalry between the Navy and Marine Corps remained just as alive and active in 
the First World War as it had in the decades proceeding. While the Marines aviators 
in the Azores and France were sent to conduct strictly antisubmarine warfare, as will 
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be seen in chapter three, the mission was short-lived and the support of ground forces 




ROYAL AIR FORCE AND INTEGRATION OF MARINE AVIATION 
 
 
The relationship between the British and US Marine Aviation is not well documented 
in published sources including those officially published by either service history office.  
This relationship was new, and would leave a lasting impact upon USMC aviation.  This 
chapter will discuss why, and how the American Marines were integrated into the RAF, and 
the outcome of that integration. It is this relationship that sets the Marines on a path for 
success in the interwar period of the next two decades after the First World War. The 
integration provides the successful record of practical experience in wartime that was 
required to ensure aviation remained within the Corps’ arsenal during the 1920s and 30s, a 
time wrought with manpower drawdowns, and financial difficulties for the services.   
America’s entry in to the First World War on the side of the Allies was not entirely 
the blessing many thought. As the first chapter demonstrated, the Allies were in desperate 
need of manpower and supplies, yet the entry of Americans into the war brought questions of 
their specific roles and how their own participation would affect the flow of goods and 
supplies across the Atlantic.221 On the American side of the ocean, there were still hard 
feelings towards the British; in fact, Chief of Naval Operations William S. Benson warned 
Admiral Sims prior to the latter’s departure for Europe in 1917. ‘Don’t let the British pull the 
wool over your eyes. It is none of our business pulling their chestnuts out of the fire. We 
would as soon fight the British as the Germans.’222 Therefore, this chapter examines this 
complex relationship from the views of those who experienced it first-hand leading to the 
integration of their respective aviation components.  
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The British attitude was one of desire for Americans and materiel, and yet not 
enthusiastic on the American wish to fight the war on their own terms and under their own 
command. This internal conflict may have caused friction between the RAF and USMC 
aviation upon the Marines’ arrival. This chapter will also investigate this aspect of the two 
services’ interactions. Lastly, this chapter will examine the specific operations in which the 
Marines flew with the British in 217 and 218 Squadrons in order to demonstrate how the 
RAF provided the USMC with the critical flight training and experience needed in the future. 
The relationships between these men formed the day-to-day workings of how the Marines 
were or were not accepted and formed the base of skills that the Marines took with them into 
the interwar period.  
Complex Relations: Admiral Sims and British Military Relations 
 
Before one can fully understand how the USMC and the RAF were integrated, one 
must understand the complex nature of the relationship between the United States and Great 
Britain military establishments. It is the intention of this portion of the chapter to outline the 
complexities of personalities such as Admiral Sims, commander of all American naval forces 
in Europe, and admitted anglophile, and the higher-level political ramifications of the 
relations between the United States and Great Britain. As Sims was the senior American 
naval officer present in Europe, his example set the tone for the interactions of the lower 
levels of echelon under his command, thus they are key to understanding the relations 
between the Marines and the RAF. 
On 6 April 1917, the long-awaited entry of the United States into the war took place. 
It is safe to say that no other country breathed a heavier sigh of relief than Great Britain. 
Historian Kathleen Burke summed up the feelings of the nation.  
She [Great Britain] greeted the entry of the United States into the war with elation, 
and prepared to throw herself into the arms of the American government, bringing as 
her gifts hard-gained knowledge of how to fight on the Western Front and how to 
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control her free-spending Allies. She expected to be treated with deference or at least 
with the camaraderie of equal partnership.223  
The expectations of the British were not matched by the actions of the Americans; 
disagreements over convoy operations and amalgamation of armies strained the relationship 
from the start. These strained relations within the militaries of the respective countries were 
mirrors of the political and financial complications met by the Balfour Mission upon its 
arrival in the United States in 1917.  The relationship between the two nations had direct 
impacts upon the Marine and British aviators and as such it is imperative to understand the 
conflict points between the two and how they affected as presented herein. 
Representing the United States Navy in Europe was Rear Admiral Sims, former 
president of the Naval War College and ‘rather boisterous Anglophile’ who had been 
described as the ‘most popular British Admiral in the American Navy.’224 Historian Michael 
Simpson’s article on the relationship between Sims and Bayly portrays the complex 
relationship between the two nations, through the relations of these two men.225 Sims, who 
first interacted with the Royal Navy in China in 1894, quickly learned, and adopted, the 
British methods and persuaded the US Navy to implement the British fleet gunnery standards 
in 1902.226 In 1917, underscoring Sims’ complex relations was the relationship with his 
counterpart at Queenstown, and under whom the American destroyers operated, Admiral Sir 
Lewis Bayly, Royal Navy. Bayly, described as a ‘crusty old sea dog,’ was seemingly nearing 
the end of his naval career in 1915.227 The American Navy dispatched the Eighth Division of 
the Atlantic Fleet’s Destroyer Force to Queenstown in order to assist with antisubmarine 
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warfare and protection of merchant ships. In advance of the arrival of the American 
destroyers, Bayly was summoned to meet Sims in First Sea Lord Jellicoe’s presence on 14 
April 1917. Sims recorded that, ‘he [Bayly] was as rude to me as one man could be to 
another.’228  
Sims was well aware that his relationship with Bayly needed to be a productive one; 
therefore, prior to the arrival of the American destroyers, Sims drafted an operational order to 
his Captains, but first submitted it to Bayly for his review and noted, ‘You will, I am sure, 
find our officers more than willing to carry out your orders and instructions and to cooperate 
with your forces as completely as their present inexperience in this peculiar warfare will 
permit.’229 The submissive approach worked, and Bayly informally welcomed Sims to 
Queenstown. ‘Should you come here, please come to Admiralty House and bring your aide. I 
do not entertain, but can make you comfortable.’230 After the war, Sims was keenly aware of 
possible misinterpretations of his initial impressions of Bayly; in his autobiography, he 
attempted to set the record straight and ensure the good reputation and relationship between 
the United States and Great Britain remained intact, stating.  
In what I have already said, I may have given a slightly false impression of the 
man; that he was taciturn, that he was generally regarded as a hard taskmaster, 
that he never made friends at the first meeting, that he was more interested in 
results than in persons—all this is true; yet these qualities merely concealed 
what was, at bottom, a generous, kindly, and even a warm-hearted 
character.231 
 
Sims continued his heaping praise for Bayly by stating, ‘Americans have great reason to be 
proud of the achievements of their naval men and one of the most praiseworthy was the fact 
that they became such intimate friends with Admiral Bayly.’232 
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While Sims’ point of view and impressions of the relations with the British were 
positive, they were not entirely accurate to the situation. One of Sims’ own staff, Ensign John 
Langdon Leighton published his own autobiographical history of service in 1920. Somewhat 
skewed due to his limited knowledge and rank, Leighton contradicts his former superior 
officer regarding the relations between the British and Americans, particularly in 
Queenstown, and at the level of the average sailor. Leighton acknowledged the positive 
relations fostered by Sims and enforced within his officer corps, however, also admitted the 
difficulties between the men of lower ranks. ‘But in spite of the efforts of the Officers, 
arguments, relieved by brawls, arose between the enlisted men.’233 
Sims fully acknowledged his anglophilia and did not attempt to deny his affections for 
the things British. 
In all this you must give me credit for being reasonably honest. You must not 
assume that because I am pro-British and pro-French and pro-all the rest of the 
Allies I am necessarily anti-American. I have lived a long time in the United 
States (forty-six years). I have shown some interest in the efficiency of our 
Navy. I am fifty-nine years old and have a modest reputation for reasonable 
independence of thought. So do not assume in the pride of intellect that I am 
owned by the British or any other Admiralty. If you do not think a pro-ally is 
the right kind of man for this job, they should have sent a pro-Prussian with a 
trunk full of bombs.234 
 
The relationship between the Americans and British was complex, with no doubt.235 
However, Sims’ personal feelings toward the British were motivated in ensuring that the war 
was won, and he endeavored to foster good relations, even with the most disagreeable 
members of the British authorities such as Admiral Bayly. Sims’ goal was simple; support the 
British Navy in its operations, secure safe Atlantic passage of transport and merchant ships, 
and defeat the German U-boat threat. In a June 1917 letter to Secretary of the Navy Daniels, 
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Sims clearly explains his sense of urgency and need for cooperation. ‘. . . I consider that the 
military situation is very grave indeed. . . . My reasons for being so insistent in my cable 
despatches have been because of my conviction that measures of cooperation which we may 
take will be inefficient if they are not put into operations immediately, that is within a 
month.’236  
 
The Royal Air Force and British Complex Desire for Americans 
The Marine Corps’ first organization to command multiple squadrons, the First 
Marine Aviation Force (FMAF), arrived in France at the end of July 1919.  By this time, the 
RAF, as a separate service, had already served for more than four months over the Channel 
Coast in efforts to combat the U-Boat danger. Four years of war had taken its toll—hundreds 
of British airmen had been killed on the Western Front and many more tragically in training 
on the home front.237 After four years of bloodshed, the arrival of fresh troops from the 
United States, at first glance appeared as a blessing. This portion of the chapter will explore 
the complex nature of the RAF’s desire for American support, manpower, and equipment in 
the months between the entry of the United States and the arrival of the FMAF in order to 
then investigate the integration of the two air organizations. In November 1917, Major 
General Salmond, Director-General of Military Aeronautics in the War Office, estimated that 
despite great strides, the actual numbers of mechanics and other personnel with technical 
skills was far from meeting demand. Despite efforts to locate suitable candidates within the 
British Army, staffing was still inadequate and help was sought from the Americans. An 
agreement was reached and fifteen thousand American mechanics were sent direct to Britain 
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for service with the RFC units. The already trained British personnel were then free to be 
placed with the operating units along the Western Front.238  
Further, the arrival of the American Naval air service also meant additional strain on 
the aircraft production in Great Britain. ‘The planned expansion of American air services 
meant that the US was less willing to offer Britain her raw materials (such as spruce for 
aircraft construction) and finished aircraft and engines.’239 Furthermore, the supply of Liberty 
engines from the United States simply did not materialize in the numbers promised by it. 
‘Total deliveries of the Liberty were, according to the November 1917 schedule, to reach a 
figure of 9,420 by the end of May 1918.’240 However, actual numbers received were a 
fraction of those promised. Additional stress caused by the arrival of the Americans impacted 
the overall ability to man and equip squadrons. The Americans were a blessing and a curse. 
The desire for fresh troops and equipment from the United States conflicted with Britain’s 
need to continue to supply its own aviation forces with equipment and made the arrival of the 
Americans bittersweet.  
The British desired American pilots, mechanics, aircraft, and equipment the longer the 
war continued. However, this desire for American men and materiel placed a burden on the 
relationship between the Americans and the British. As it has been covered in Raleigh and 
Jones’ The War in the Air and Abbatiello’s Anti-submarine Warfare in World War I, the 
British were increasingly dependent upon the supply chain stretching across the Atlantic 
where Americans promised much-needed aircraft materials such as Washington and Oregon 
Spruce for frames, Liberty engines for bombers, mechanics to repair and build airframes, and 
the pilots to fill the ranks. In fact a prime example of the need for raw materials from the 
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United States was the need for Spruce, which was a primary ingredient in aircraft airframes. 
The 21 September 1917 report, authored by Air Board member Sir William Weir, on the 
American air effort, stated that over all other allied countries, the British should receive fifty 
percent of the allocated Spruce.241 However, with the entry of the Americans into the fight, 
the priority of supply was given to the American forces. ‘So far as concerns supply, therefore, 
it may be said that America was on the side of the Allies from the beginning. When, 
however, she began to organize forces of her own, subsequent to her declaration of war, she 
could do so only at the expense of the Allies in the early stages.’242  
The troubles with shortages within British aviation forces on the Channel Coast were 
also caused due to the March 1918 creation of the RAF and efforts to focus resources on the 
bombing and fighter squadrons operating in France over the Western Front. However, the 
reorganization and reallocation of men and materiel away from Flanders and the German 
submarine bases seemingly did not cause a great deal of anxiety within the Royal Air Force 
as it opened an opportunity for the US Navy and Marine Corps aviation service to fill any 
gaps. ‘The United States naval authorities had agreed to form a bombing group which would 
have for particular object attacks on the German U-boat bases as Bruges, Zeebrugge and 
Ostend.’243 In addition to the creation of the Northern Bombing Group, used to aid the Royal 
Air Force’s mission of hemming in the German U-boats, American aviators from the Navy 
and Marine Corps were integrated into the Royal Air Force squadrons—a much needed 
influx of new men to fly empty airplanes that provided combat training for the novice 
American pilots.  Cunningham, commander of the Marine Corps First Marine Aviation Force 
(Day Wing) of the Northern Bombing Group, realized the shortage of aircraft for his 
squadron was causing a dulling of the skills of his pilots and observers, and that the British 
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were in need of trained pilots. ‘I have had the pilots going over the lines on raids with the 
British squadrons and so far, they have done excellent work.’244 
Indeed the British required the additional manpower and supplies that the American 
entry into the war brought to bear, so too in return, the Americans needed the hard-earned 
skills and experience that the British had gained in the previous three years of war. The 
relationship was not perfect, nor were the solutions to the shortages in experienced pilots or 
fully functioning aircraft. However, the British agreement of training American naval 
aviators and allowing them to fly in the RAF squadrons until their own squadrons were fully 
capable proved a positive and productive experience. In the end, each country needed the 
other for a variety of reasons, and their cooperation with one another, despite any differences, 
yielded a strong force against Germany. 
American Pilots in the Royal Air Force 
Well known are those Americans who volunteered to fight in the skies over Europe 
for France before the United States entered the war—the Lafayette Escadrille was an 
organization within the French Air Service formed of volunteers from America.245 However, 
there were literally hundreds of Americans who served, in a variety of capacities, with the 
RFC, RNAS, and RAF during the Great War. This section will examine those Americans in 
service with the British as well as the Marines who temporarily joined the ranks of the RAF’s 
217 and 218 Squadrons in the closing months of the war, and how their British counterparts 
viewed them.  
American men desiring to enter the war in Europe before the United States declared 
war were known to cross in to Canada and enlist in either the Canadian forces or join the 
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British military outright. Those with aspirations of taking flight were no different. 
‘Approximately three hundred Americans joined the Royal Flying Corps, the Royal Naval 
Air Service, and the Royal Air Force. Most of these young men journeyed to Canada, where 
they enlisted and did part of their ground and air training.’246 The true number of Americans 
who took this route to war is closer to five hundred, but cannot truly be known owing to the 
fact that many feared losing their American citizenship and therefore simply claimed to be 
Canadian upon enlistment.247 In fact, one American, who later became a Marine aviator, had 
crossed the Canadian border with the intention of flying for the British before the American 
entry into the war. Marcus A. Jordan, a native of Washington, DC, enlisted in the Canadian 
Army in the hopes of joining the RFC in April 1916; however, by November of the same 
year he resigned from the service and returned to the United States stating he ‘was unable to 
be transferred to the Royal Flying Corps without becoming a naturalized British subject.’248 
As historian S. F. Wise discussed in Canadian Airmen and the First World War, Volume I 
(1980), enlistments of Americans commenced in the earliest days of the war, both for the 
Canadian military as well as that of the British. While enlistments took place, they were done 
so with care as not to unbalance the relations with the then-neutral American government.249 
Americans enlisted under their own initiative for a variety of reasons, including the desire to 
fly for the British and thereby aiding their war against Germany, some were eager to try 
flying, and then there were those who thought British aviation was superior than that of the 
United States.250 
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The multitude of published histories that cover the FMAF, including the official 
history written by the Marine Corps, all report that the Marine aviators arrived in Brest, 
France, in August 1918 and did so without functional aircraft; the personal narratives of the 
men themselves bolster this fact.251 ‘We landed in France about the end of July or the 1st of 
August . . . of course we had this problem: the British were short of pilots, and we were short 
of airplanes, so we were allowed to send some pilots to the British to fly their airplanes.’252 
Johnson’s Marine Corps Aviation: The Early Years, 1912–1940, the official history of 
Marine aviation’s earliest years, states that FMAF commanding officer Major Cunningham 
struck a deal with the British to allow Marines to fly with 217 and 218 Squadrons as they 
were flying the same aircraft that the Marines were waiting to receive.253 However, without a 
corresponding footnote, verification of Cunningham’s deal is unsubstantiated. In September 
1920, while attempting to convince the Marine Corps of the benefit of aviation, Cunningham 
gave a shortened history of the creation, deployment, and employment of Marine Corps 
aviation in ‘Value of Aviation to the Marine Corps’ published in Marine Corps Gazette.254 
However, conspicuously missing from his article are any details explaining how he integrated 
the Marines with the RAF; further, and more noticeably missing is any mention of his hand in 
the creation of the deal. In fact, Cunningham’s own 1931 letter to a fellow Marine, identified 
simply as Miller, states that the ‘British were short of pilots and in order to keep mine in 
practice I farmed as many as possible out to their Squadrons where they did splendid 
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work.’255 In light of the fact that Cunningham does not personally take credit for the 
arrangement in his personal correspondence, and that three Marines were assigned to the 
British before the arrival of the FMAF, it is doubtful Cunningham had anything to do with 
the arrangements, as Marines were already flying with the RAF before the arrival of the 
FMAF. 
A review of the operational records submitted by 217 and 218 Squadrons 
demonstrates that at least three Marines were flying with the British before the arrival of 
Cunningham—William M. McIlvain, Roy S. Geiger, and Edmund Gillette Chamberlain.256 
The FMAF arrived in the port of Brest on 30 July 1918 and did not disembark from the USS 
DeKalb until 1 August; Cunningham did not move his unit to Calais until 7 August.257 With 
just two days at their operational location, another five Marines are assigned to 218 
Squadron, which reinforces the notion that Cunningham did not broker the deal at that time 
and was more likely enjoying the fruits of a previously negotiated agreement.258 In fact, on 
22 July 1918, US Navy Captain David Hanrahan, commander of the Northern Bombing 
Group, wrote to the commander US Naval Aviation Forces Foreign Service, Captain Cone 
regarding the recent activities of several Marines already in France and flying with the 
British. Hanrahan’s letter not only details that four Marine pilots and three enlisted were in 
service with the British, but additionally that more training was planned. ‘An endeavor will 
be made to give as many of the flying personnel of the Marine Day Squadrons as possible, 
training over the lines before active operations of the squadrons.’259 
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The similarity of aircraft between that of the Marine’s and RAF 217 and 218 
Squadrons, combined with the inability to receive completed American shipments of DH-4 
aircraft from Pauillac made it desirable to bring the two forces together. In his 1 July 1918 
letter to Captain Cone, Brigadier General Charles L. Lambe, 5th Group commander proposed 
that any surplus pilots awaiting assignment should be sent to the RAF’s training facility at 
Audembert for additional training, to learn the lay of the land and additional gunnery 
training.260 While this appears to be the beginnings of bringing the American airmen to work 
with the RAF, the flight records for 218 Squadron show that Chamberlain himself was flying 
with the squadron on the same day as Lambe’s letter to Cone.261 Further to this, as early as 24 
May 1918, apparently in response to correspondence from Cone regarding American service 
with the RAF, Lambe replied ‘if it is your desire to co-operate with us in this [Dunkirk area] 
the time has come for you to inform our Admiralty and the Air Ministry.’262 While Cone’s 
initiating letter is not attached to the reply, it is implied that the American Naval Air Service 
wished to operate with the RAF 5th Group in antisubmarine patrols. Therefore this may 
possibly be the starting portion of the agreement that then brought Marine pilots into service 
with the RAF, and thus negates the long held belief that it was Cunningham who brokered the 
deal to have Marines fly with the British.  
Despite the fact that Cunningham was not the bargain broker, it remains that the 
Marines participated in training flights and combat missions with 217 and 218 Squadrons. 
Initially, the Marine pilots were only to complete three flights over the lines; however, as 
time went on, the Marines found themselves with the British longer and participating in more 
flights than the minimum. ‘I think probably about my third flight they had a big push on, and 
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so we just stayed with them [the RAF] until that thing simmered down.’263 First Lieutenant 
Francis P. Mulcahy flew with 218 Squadron and participated in a total of fourteen raids in 
September and October 1918, with nine raids during the first four days of October 1918 
alone.264 Despite the extensive number of flights that Mulcahy participated in with the 
British, his oral history interview was bereft of any insight or descriptions of the relationship 
between the British and American Marines; the fifty-year departure from the events simply 
took its toll on his memories. Retired Marine Corps Lieutenant General Karl S. Day’s 
interview fifty years after the fact was also lacking in details, save for method employed by 
the British to deal with new pilots—a method confirmed by retired Marine Corps Major 
General Ford O. Rogers’ interview. ‘I think I made five raids with the British, and I was 
always tail-end Charlie, a Yank.’265 Rogers offered slightly more clarification of Day’s 
remark when he stated, ‘They [the British] put us—always the newcomers were the last on 
the right, in the ‘V’, because if you got shot you hadn’t lost anything.’266 Yank or not, it was 
for the lack of combat experience and their fresh arrival that the British put the Americans in 
the end position of their flight formations, and not their nationality.  
Rogers’ only lasting memory of the British was more of an observation of an event 
and not based on any adverse actions taken against the Americans.  
It was perfect. They [the British] were cold-blooded. They were just as fine as 
could be. . . . This is why I was so impressed with them. I saw an ambulance 
come up to one of the planes [having landed after a raid]. I didn’t pay any 
attention to it. I was cold and wanted to go in. I had tea at 3 o’clock in the 
morning and I was going in to get breakfast. At the table the doctor came in, 
and McLarren [pilot of the plane met by the ambulance] said, ‘How’s 
Potts?”’The doc says, ‘He’s dead.’ Potts was McLarren’s rear seat gunner. It 
was the third boy killed behind him. So McLarren said, ‘Potts dead. Poor 
Potts. Pass the tea, will you?’267 
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The years of war and the losses of friends had clearly made an impression on the British. 
Rogers witnessed this first hand during his four raids with the British, and later as the 
influenza epidemic took hold of his Marine squadron as well as the inevitable combat losses. 
Regrettably, the British perspective on Americans assigned to the RAF is scant.  One 
example is that of British Sergeant Edward Farley, an observer with 217 Squadron, recorded 
his activities in his flight log book during his service. On 20 August 1918, Farley recorded 
the deaths of two Americans assigned to his squadron. ‘McKinnon and O’Gorman (USA) on 
patrol at same time crashed into sea off Dunkirk. O’Gorman picked up dead. Skull, arms, legs 
and back broken. Pilot not found.’268 Normally given to lengthier commentary in previous 
and subsequent diary entries, Farley reports the incident without emotion and demonstrates 
Rogers’ observations of the British.   
While personal observations of the Marines and RAF are not voluminous, there are 
other materials that aid in a better understanding of the relationship between the British and 
American airmen. Personal narratives of those Americans who joined the RAF outright; those 
who were in the US Army Air Service (USAS) and were trained by the British; those who 
left the USAS to join the RAF; and those of the US Naval Air Service who flew their first 
combat missions with the RAF alongside the Marines all prove a valuable source in 
investigating the relations between the British RAF personnel and their American 
counterparts. The personal diaries and compilations of correspondence left behind by these 
men offer a window into the relationship between the American and British pilots. Those 
with the closest relationship to the British were those Americans who crossed the border into 
Canada and joined the RFC. Two such men were Alvin A. Callender and Bogart Rogers. 
Callender’s service in the military began with duty on the Mexican border in 1916 with the 
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troubles with Poncho Villa. It appears his lust for the active service was powerful; with the 
entry of the United States into the war in April 1917, the mobilization of American military 
forces was too slow for Callender, therefore, he crossed into Canada and enlisted in the RFC 
in June 1917. In February 1918, Callender was stationed at the Central Flying School in 
Upavon, England, and reported to his mother on the composition of his class of students as 
well as the attitudes he witnessed.  
They [his fellow students] are mostly Canadians, R.F.C. Americans like 
myself, and some few South Africans and Australian Colonials. The 
Englishmen are considerably in the minority, thank goodness. The latter 
‘Cawn’t (sic) stand these beastly Colonials,’ and we in turn have no use 
whatever for them.269 
Callender’s letters home to his mother, other family and friends provides descriptions of 
training and of course his service with 32 Squadron over the trenches. Regrettably, his only 
remaining commentary regarding interaction with British was a conversation with Major 
Russell in which Callender was informed that despite being a legitimate member of the RAF, 
he may eventually be transferred to the American squadrons as they became more 
operational.270 Whatever his future, it was cut short on 30 October 1918 when Callender was 
killed in action. His writings were limited and not detailed enough to provide any real insight 
into how Americans were received by the British. 
In contrast to Callender, Bogart Rogers was a prolific a writer who survived the war. 
Rogers, a native of San Francisco and alum of Stanford University, learned of the RFC 
recruiting for its service in Canada and was intrigued. Within a month, he and four of his 
friends crossed the border and signed on to be aviators. Rogers appears to have been more 
gregarious than Callender, and while still in training, he appears eager to engage his fellow 
students light-heartedly, and they in return.  
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So this is Washington’s Birthday? Funny but they don’t seem to make any 
fuss about it over here. We had an argument at lunch today with a couple 
English boys and one of them pipes up ‘Who was this fellow Washington?’ 
Whereupon young Mr. Shapard of Tennessee says ‘Who was this guy Nelson? 
I hear a lot of talk about him over here.’271 
 
The opposing attitudes of the students in Callender’s and Rogers’ training squadrons may be 
simply the difference of their own personalities, but may also be very similar to the attitudes 
of the British as a whole toward the United States. Coincidently, Rogers and Callender served 
together in 32 Squadron. Their experiences may have been similar, but Callender’s lack of 
details makes a comparison difficult. However, in Rogers’ letters one can obtain more 
insight. Rogers and his fellow Americans brought their heritage to the English, for example, 
with lessons in baseball, albeit with a cricket bat. ‘It’s surely a treat to watch some of these 
Englishmen struggling with the intricacies of baseball, but they get on very well.’272 One 
interesting aspect of Rogers is that it seemed that while he tried indoctrinating the British into 
American culture, as his entries in his diaries and letters home show, the British life made an 
impact on him as well. A subtle change begins to emerge in his writings; his entries speak of 
Americans he encounters as if he was not an American himself. ‘Last night was our regular 
guest night and I had a couple fellows from an American squadron over.’273 Rogers survived 
the war, returned to the United States in 1919, was married in his RAF uniform and lived into 
his late sixties; which demonstrates the lasting positive impact of his service with the RAF, 
certainly not an acrimonious one.274  
Much like Naval Aviation, the USAS was still in its infancy when the United States 
entered the First World War. Shortage of combat ready aircraft and skilled pilots slowed the 
progress of the American Army to field aviation combat forces; therefore much like the US 
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Navy, the Army pilots were placed with the RAF for further training and combat flying until 
such time as they could be placed with American units.275 Two men who found themselves in 
this situation were Elliott White Springs and John McGavock Grider. Like Rogers and 
Callender, Springs and Grider were friends, trained with one another in England, and flew 
with RAF’s 85 Squadron together until Springs was wounded in action and subsequently 
transferred to 148th Aero Squadron of the American Air Service.276 Springs and Grider had 
initially been bound for service in Italy; however, upon arriving in Liverpool, they were 
quickly informed that they were to report to Oxford University. Grider recorded the change in 
his diary:  
We aren’t going to Italy afterall [sic]. We’ve got to go to Ground School all 
over again. Our orders got all bawled up in Paris and MacDill, La Guardia, the 
doctors, the enlisted men and Spalding have gone to France. . . . Somebody 
had made a mistake. All our mail is in Italy, all our money is in lira and our 
letters of credit are drawn on banks in Rome and we’ve wasted two weeks 
studying Italian and two months going to Ground School learning nonsense 
for now we’ve got to go thru this British Ground School here.277 
 
The Americans were sent by train to Oxford and amalgamated into the training regimen. 
They began to enjoy their British officers and vice versa, as noted by Springs in a letter to his 
mother in November 1917, ‘I’m getting along fine with these English officers. Particularly so 
since we have 360 lbs of sugar which we brought over with us.’278 The sugar was welcome to 
the British after many years of rations; however, not all things American were wanted by the 
locals. In May 1918, Grider records in his diary an incident with British soldiers that reveals 
more about the delicate relationship between the two nations.  
There were a couple of Guards officers in there and they all got to chewing the 
rag. The Guards officers began taking cracks at the American Army. One of 
them, a long tall bird, said, ‘I’ve been reading in the papers until I’m bloody 
                                                        
275 For additional information on the US Army Air Service’s development and operations in the First World War see Maurer 
Maurer’s Aviation in the U.S. Army, 1919–1939 (Washington, DC: Office of Air Force History, 1987) and The U.S. Air 
Service in World War I. 4 Vols. (Washington, DC: Office of Air Force History, 1978–1979). 
276 Elliott White Springs, Letters from a War Bird. The World War I Correspondence of Elliott White Springs. Ed. David K. 
Vaughn, (Columbia, SC: The University of South Carolina Press, 2012), 173.  
277 John M. Grider Diary Entry, 3 October 1917, [John McGavock Grider?], War Birds. Diary of an Unknown Aviator. Ed. 
[Elliott White Springs?], (New York: George H. Doran Company, 1926), 25.  
278 Elliott W. Springs to Lena Springs, 1 November 1917, Springs, Letters from a War Bird, 44. 
 107 
well sick of it, about the number of American troops that have come over. But 
what I can’t understand is why none of them will fight. Paris is full of them, 
London is full of them, but they all jolly well stay away from the front. None 
of them will fight.’279 
 
There is no doubt, the slow moving nature of the American military, and the apparent 
late entry into the war, seemed to their Allies as unwillingness to fight. The experiences of 
American military servicemen in Britain during the First World War may have had an impact 
on the reasons the Americans created guide books for their servicemen in the Second World 
War. In fact, the American War Department issued several guide books for the various 
countries in which the US military had a significant presence such as Britain and China. It is 
logical to think that much of the experiences of Americans in Britain in 1917–-1918 
necessitated the creation of the guide books three decades later.280 
Grider’s and Springs’ diary entries and letters often wax and wane between being 
hostile toward the British and being thoroughly impressed by them.  
Yet you’d be surprised to see how well Americans are getting along over 
here, much better than I expected. We were about the first American troops 
in England and I foresaw numerous difficulties which seem to have been 
overcome very well.281  
 
Interestingly, just as it did with Callender and Rogers, the attitudes of Springs and Grider 
seem to become more British than American. In June 1917, Grider records his thoughts on 
the American way versus the British way of handling morale, stating, ‘There’s one thing 
about the British I like—they realize the importance of morale. The British try to build it up, 
the Americans try to tear it down.’282  
An example of how close some Americans came to their British counterparts is in 
July 1918 when Springs was nearly confined to a mental hospital for refusing a promotion 
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and transfer to 148th Aero Squadron of the American Air Service. His comfort with, and 
devotion to his comrades in 85 Squadron overrode his common sense. While Springs’ letter 
of 18 July 1918 to his mother glosses over the topic, Grider’s diary entry does not. 
The reason the doc was so sure he [Springs] was crazy was that he overheard a 
telephone conversation. Major Fowler’s adjutant called up to tell him that he’d 
been made a flight commander in the new American squadron up at Dunkirk. 
Springs said he didn’t want to be flight commander and he didn’t want to go to 
any American squadron. He told the adjutant to give the job to some one [sic] 
else quick. The doc overheard him refusing promotion and sure he was 
cuckoo. 283 
 
Springs was transferred to 148th Squadron and Grider remained behind; while Springs 
survived the war, Grider was one of the many pilots killed in action on 18 June 1918. 
In comparison to those of the Army’s pilots with the British, the American Naval Air 
Service aviators, mechanics, and observers also left lasting memoirs and personal 
observations. The American Naval Air Service was intended to serve as a countermeasure to 
the German U-boat menace by operating out of Calais and Dunkirk regions off the English 
Channel functioning in tandem with the RAF upon its arrival in Europe. However, a lack of 
fully trained pilots and completely operational aircraft stymied the hopes of the naval 
aviators. In the fall of 1917, as the short-comings became apparent, the American Naval 
authorities worked out an agreement with the Admiralty for advanced flight training of 
American naval aviators at RFC schools in Gosport, Turnberry, and Ayr.284 Two of the pilots 
who were sent for additional training were David S. Ingalls and Kenneth MacLeish, both 
members of the First Yale Unit.285  
MacLeish was a first generation American born in Illinois on 19 September 1894; his 
father emigrated from Scotland in 1856 at the age of eighteen. MacLeish entered Yale 
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University in the autumn of 1914 where he was an avid athlete who was less than stellar 
academically. MacLeish joined the First Yale Unit late in 1917 and by the end of the year he 
was in Gosport, England, for ground flight training.286 Albeit in England for a short period of 
time, in his 16 December 1917 letter to his family, he was keenly aware of the slow progress 
of American naval aviation. ‘I wonder if the Americans really will wake up and send over the 
promised ten thousand aviators and machines.’287 MacLeish served with the British in the 
RNAS and RAF while under instruction at Gosport, Turnberry, and Ayr, as well as in 
operations in the air with 213 and 218 Squadrons. However, his correspondence to his family 
and fiancée was often harsh in relation to those he deemed hard guys—Americans in the US 
Army, Marines, and especially enlisted US Sailors as well as those back in the United States 
whom he saw as slackers.288 Despite the comments toward his fellow Americans, MacLeish 
seemed to enjoy the British and their military. ‘The RNAS is a wonderful organization, and 
the men in it are perfectly wonderful too. There’s no crowd I’d rather fight with at the 
moment.’289 It is possible that his upper-class ivy-league education created a conceited 
attitude in MacLeish, and that combined with the British environment and military hierarchy 
fed his predispositions against those whom he deemed inferior—particularly the enlisted 
Sailors and Marines. Regrettably, the plethora of correspondence MacLeish left behind 
provides little insight into the relations between the United States and the British, and his 
death in combat in October 1918, ended the hopes of further commentary. 
Very similar to MacLeish was the younger David S. Ingalls. Also of a well-to-do 
family, he was born 28 January 1899 and was just sixteen when he entered Yale University. 
In 1917, as the First Yale Unit expanded with men wishing to win the war, Ingalls joined the 
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group, still just seventeen years of age.290 It is in Ingalls’ correspondence that it is understood 
why little information regarding the relationship between the British and Americans is found 
within MacLeish’s materials. While training at Gosport, there were very few, if any British 
students and instructors; the Americans nearly had free-reign at the schools.291 However, as 
previously stated while at Ayr, the Americans were enrolled with virtually the entire cross-
section of the British Empire—fellow students from South Africa, Canada, and the many 
other parts of the United Kingdom. Ingalls’ first operational assignment was to the RAF’s 
213 Squadron, which was operating out of Dunkirk. He noted his interactions with fellow 
Americans to his father in March 1918 that the accommodations and fellow pilots were to his 
liking. ‘The men here are a great bunch, and we have very comfortable quarters, perhaps not 
quite so palatial as our former mansion, but yet tres bon.’292 Like many of the other 
Americans posted to the British units, baseball was a common game and Ingalls, just as 
Rogers, lightheartedly attempted to teach the British to play baseball.293  
With the limited personal narratives available with regard to Americans who flew 
specifically with the British, the sample size is simply not enough to draw definitive 
conclusions about the nature of relations between the British and the Americans. However, 
what is apparent is that the men worked together against a common enemy, and their 
differences did not get in the way of ensuring the mission was accomplished. With such 
diverse personalities and nationalities in the units investigated in the personal narratives, it is 
apparent that the Americans melded well into the Commonwealth of Nations that made up 
the RAF squadrons during the First World War. 
Integration in Action 
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The FMAF, the cumulative unit of Marine aviation in Europe in the First World War, 
arrived in Brest, France on 30 July 1918; the unit did not receive its first functional aircraft 
until 7 September 1918.294 The gap of nearly six weeks could have severely stunted the 
abilities of those already trained as pilots, and halted the ability to create new pilots within 
the Marine Corps while in France. This possible calamity was averted; on 9 August 1918, 
Marine officers 1st Lieutenants Robert S. Lytle, Arthur H. Wright, 2d Lieutenants Charles R. 
Needham, William A. McSorley, and Donald N. Whiting, joined by Navy pilot Lieutenant 
(junior grade) Herman A. Peterson, were assigned to the RAF’s 218 Squadron, a DH-9 day 
bombing squadron from the FMAF’s Squadron C. 295 Each individual was already designated 
as a Naval Aviator or observer and were given the opportunity for actual combat flying. This 
initial group returned to the FMAF from 218 Squadron on 20 August and quickly replaced 
the next day by 1st Lieutenants Everett R. Brewer, John G. E. Kipp, and Francis P. Mulcahy 
and their observers Gunnery Sergeant Harry R. Wershiner, Sergeant Archie Paschal, and 
Corporal Thomas L. McCullough from 1st Squadron, FMAF.296 A second set of Marines was 
assigned to 217 Squadron, DH-4 day bombing squadron, the same day. 297 In order to ensure 
a cumulative pool of trained pilots, the Marines assigned potential pilots to the British Pilots 
Pool in Audembert, France, starting on 4 September 1918.298 Over the remaining months of 
the war, at least forty Marines were trained by the British to be combat pilots.299 These 
Marines, and those who replaced them were the first combat trained aviators in the Corps, 
and many took their skills into the interwar period and in turn taught the next generation. 
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The mission of 217 and 218 Squadrons was not aerial combat, but day bombing of 
German submarine pens and canals that provided the German U-boats access to the English 
Channel. And yet, as the U-boat threat waned, Marines were able to accomplish several 
missions, which their aviation force embraced in years subsequent to the war. While not the 
primary mission, aerial combat was the natural outcome when enemy aircraft were 
encountered; thus the first enemy shot down by US Marines took place while flying with 218 
Squadron on 28 September 1918, by pilot 1st Lieutenant Brewer and his observer Gunnery 
Sergeant Wershiner. During a raid over Courtemarke, Belgium, Brewer and Wershiner were 
embroiled in aerial combat with fifteen German aircraft. Historic in itself, further to the aerial 
combat, in the ensuing aerial acrobatics, Wershiner was reportedly ejected from his gunnery 
cockpit but managed to hang on to the aircraft. He scrambled back to his position and 
resumed firing at the attacking aircraft.300 Both Brewer and Wershiner were wounded, but 
survived and returned to the air station.301 Their actions were recognized by the award of the 
Navy Cross; Wershiner’s citation does not include the near fatal fall, but does state that the 
Marines possibly shot down a second enemy aircraft in the same action. 
For extraordinary heroism as an observer in the First Marine Aviation Force at 
the Front in France. On September 28th, 1918, while on an air raid into enemy 
territory, his plane attacked by fifteen enemy scouts. Despite the 
overwhelming odds he fought with great gallantry and intrepidity. He shot 
down two enemy scouts (one officially allowed) and although he himself was 
shot through the lungs, and his pilot shot through the hips, he continued the 
fight until he was able to shake off the enemy.302 
 
The second possible downed enemy aircraft was disallowed as the authorities ‘were 
unable to get particulars owing to his (Brewer’s) precarious state.’303 Major Bert 
Wemp’s, commanding officer of 218 Squadron, report was filed with the Marines to 
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ensure that proper credit was received even though they were unable to provide their 
own statements having been sent away immediately to receive medical treatment for 
their wounds. 
An additional skill learned by the Marines while with the British is an aspect of 
today’s Marine Corps aviation—support of the ground forces. One such mission was the first 
aerial resupply mission in Corps history, which was accomplished on 2 October 1918.304 
New promoted-Captain Mulcahy and Corporal McCullough, along with 1st Lieutenant Lytle 
and Sergeant Amil Wiman, and 2d Lieutenant Frank Nelms with Corporal Henry Tallman 
flew through vicious German rifle, machine gun, and artillery fire just one hundred feet above 
the ground and dropped forty-nine bags of food containing bread and canned goods as well as 
other supplies to a French regiment near Stadenburg in Belgium, which had been isolated for 
several days. The Marines accumulated just over nine hours of flight time in ten flights over 
the beleaguered French forces while with 218 Squadron.305 In his 1920 article ‘The Value of 
Aviation to the Marine Corps,’ Cunningham extolled the virtues of aviation to a skeptical 
Marine Corps based on the lessons of his experiences in the First World War, lessons such as 
aerial resupply. Cunningham asserted that the only reason for aviation was the assistance of 
‘the troops on the ground to successfully carry out their missions.’306 Therefore, the aerial 
resupply mission conducted by the Mulcahy/McCullough and Lytle/Wiman teams was not 
simply an isolated, singular event that took place while Marines were with the RAF; rather, it 
was a critical skill set learned and thus laid the foundation for the future operations of Marine 
aviation.  
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Of the 2,462 men who served in Marine Aviation during the First World War, 1,060 
served in France.307 Nearly ten percent of the total number of aviation Marines, 103 men, 
served or trained with the British in the few short months before the end of the war. These 
men served more than 1,375 man-days with the RAF averaging nine days per man. With the 
help of the skills learned while flying with the British, two Marines later earned the Medal of 
Honor, four were awarded the Navy’s Distinguished Service Medal, and another sixteen 
earned the Navy Cross—the top three decorations given by the United States military of that 
time.308 With the training and combat experiences earned with the British, the FMAF 
accumulated a record of 126 flights and at least twelve independent raids; certainly an 
impressive number considering that the unit managed only eighteen aircraft of its own in 
commission by the time of the armistice.309 
 
Conclusion 
The first practical application of Marine aviation in combat was not a Marine-only 
event; the British deserve most of the credit for the successes of the FMAF in France during 
the First World War. As demonstrated, the Marines arrived in France without equipment but 
with a mission and a small pool of trained pilots, mechanics, observers, and gunners. This 
small pool of men were not equipped with the practical skills needed to participate in 
antisubmarine warfare and later, air-to-air combat, and air support of ground forces—all this 
was learned by their service with the well-equipped and skilled British. Despite the lack of 
records detailing the personal interactions of the Americans and the British, the few surviving 
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pieces do indicate that the relations at the individual level were as complicated as they were 
at the national level. The British soldiers and airmen knew that the added manpower of the 
Americans was required but were skeptical that their new allies would or could fight after 
taking, what seemed to them, an inordinate amount of time to enter the war in the first place. 
American bravado and eagerness to demonstrate fighting prowess often clashed with the 
British.  
The successes of the FMAF were a direct result of its service with the RAF. As 
demonstrated by the 1st Marine Aeronautic Company in the Azores, flying boats and 
floatplanes were no longer the aircraft of choice as the antisubmarine mission waned. The 
aircraft required to conduct air-to-air combat over land, and the ability to resupply ground 
forces from the air could not be achieved by the slow moving seaplanes. In fact, the De 
Havilland DH-4 had a maximum speed of 198 kilometers per hour, which was at least 60 
kilometers per hour more than both the Curtiss R-6 and Curtiss HS-2L seaplanes.310  
The integration of the USMC and the RAF during the First World War, albeit brief, 
would prove to have a lasting impact on the Marine Corps as the Marines who remained in 
the Corps throughout the Interwar years of the 1920s and 1930s would pass on their skills to 
the younger generation of aviators and thus set the Corps up for success in the Second World 
War.  The experiences of the FMAF with the RAF gave the Corps a foundation of skills and 
successes, which Cunningham could use to ensure aviation, remained within the arsenal.  
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Chapter Four:  
INTEGRATION GONE TOO FAR? THE CURIOUS CASE OF  
CAPTAIN EDMUND G. CHAMBERLAIN, USMC 
 
 
A unique event in the history of the RAF and USMC integration is that of Captain 
Edmund Gillette Chamberlain, US Marine. It offers a distinctive window into the integration 
and interrelation of the two services during the war. The events surrounding the actions of 
Chamberlain offers a chance to view the integration of the two services on a non-operational, 
and more personal level as well as a means of possibly identifying any friction points 
between the RAF and USMC.  The Chamberlain case will demonstrate that American Navy 
and Marine Corps aviation were engaged with the British and operating as a unified force 
against the Germans—nearly fully amalgamated, unlike their infantry counterparts. 
On 21 September 1921, the headlines of The Independent proclaimed that Marine 
Captain Chamberlain was the latest hero in the First World War.311 The very short article, 
which included a photograph of the Marine, stated that while on holiday he flew with a 
British squadron and in that time downed five German aircraft, disabled two more, crash-
landed behind enemy lines, took a German prisoner, and saved a French officer before 
making it back to allied lines. The article further states that for his actions, Chamberlain was 
recommended for the Victoria Cross and the Medal of Honor.312 However, by the time this 
article—and the dozens of others—was published, Chamberlain was already under 
investigation by the Navy for concocting the entire story.  
Chamberlain’s story began to unravel soon after it had been reported. The first person 
to challenge the reported events was RAF Brigadier General Salmond, commander of the 
RAF in the Field.313 Were his objections based on facts, natural suspicions or were they the 
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biased opinions of a British officer against the American? As the story spread, Chamberlain 
was investigated and eventually court-martialed for forgery and scandalous conduct. A key 
member of the events leading to the court-martial was none other than Admiral Sims, the 
commander of all American naval forces in Europe and one of the ringleaders of the 1908 
affair to dissolve the Marine Corps; therefore Sims’ actions are investigated to understand if 
they were simply out of hatred for the Corps and desire to blacken the reputation of the 
unseasoned air service or a natural reaction to the events as they occurred.  
Had Chamberlain achieved the feats of flying as he claimed, he would have been the 
first Marine to be recommended for not only the Medal of Honor but the British Victoria 
Cross as well. The publicity spotlight would have shone brightly on the Corps, only a few 
months after it had done for those Marines who fought at Belleau Wood. The battle of 
Belleau Wood in June 1918 garnered a great deal of American media attention, and contrary 
to the military orders of the day, identified Marines as the main participants, thereby angering 
the Army leadership.314 The ramifications of the media attention gained by Marines for their 
actions at Belleau Wood later were revisited when Army generals such as Dwight 
Eisenhower lead the efforts in 1947 to eliminate the Marine Corps from the Department of 
Defense.  
Chamberlain, the Man and the Aviator 
Chamberlain was born to Edwin and Adelaide Chamberlain in San Antonio, Texas, 
on 14 June 1891.315 His deceptions began at an early age. He claimed that after attending the 
local San Antonio Academy, he attended Princeton, but transferred back to the University of 
Texas at San Antonio where he completed his degree in engineering.316 Checking the 
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Princeton Alumni database for Chamberlain confirms the 1920 report—only his brother 
Fidelio is recorded.317 The truth was that Chamberlain did not enter Princeton, but entered the 
Lawrenceville School in New Jersey in September 1909 and over the course of two and a half 
years attended sporadically. In June 1911, he wrote the headmaster of the school seeking 
advice.  
Doctor I wish to [ask] your advice, as I know you will be perfectly candid 
with me! [I think] I might got up to [the University of] Texas, and see if I 
could enter there in September . . . and go there this next year, then enter the 
Freshman class at Princeton.318 
 
Chamberlain spent a considerable amount of time away from the Lawrenceville School due 
to sports injuries and his mother’s poor health. After requesting advice from the headmaster, 
he returned to the school the next academic year, yet once again injured himself and returned 
to Texas to heal. By June 1912, Chamberlain withdrew from Lawrenceville for the last time, 
and by October of that year, he was enrolled in the University of Texas at Austin.319 The 
University confirmed Chamberlain’s first semester was in fall 1912 and his last was fall 
1913, but that no degree had ever been conferred upon him.320  
As previously discussed, during the period of 1909 to 1912, Chamberlain was often in 
Lawrenceville attending school in preparation for entering college, and when not in New 
Jersey, he was in Texas recuperating from a variety of physical injuries. However, he stated 
that, ‘When war broke out I immediately asked to be placed in aviation, as I had been flying 
ever since 1911. In different ways I had learned to fly, just personally at my home, which is 
quite a flying center—San Antonio, Tex.’321 With these considerations, and the fact that 
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flying in the earliest days required complete concentration and physical strength, it is highly 
unlikely Chamberlain spent enough time learning to fly to be qualified as an actual pilot—
more likely no time at all. His Marine Corps superiors further emphasized this fact; 
Cunningham reported that Chamberlain was not a qualified flier upon his entry into the 
Marine Corps. ‘He [Chamberlain] had told me he had flown before, but I got Major Geiger to 
take him out and give him a check hop. Major Geiger reported back that he could not fly at 
all. So after that he [Chamberlain] was given instruction by one of the officers, probably 
Captain McIlvain.’322 Geiger himself stated that during the check hop Chamberlain was given 
the controls of the aircraft twice and practically went into a spin.323 Chamberlain’s 
exaggerations did not simply end with the ability to fly, during testimony in 1921, 
Cunningham stated: 
He [Chamberlain] told me that he had been flying a great deal in Texas and 
Mexico, or rather, on the border; that he had flown a great deal with Colonel 
Carberry,∗ of the Army, and other Army officers around there, and that he had 
a great deal of experience in Mexican revolutions. I think he said he was a spy 
at one time of either Villa [General Francisco ‘Pancho’ Villa ] or some other 
person.324 
 
Chamberlain entered active service in the Marine Corps on 2 May 1917 and was 
assigned to the Aeronautic Company, which was stationed at Marine Barracks Philadelphia 
as part of the Advanced Base Force.325 The Aeronautic Company, training in seaplane 
aviation, was enhanced by Cunningham’s arrangement with Army Signal Corps commander 
Colonel Henry H. “Hap” Arnold in October 1917. The squadron, Chamberlain included, was 
relocated to Army Aviation School in Mineola, New York, for basic flight training—
landplane flight training.326  
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As the winter weather made flying increasingly difficult for the Marines, and 
advanced training was required, the squadron was relocated once again to Gerstner Field in 
Lake Charles, Louisiana; Chamberlain again made the move with the unit.327 However, he 
did not remain in Louisiana. Chamberlain traveled to Buffalo and Ithaca, New York, to the 
factories of the Glenn Curtiss and Thomas Morse Companies respectively to conduct liaison 
and inspect the factories.328 As his temporary duty was completed, Chamberlain was sent 
back to Miami in mid-April 1918.329  
On 7 May 1918, in one of his lengthy letters to Geiger, Cunningham informed his 
subordinate that his office had received a telegram. ‘I received a wire from Chamberlain 
stating that you were flying an average of only eight machines. I hope you will be able to get 
considerably more than this at work.’330 From the tone of the response elicited by 
Chamberlain’s telegram, Cunningham was unhappy with Geiger’s performance. If this was 
Chamberlain’s intent, it appears as if he was attempting to cause his commanding officer to 
fall out of favor with the head of Marine aviation, for possible personal gain. 
Chamberlain’s efforts, malicious or not, were cut short when he received orders to 
deploy to France ahead of the main body of Marine Aviation on 9 May 1918. The reasoning 
is unclear, based on his own testimony his method of receiving orders is clouded. Initially in 
Chamberlain’s testimony before the Subcommittee, he stated: 
I had made requests from the first day I got in. I had made so many I don’t 
know how many I did make, but I know I made several official requests. I was 
sent as the first [Marine] active flier ahead of my squadron to keep the Marine 
Corps aviation in this country in touch with the plans that the Navy had to use 
our planes in France. . . . I was sent to follow up his [Cunningham’s] work and 
to keep the plans that he had made in touch with this country and to advise this 
                                                        
327 Major General Commandant to Commanding Officer First Marine Aviation Squadron, 31 December 1917. Roger 
Emmons Personal Papers, Archives Branch, Marine Corps History Division, Quantico, VA. 
328 Orders of 14 March 1918, 23 March 1918 and 27 March 1918 to Edmund G. Chamberlain. Edmund Gillette Chamberlain 
Military Service Record. 
329 Douglas B. Roben to Alfred A. Cunningham, 15 April 1918, Alfred A. Cunningham Papers. 
330 Alfred A. Cunningham to Roy S. Geiger, 7 May 1918, Alfred A. Cunningham Papers,. 
 121 
country as to the different methods and through whom they could advise the 
Navy in France of the proper methods. 331  
 
Later, in additional testimony, Chamberlain states that it was his performance that 
garnered the attention of now-Major Bernard L. Smith, a Marine aviator stationed with the 
Chief of Naval Operations who was bound for France for temporary additional duty. ‘Maj. 
Smith was attaché in the American embassy in Paris from 1914 until 1917. He was then sent 
home for a few months and it was through his help and his knowledge of my work that I was 
sent to France, and I went over with him.’332 Regardless of his skills, it seems that 
Chamberlain’s assignment to be the advanced party of the Marine aviation contingent to 
arrive in France was not Smith’s doing, but that of Cunningham. ‘Chamberlain is to go 
abroad to collect our material on the other side [France]. I send him as being the only officer 
we could spare who is familiar with the work.’333 Cunningham clarified these events while 
testifying during the Senate Subcommittee hearings, and contesting the statement made by 
Smith at the same hearings.  
Major Smith was not connected in any way whatever with the northern 
bombing group [sic] or with Captain Chamberlain. . . . No one got Mr. 
Chamberlain’s orders to go to France except myself. . . . I sent Mr. 
Chamberlain because, in the first place, I thought he was a good officer, and 
he had asked me time after time, almost begged, to go over there [France] a 
number of times; and after I decided we needed an officer over there, I 
decided that I would let Chamberlain go.334 
 
A considerable shadow has been cast over Chamberlain’s service up to the point at 
which he arrived in France. This negative light, along with the previous inconsistencies 
established, taints every utterance that the Marine made and causes enough doubt as to his 
ability to fly and perform the acts he claimed. However, the testimony of those with whom he 
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served in active flights provides another point of view contradicting the negative comments. 
From 20 June to 13 July 1918, Chamberlain served with RAF’s 218 Squadron.335 A 
Canadian, Milton G. Baskerville, serving with the squadron testified during the court-martial 
in support of Chamberlain’s bravery. During a bombing run, the flight was attacked and spent 
considerable time fighting with German forces, during which Chamberlain did not drop his 
bombs. ‘Chamberlain hung on to his bombs all through this, and consequently he lost about 
three thousand feet scrapping . . . after that scrap was over and we had left Ostend, he 
remembered that he had his bombs and turned back . . . he went back to Ostend and dropped 
his bombs all alone.’336 In all the 140 questions asked of Baskerville, none were in reference 
to his actual flying ability being better than most or better than average, let alone if he was 
capable of climbing into an unfamiliar airframe and flying it without instruction.  
The only verifiable report of Chamberlain’s capabilities flying with a British squadron 
is that of Major Wemp, the commanding officer of 218 Squadron. Wemp reported that 
Chamberlain had proven ‘himself an experienced pilot at all altitudes over enemy territory, 
and his capabilities as a war pilot are excellent.’337 In his short time with 218 Squadron, 
Chamberlain accumulated eleven hours and fifteen minutes in combat flights and another 
twenty minutes in test flights.338  Chamberlain’s experience with the British was unique in 
comparison to the other Marines; his interactions were far more involved as they were more 
than just operational in nature and not as short-lived as most.  Thus, his experience provides 
an opportunity to more closely examine the relationship between the British and American 
Marines.  
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British Views of Chamberlain 
Aspects of the court-martial offer inside views to the larger relations with the RAF 
and the USN with respect to the Marine Corps; therefore the British views relative to the 
court-martial are discussed herein. Chamberlain’s exploit remained unchallenged by the 
Americans through the remainder of August and nearly through September 1918. However, it 
was the British who seemed to have targeted the Marine as unbelievable. With Marine 
aviation dependent upon the desires of the RAF in allowing Marines to fly and train with 
their squadrons, their views regarding Chamberlain’s alleged exploits are necessary to 
understand.  
The Marine’s own commanding officer was unaware of the alleged events, as he had 
yet to reach France; however, by autumn Cunningham was well versed in the details. 
Cunningham’s involvement with the Chamberlain events began when he accompanied 
Chamberlain to the office of Major General Salmond on 22 September 1918 when he was 
summoned.339 Regrettably, Salmond retained no personal correspondence or made any diary 
entries that give his personal thoughts on the Marine’s exploits; however, Salmond was not 
swayed by the Marine and clearly decided further action was required to ensure the exploit 
was discredited. The general’s report to the Air Ministry remains within the court documents 
and subsequent legal filings; the court of inquiry and succeeding court martial can be traced 
back to the actions of Salmond. After meeting with and questioning Chamberlain, Salmond 
filed a report with the Air Ministry. 340 Salmond further forwarded a copy of the report to the 
American Mission with an enclosure ‘stating that he considered the alleged exploits of Lieut. 
E. G. Chamberlain a fabrication . . . forwarding this information for whatever action you may 
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think necessary.’341 Salmond’s report sparked the court of inquiry by the US Navy, which in 
turn prompted the court-martial. 
It is a fair assertion on the behalf of the defense; Salmond’s report is quite damning 
when read without the ability to question the creator.  
I have interviewed Lieut. Chamberlain and his account of the affair was 
confused and far from satisfactory. I have come to the conclusion that the 
whole affair is a concoction of lies and forgeries.342 
 
Salmond’s are not the only thoughts available from the British perspective. 
Throughout the court of inquiry and the court martial, thirteen members of the RAF were 
brought to testify against Chamberlain. None indicated they knew the Marine during July 
1918, and none indicated he flew with their squadrons in July 1918. However, the testimony 
of Major R. S. Maxwell, former commanding officer of 54 Squadron, was most telling as he 
had interacted with Chamberlain in January 1919 and his comments seemed to corroborate 
the Marine’s claims. The two met in a restaurant in Lille, France, while Chamberlain 
attempted to scour the countryside for corroborating evidence of his exploits. Accompanying 
Chamberlain was US Navy Lieutenant Commander Frederick Allen, who later also testified 
in the court-martial. Upon entering the restaurant, Chamberlain and Allen noticed a group of 
RAF officers whom Chamberlain recognized from the night of his exploit; the Marine joined 
their table and began a ten-minute conversation. While Chamberlain claimed the conversation 
vindicated his account, Major Maxwell recalled it differently.  
We questioned him a good bit about it [the exploit] because we thought the 
thing had been a good bit exaggerated in the newspapers, and we had been 
rather treating the whole matter as a joke, and we talked to him rather with that 
in mind and not seriously at all . . . it seemed to us that the thing if not actually 
impossible, was very highly improbable as reported in the papers, and we 
were also quite certain that we would all have heard about it officially or seen 
it in communiqué and that sort of thing if it had actually happened, and we 
considered that it had not happened at the time.343 
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Maxwell’s testimony was advantageous for the defense and came during lengthy 
questioning on the stand. Maxwell was asked about permitting unofficial flights, his fear for 
admitting to allowing such flights and his perceived repercussions, which cast doubts on his 
veracity. Maxwell was queried: ‘If you had permitted, contrary to regulations, a person to 
make a flight, would you have any fear now in admitting it, at this time?’344 Maxwell replied 
that he was not sure as it was simply a hypothetical instance, and the counsel asked him why. 
His response was quite telling; it left open the idea that the British had simply closed ranks on 
Chamberlain and left him to the fates of the court-martial. ’If I was capable of disobeying 
such regulations and deliberately falsifying records in order to shield myself at the time it is 
quite conceivable that I would be capable of still concealing that information.’345 His 
statement about falsifying records seems in line with the statement Maxwell made to 
Lieutenant Commander Allen in January, ’Major Maxwell assured me that in such a case as 
Captain Chamberlain’s no commander would admit that the Captain had ever secured a 
machine . . . and that if he admitted that he had allowed Captain Chamberlain to fly he would 
probably be court-martialed and lose his majority, and even be reduced to the ranks.’346 The 
statements made by Maxwell give plenty of cause to believe that the British had motive and 
means to suppress the actions of Chamberlain and ensure that his entire story be discredited 
by the Navy’s court-martial. 
Of the thirteen RAF officers called to testify in the court-martial, only Maxwell 
indicated any interaction with the Marine above a mere passing introduction. Major C. C. 
Miles, former commanding officer of 43 Squadron testified as his squadron was stationed at 
Touquin Aerodrome. Miles was questioned with regard to any knowledge of the alleged 
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exploit; his answer is indicative of all officers who appeared. When asked if Chamberlain had 
used one of his airplanes to make the flight, Miles responded, ‘Certainly not from my 
squadron, and probably not from the aerodrome. . . . Because I would have heard an exciting 
thing like that, certainly.’347 Had the exploit taken place, it is quite true the aerodrome would 
have been filled with a considerable amount of discussion amongst the fliers; it would not 
have been easy to suppress, let alone conceal indefinitely. The events would have swept 
through the facility and anyone questioned about the event would surely have been privy to 
it. 
The testimony of the British officers leaves little room for Chamberlain’s actions to 
be true and accurate. It is more likely the Marine visited the aerodrome with a companion and 
departed the same day. In fact, Major Miles’ own testimony alludes to this fact, while not 
specifically identifying Chamberlain by name. Miles remembers an American visiting his 
squadron. 
I had an American, U.S. Air Service pilot, who was at that time on leave in 
Paris, and he came over one day bringing with him another American officer 
whom I think was a marine. They arrived early in the afternoon and they went 
away after tea.348 
   
The USAS pilot was identified as First Lieutenant George C. Whiting, who in fact 
was assigned to 43 Squadron and later transferred to the 148th Aero Squadron, a Sopwith 
Camel squadron.349 It is entirely possible that Whiting and Chamberlain were acquaintances, 
as the Army pilot attended military flight schools both in Miami, Florida, and Austin, Texas, 
between April and August 1917.350 Curiously, Chamberlain’s defense attorney did not call 
Lieutenant Whiting to refute the claims by Miles and it appears that no attempt was made to 
distance the Marine and the Soldier from one another. The possible answer to why not may 
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be the fact that the Marine did visit 43 Squadron at the Touquin Aerodrome with Whiting and 
did not want to bring this fact forward. However, just as curious, the prosecution did not call 
Whiting either to close the case easily. With the US military demobilizing as rapidly as it was 
mobilized, it is entirely possible that attempts were made by both sides to secure Whiting, but 
he was already returned to the United States. No documentation remains to provide the 
definitive answer. 
Conclusion 
It appears from the research that Captain Chamberlain was the only American Marine 
aviator court martialed for actions dealing with service with the RAF in the First World War. 
As such, the court martial offers a unique perspective, albeit limited, on the thoughts of the 
British toward the American Marines and is a unique case study of the larger tale of 
integration and relations between the US and Great Britain. The court-martial of this Marine 
could have been a catalyst for driving a wedge between the two militaries; however, it 
remained a localized affair despite a vigorous defense. While the Chamberlain court martial 
was a significant event for the First World War Marine Corps, the Day Wing of the Northern 
Bombing Group and Chamberlain himself, it did not make an impact on the RAF or the 
relations between the American and British air services, as demonstrated by the lack of 
documentation within the archives of the Royal Air Force and The National Archives at Kew, 
personal and official. 
The curious case of Captain Chamberlain is a view into the individual level relations 
of the Marines and British, demonstrating that the Americans were nearly fully amalgamated 
with the British.  The Americans did not balk or refuse to investigate the events when notified 
by Salmond of his suspicions, the American’s produced Chamberlain in Salmond’s office 
when called and the British allowed many of its officers to testify in the case.  These actions 
demonstrate that the RAF and USMC were cooperating fully as allies and were not at odds 
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with one another as the previous points of conflict discussed in previous chapters may have 
forecasted.  The Chamberlain case remains a curious affair in the history of the integration of 




IMPACT AND LEGACY OF US MARINES INTEGRATION WITH  
THE ROYAL AIR FORCE 
 
The lack of detailed information related to the integration of the Marines into the RAF 
in the official and secondary literature would indicate the impact was less than impressive. 
However, quite in contrast, based on the flight records of 217 and 218 Squadrons, the records 
of the FMAF and the muster rolls of the Marine Corps, it can be reasoned that the Marine 
Corps benefited greatly from the few months of experiences gained while serving with the 
British.  As the First Marine Aviation Force returned to the United States in late 1918, 
demobilization began in earnest.  Cunningham remained the titular head of the Corps’ 
aviation; he realized that aviation was not necessarily a permanent fixture. In the September 
1920 issue of “Marine Corps Gazette” Cunningham published his case for the value of 
aviation in the Marine Corps, and it is this article that demonstrates how the experiences of 
the FMAF in France and outlined his ideas for the expansion of size and skills of Marine 
aviation.351 In the article, Cunningham gave a brief history of the creation of Marine Corps 
aviation, but also detailed the record of achievement of the FMAF in France.  Cunningham 
understood that the positive achievements and experiences gained while serving with the 
RAF were the crux of demonstrating the usefulness of aviation to the Corps.   Additionally, 
while the majority of the FMAF was discharged as soon as it returned to the United State in 
early 1919, there were others who continued to serve the Corps during the Interwar period in 
Haiti, Nicaragua, the Dominican Republic, and across the country. There is no doubt the 
skills they learned while serving with the British served them well in the ensuing years, and 
were passed along to the next generation. The program of Marine Corps and British pilots 
serving with each other was utilized again in the Second World War during combined 
operations.  The lessons learned in France with the British were put to good use in the 
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Interwar period, which is when the skills of the pilots and abilities of the aircraft were honed 
and demonstrated the usefulness of aviation to the Corps.  Indeed most Marines of FMAF 
were discharged upon returning from France, however, five of the Marines went on to serve 
as general officers fighting the Japanese in the Pacific.352  Regrettably, personal papers of 
these five do not provide additional information regarding lessons imparted upon the 
incoming recruits. 
Upon his return to the United States, Cunningham understood that while the 
achievements of the Marine fliers in France and the Azores were notable in most cases, the 
Corps was not necessarily sold on the usefulness of aviation. In his September 1920 article, 
Cunningham plead his case in print. While he told of the successes of the fliers in France, 
Cunningham also laid out how aviation could benefit the infantry-focused service. The senior 
aviator knew that he had to ingratiate the ground Marines to his cause and demonstrate the 
despite the Naval aviator wings, pilots were Marines through and through.  
Conditions arising from the necessity of organizing and training in a short time an 
aviation section, with practically nothing to start with and the nature of the duty, 
which does not allow the older officers to keep their juniors continually under their 
observation and guidance as is allowed in ground work, may have prevented the 
instillation in the younger pilots of all the qualities necessary in a Marine officer to 
the same degree as is done in infantry work. We have realized this difficulty and have 
made an earnest effort to overcome it and believe, with some few exceptions, that we 
have been successful.353 
 
Some of the problems that plagued the FMAF, plagued the squadrons deployed in 
1919.  In February of that year, six land planes were sent to the 2d Brigade in the Dominican 
Republic and the following month, six land and six flying boast were deployed to the 1st 
Brigade in Haiti.354  Each organization experienced the same shortage of skilled men and 
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suitable aircraft as their FMAF counterparts had in France the previous year.355 
Cunningham’s ambassadors were the few First World War veterans of FMAF that remained 
in the Corps after the mass demobilization.  As previously stated, 103 Marines flew with, or 
were trained by the RAF during the First World War; of the 103, just thirteen Marines 
remained in aviation as pilots, and saw service in the Caribbean and Latin American 
locations, including Cunningham.356  While an admittedly a small number, these thirteen men 
were senior to the new pilots of the Corps and served as instructors by example and provided 
sound leadership, some of which was learned from the British.  Of the thirteen, seven served 
in multiple locations or repetitive tours in a single location.357 It is true that Marine Corps 
aviation remained relatively small during the Interwar period; however, the small size 
allowed for greater transfer of skills from the first generation of Marine aviators to the 
next.358  The best examples of transmission of experience and skills come from Marine Corps 
deployments to the Dominican Republic and Nicaragua in the 1920s.   
In December 1920, Cunningham was sent to the Dominican Republic to take charge 
of the 1st Air Squadron, which had arrived the year prior; at the same time the squadron’s 
Curtiss JN-6 ‘Jenny’ aircraft were replaced by the recognizable DeHavilland DH-
4B.359While the FMAF was in France, the antisubmarine warfare mission waned and the 
Marines adapted to bombing key positions, conducting reconnaissance flights, supporting 
ground forces and even air-to-air combat.  While the Marines did not meet the enemy in the 
air over the Dominican Republic, other familiar missions were conducted.   
In 1922, they helped ground commanders to control the operations of widespread 
patrols by dropping messages to them from the air and keeping the regimental 
headquarters informed of their whereabouts. The squadron conducted an aerial survey 
of the Dominican coastline and the important rivers and made photographic maps, of 
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obvious help in planning ground operations.360 
 
This was reminiscent of the survey and reconnaissance missions conducted in France during 
the First World War.   
While Marine aviation participated in the operations in the Dominican Republic, the 
greater impact of aviation was in Nicaragua. While the majority of the WWI FMAF veterans 
who remained in the service were deployed to the Dominican Republic, and even Haiti, those 
who were sent to Nicaragua made their abilities known quite well.361 In the Annual Report 
that covered the period of 1 July 1927 through 20 June 1928, submitted by the senior aviator, 
Major Ross E. Rowell, Marine Observation Squadrons 6 and 7 (VO-6M and VO-7M) 
performed ‘infantry liaison’ duty.  Like their counterparts in the Dominican Republic, the 
Marines in Nicaragua were equipped with the DH-4.362 Rowell reported the following: 
…troop commanders have depended almost entirely upon air liaison not only to 
control, to maintain contact with and to receive daily reports from these patrols 
[ground patrols by infantry], but to furnish them with medical and other emergency 
supplies and to provide them with the only combat support possible…363 
This action, support of ground forces from the air, repeats that mission of October 1918, and 
those conducted in 1922 in the Dominican Republic. Gunnery Sergeant Thomas L. 
McCullough, a veteran of the 2 October 1918 Belgian food drop, departed Nicaragua on 16 
June 1927 after a period of service.364 Another veteran of service with the RAF in Nicaragua 
at the time was then-Technical Sergeant Archie Paschal, who served with 218 Squadron 
during the First World War.365  It is very likely many of the tactics needed to support the 
infantry in Nicaragua had been learned in France and passed along by McCullough and 
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Paschal to those new Marine aviators.  Paschal served twice in Nicaragua alone and was 
awarded the Navy Cross for actions. 
 While the nature of warfare from the air in the interwar period did not include 
bombing submarine pens, it did include bombing enemy strongholds when infantry were 
unable to take the position or insufficient in number to accomplish the mission.  In 
Nicaragua, the Marines were forced to use aircraft alone to engage a well-entrenched enemy 
position.  ‘Four airplanes unsupported by any other force, attacked the outlaw position using 
fragmentation bombs, demolition bombs, machine guns and W. P. [white phosphorous] hand 
grenades.  The planes encountered heavy rifle and machine gun fire and a barrage of sky 
rockets…’366 These types of missions are reminiscent of the raids performed in 1918 by the 
Marines with the RAF, which were also often conducted while under heavy machine gun fire 
from the ground. 
The coalition of British and Americans, including that between the Marines and their 
RAF counterparts, was tenuous at times, strained by competing national interests and 
competing personal interests at all levels of warfare—from the governments at the strategic 
level, to the generals and admirals at the operational level, and down to the individual 
warfighter at the tactical level. With such conflicting interests, the entire coalition could have 
failed the instant it started.  It did not and set the Corps up for future success, particularly in 
Nicaragua, Haiti and the Dominican Republic.   
Through a review of the relations at the different levels, and through the discussion of 
the actual operations of the Marines with the RAF, one can see successful integration was not 
a forgone conclusion.  However, the actions of men like Sims and Cunningham, both devoted 
to the success of their respective missions, conflicts were overcome and effective in setting 
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the Marine Corps’ aviation component up for future success. The experience of integrating 
the American Marines with the RAF proved invaluable to the Marine Corps. The skills 
learned by the Americans, such as aerial resupply, remain today as a standard part of Marine 
Corps aviation doctrine; further, the act of providing pilots to serve with their allied country 
also remains today as part of normal operations of both the RAF and the USMC.  
Cunningham, in his September 1920 article, offered potential missions that aviation could 
provide to the Marine on the ground and commander of the forces, some of which were a 
direct result of operations in France.  In describing the effect of aviation upon the 
infantryman in trenches, Cunningham reminded his readers ‘who served at the front in the 
World War was given a rather impressive demonstration of the damage and demoralizing 
effect of bombs dropped from the air…’ and that trenches provided cover and concealment 
from aircraft bombs, but that in guerrilla warfare, bombs dropped from aircraft would be far 
more effective.367 Cunningham used the experiences of the FMAF in France to teach not only 
the senior leaders of the Corps but the new pilots via his article. 
  Cunningham conjured an aviation force out of nothing in the earliest days leading to 
the First World War, and then, with the British, helped create a viable aviation force that 
remains an integrated and integral part of the United States Marine Corps warfare capabilities 
today. Prior to the First World War and the integration of the FMAF into the RAF, the 
Marine Corps’ aviation forces were miniscule and inexperienced.  Upon the arrival of the 
FMAF in France, the Marines were incapable of flight without their aircraft. Had 
Cunningham accepted the offer to simply conduct logistic flights on behalf of the US Army, 
ferrying aircraft from supply depots to operating air bases, no practical combat experience 
would have been accomplished by the Marines. Without practical combat experience, the 
Corps’ aviation asset would have suffered stunted growth in skill and doctrine through the 
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interwar period of the 1920s and 1930s.  The initial combat experience gained under the 
British tutelage led to practical experiences in Haiti, Dominican Republic and Nicaragua for 
the Corps; these experiences were the basis for the doctrinal (air support of ground forces) 
advances made during this period, further, the pilots learned to adapt to the needs of the 
service while in active operations.  These skills and lessons were initially learned while in 
active service with the British in 1918.  Cunningham’s 1920 article attempts to demonstrate 
that the experiences of the FMAF in 1918 were valuable and useful to the Corps; he 
explained the similarities but also expanded the list of possible missions that aviation could 
achieve.  The senior Marine aviator knew that the experiences of the First World War were 
just the beginning of what aviation could do, and he expounded the virtues of radio 
communication, photographic reconnaissance, aerial intelligence gathering and providing 
assistance to field artillery in target acquisition.368 Had the FMAF not served with the British, 
rather simply provided a shuttle service to the Army, it is possible that Marine aviation may 
not have expanded, let alone survived the interwar period, and thereby not become the 
success it was in the Second World War.  The Corps may have continued to be relegated to 
constabulary and ship detachment duty, and in places such as Nicaragua, Haiti and the 
Dominican Republic the Navy could have as easily taken the role of providing aviation to 
support the ground forces.  However, Cunningham forged a path for aviation in the Marine 
Corps, supporting the infantry on the ground and expanded its abilities, in part due to the 
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Appendix A: Abbreviations and Definitions 
 
Abbreviation Definition 
1stLt First Lieutenant, US Marine Corps 
2dLt Second Lieutenant, US Marine Corps 
BrigGen Brigadier General, US Marine Corps 
Capt Captain, US Marine Corps 
CAPT Captain, US Navy 
Col Colonel, US Marine Corps 
DH-4 DeHavilland designed two-seat day-bomber aircraft  
DH-9 DeHavilland designed two-seat day-bomber aircraft 
FMAF First Marine Aviation Force.  The US Marine Corps aviation 
unit deployed to France in First World War under command of 
the Northern Bombing Group. 
LtCol Lieutenant Colonel, US Marine Corps 
Maj Major, US Marine Corps 
MajGen Major General, US Marine Corps 
MajGenCmdt 
Major General Commandant, senior officer of US Marine 
Corps 
NBG 
Northern Bombing Group. Combined US Navy and Marine 
Corps land plane bombing operation in northern France. 
RAF Royal Air Force 
RNAS Royal Naval Air Service. Royal Naval Air Service; 
predecessor organization to Royal Air Force when combined 
with Royal Flying Corps in 1918. 
USAS US Air Service.  US Army's aviation component serving with 
the American Expeditionary Forces. 
USMC United States Marine Corps 
USN United States Navy 
 
 
